


TO

BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE

OCTOBER 23, 1921



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Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

EDITED BY

CHARLES WILLIAM EMIL MILLER

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, HERMANN COLLITZ, TENNEY FRANK,
WILFRED P. MUSTARD, D. M. ROBINSON

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JANUARY, FEBRUARY, MARCH

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
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TO BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE

OCTOBER 23, 1921

On the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of your birth, it has seemed fitting to dedicate to you this forty-second volume of the American Journal of Philology. The volume is not extraordinary; except for the index of your Brief Mention, it does not differ from many others. A larger, more representative, and conceivably more ideal volume might have been produced. But bulk would have been prohibitive; to invite all your friends, impracticable; to discriminate among them, invidious. As it is, the regular size of the Journal has been adhered to; only papers that were on file have been printed; and the choice of the papers has been determined by the usual editorial considerations. On behalf of the contributors, then, I ask you graciously to accept this volume as a humble token of affection and regard; on behalf of the numerous company of pupils, colleagues and friends that are perforce not represented in these pages, I beg leave to assure you that they would have delighted to unite with the others in bringing loyal tribute; on behalf of all, I desire to extend to you the most hearty congratulations and to express the fervent wish that your future years may be blessed with abundance of health and happiness.

C. W. E. MILLER.



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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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WHOLE No. 165.

I.—AND AND OR.

Leo, *Hermes* XLII (1907) 52, remarking that in *Ciris* 395 and *Georg.* 4, 389 we should expect *vel* for *et*, says, "Darüber bedarf es einer Untersuchung." The matter has been touched on here and there—at most length, I think, by Wagner, *Quaest. Verg.* XXXVI, and by Wickham in his edition of Horace. Prof. W. A. Merrill, *A. J. P.* XXI (1900) 185, laid down a rule for the Lucretian use of *que* and *ve* with forms of *qui*; Klotz, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* XXXV (1915) 816, gave some examples of the Latin use of the copulative particle, for which editors, as he observes, are prone inconsiderately to substitute the disjunctive. The examples I give of both particles are drawn partly from other languages; it has seemed to me that even an imperfect comparison of other usage is helpful toward understanding variations or singularities in Latin.

Bentley on *Hor. Epod.* 5.33 explained *bis terque* as equivalent to *saepe*, *bis terve* as equivalent to *raro*. Wickham on *Hor. A. P.* 358, while professing to accept Bentley's definition, gave really a different turn to the phrases, rendering each not, like Bentley, by a less definite word, but with emphasis on the precise value of the numerals, *bis terque* by "twice or thrice at least," *bis terve* by "twice or thrice at most"; similarly Tyrrell on *Cic. Q. fr.* 3.8.6. But Latin expresses "at most" by *summum* or (*cum*) *plurimum*; "at least" by (*cum*) *minimum*; when these limiting words are not used, the combination of two numerals may have, not in Latin only, an indefinite sense, the notion of comparative rarity or frequency being inferred from the context. Two interpretations in Bentley's sense of such combinations are

Schol. Plat. Gorg. 498 E παροιμία δις καὶ τρίς τὸ καλὸν ὅτι χρὴ περὶ τῶν καλῶν πολλάκις λέγειν, and Dig. 1.3.5 ad ea potius debet aptari ius quae et frequenter et facile quam quae perraro eveniunt. τὸ γὰρ ἅπαξ ἢ δις, ut ait Theophrastus, παραβαίνουσιν οἱ νομοθέται. But an implication not of rarity but of comparative frequency is contained in Thuc. 5.10.9 ἡμόνοντο καὶ δις ἢ τρίς προσβαλόντα, Cic. Att. 6.1.2 bis terve ὑπομεψυμοίρους litteras miserat, and Shakespeare, Henry V, 5.1.65 "I have seen you gleeing and galling at this gentleman twice or thrice"; cp. Mart. 8.3.1 sex septemve libelli est nimium, which means "so many as," not "so few." The Oxford Dictionary recognizes an indefinite sense for both the "and" and the "or" combinations: VII 118 "Once or twice, a few times; once and again, more than once, twice (or oftener)"; X 527 "Once or twice, twice or thrice, used indefinitely: a few times."

In strictness "or" gives only a choice between two numbers, "and" expresses either (1) the actual attainment of the higher number or (2) the desirability of its attainment: (1) N. T. Thess. 1.2.18 ἠβελήσαμεν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ ἅπαξ καὶ δις, Cic. Att. 14.18.1 adductus sum tuis et unis et alteris litteris,¹ Plin. Ep. 4.3.1 semel atque iterum consul fuisti, Macaulay, *Horatius*, "And thrice and four times tugged amain"; (2) Plat. Gorg. 498 E καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασὶ καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν, Georg. 2.399 terque quaterque solum scindendum. But it seems to me impossible to make a distinction between the use of the two particles which shall be valid for the following paired passages: Thuc. 1.82.2 διελθόντων ἐτῶν καὶ δύο καὶ τριῶν, 4.124.4 δύο μὲν ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἐπέσχον; Hor. C. 1.31.13 ter et quater anno, Suet. Aug. 78 in illo temporis spatio ter aut quater; Mart. 10.11.6 lotam, ut multum, terque quaterque togam,² 12.3.17 versus

¹ There is, I think, a like use of *et unus et alter* in Hor. S. 1.6.101 where the first *et* is sometimes explained as postpositive with *ducendus*. Cicero probably means *duabus*; Horace's phrase is indefinite like Martial's, 1.103.6 calceus est sarta terque quaterque cute, where also the particle is doubled. Latin is not averse to a doubling which looks odd because our stock rendering of the doubled particle is not applicable; so of *et* Liv. 35.29.3, 40.16.8, Trebell. Gallien. 18.1; of *nec* Hor. A. P. 8, Paul. Sent. 1.12.4 in caput domini patronive nec servus nec libertus interrogari potest; of *vel* ibid. 2.9.1 servus vel filius familias . . . in solidum vel patrem vel dominum obligat.

² A passage which tells against Wickham's view; for *ut multum*,

duo tresve legantur; Tac. D. 21 vix in una et altera oratiuncula, G. 6 vix uni alterive. The ultimate concurrence in meaning of the two combinations—or rather the ultimate trespassing of “and” on the domain of “or”—is sharply illustrated by Plut. Lysand. 10 δύο καὶ τρεῖς τρήρεις ἃς ἐπεμψε κατασκόπους beside Xen. Anab. 4.7.5 δύο ἢ τρεῖς ὀπλισμένους and by Cat. Agr. 65 postridie aut post tertium diem quam (olea) lecta erit, (oleum) facito . . . si gelicidia erunt cum oleam coges, triduum atque quadriduum post oleum facito. The desperate attempts to find for Soph. El. 726 τελοῦντες ἕκτον ἐβδομὸν τ’ ἤδη δρόμον an explanation which shall not admit an illogical “and” in place of a logical “or” show how the grammatical mind revolts against such a license. Musgrave’s “τε pro ἢ,” like Serv. Aen. 2.37 que pro ve posuit, is too crudely expressed; it is better to say that the two combinations may often be used indifferently and that this indifference is sometimes carried further than a scrupulous conscience can approve.

A correction is made by *potius* with a disjunctive, “or rather”: Cic. Verr. 6.74, Att. 4.1.1, Fam. 12.29.1. An emphatic addition, sometimes virtually a correction, is made by *atque adeo* “and indeed”: Liv. 10.5.14, Cic. Verr. 3, 157. The two expressions start from different points of view, but it may happen that neither Latin nor English would find any difficulty in substituting the one for the other; compare Verr. 4.71 redemptores decumarum atque adeo aratorum dominum with 6.76 hostem populi Romani seu potius communem hostem, and Verr. 4.11 magna atque adeo maxima with Q. fr. 2.13.1 magna vel potius maxima. When the second word or phrase is not a more emphatic expression of the first, but a contradiction of it, our idiom demands the disjunctive particle, as in Verr. 4.173 quae est ergo ista ratio aut quae potius ista amentia. Even here Latin admits the copulative: Cic. R. A. 29 hoc consilio atque adeo hac amentia, Caecil. 68 hoc institui atque adeo institutum referri, Rhet. ad Her. 4.36 vicerunt atque adeo victi sunt. See Tyrrell on Att. 1.7.9, 15.3.3, and contrast Georg. 1.24 with Ov. Tr. 3.1.77. The change of sense, the exclusion of the first

virtually equivalent to *summum*, is used with the *que*, not the *ve*, combination. But I have not found *summum* or *plurimum* used with the copulative particle. (*Terque quaterque* is Schneidewin’s reading and that of the MSS; *terve quaterve* Friedl., Lindsay, following Haupt.)

word or phrase, may be brought out more clearly by a following explanatory clause; so Rhet. ad Her. l. c., Verr. 3.89, cp. Plin. Ep. 2.17.25. The equivalence of the two corrective phrases is shown by interchange, *sive* with *adeo*, *ac*, rarely *et*, with *potius*²: Verr. 2.87 huius improbissimi furti sive adeo nefariae praedae, R. A. 110 fide ac potius perfidia. The equivalence of *adeo* and *potius* with the copulative appears from Cic. Planc. 48 posco atque adeo flagito, Legg. 1.5 postulatur et flagitatur potius. The same corrective sense belongs to *immo*: Att. 6.2.7 Brutum tuum, immo nostrum, Fam. 12.16.1 adulescente tuo atque adeo nostro, Plin. Ep. 6.18.3 Firmanis tuis ac iam potius nostris; cp. Sen. Ep. 58.1 with Plin. Ep. 4.18.1, Quintil. 2.2.8 with Fam. 4.3.1. Occasional minglings occur: Rhet. ad Her. 4.55, Cic. Clu. 172 atque adeo potius, Lucr. 1.1019 sive adeo potius, Greg. Tur. H. Fr. praef. atque immo potius.

Familiar to us is the use of the copulative in "killed and wounded" and like expressions. Sir John Moore, *Diary*, uses "or" only twice, where the loss was of the whole force: ii 14 "Not a man of the French escaped being killed, wounded or taken," 96 "He had captured or sunk them all." In twenty-four passages, where the loss is partial, Moore uses "and": ii 9 "Many officers and men were killed and wounded. Our loss this day amounted to thirteen hundred killed and disabled." Mr. Fortescue, *Hist. Brit. Army*, vols. ii-iii, employs "and" much oftener than "or," (102:12, if I have counted rightly), but uses them indifferently of a partial loss: ii 329 "Nearly four hundred had fallen killed and wounded," 380 "Twenty-eight officers fell killed or wounded." In iii 446 he writes, "The gunners were killed or wounded almost to a man" (practically all); on the other hand, Clarendon, the third volume of whose *History of the Rebellion* I have glanced through for comparison, has "He killed and wounded the whole party except some ten," and again "He killed and wounded and dispersed them all." The few examples in Grant's *Memoirs* show his use to agree with Moore's; so too the four instances in Caesar: B. G. 5.43.5, 7.88.7 *atque* with *magnus numerus*, 2.25.1, B. C. 3.38.4 *aut* with *omnes*. The author of B. Alex., like Mr. Fortescue, uses either particle

² *Ac* with *potius* we translate varyingly by "or," "and," or "but"; Holden *De Officiis, Index*, says too bluntly "*ac* = *sed*."

with respect to a partial loss (18.4 *que*, 46.5 *aut*), the disjunctive of a loss of the whole, 76.4. But B. Afr. 25.3 *capti interfecitque sunt omnes*, like Clarendon.⁴ My incomplete collection of examples from Livy shows twenty-four instances of the copulative, twenty-one of the disjunctive.⁵ I have not found him using the copulative with *omnis* (cp. 24.16.4, 37.24.10); but he does not hesitate to employ it of a total loss, so 36.44.6 *deiectis caesisque propugnatoribus*, which is less clear than 26.40.8 *pulsis custodibus aut caesis*. Finally I note Cic. Fam. 15.4.8 *occisi captique*, Vell. 2.12.5 *caesa aut capta*, 46.1 *caesis et captis*.

We have here two modes of distributing losses under the different heads—by summing up with “and” and by dividing with “or.” A third way is by the asyndetic repetition of nouns or adverbs: B. Afr. 50.4 *quos Caesaris equites consecuti partim interfecerunt, partim vivorum sunt potiti*, Liv. 33.36.3 *multi occisi, multi capti*. Outside of the military sphere an illustration of all three forms of expression is afforded by local adverbs or phrases. In Latin, besides the asyndetic *huc illuc* we find often *huc atque illuc*; the disjunctive I have noted only in Sen. D. 5.6.6 *in hanc aut illam partem transferre*, Tac. G. 44 *mutabile, ut res poscit, hinc vel illinc remigium*, Plin. Ep. 2.17.18 *hac vel illac cadit*.⁶ The distributive force of the particles is brought out by comparison of Tennyson’s “This way and that dividing the swift mind” with the passage on which it is based, Æn. 8.20 *atque animum nunc huc celerem, nunc dividit illuc*, and of Cic. de Or. 1.184 *huc atque illuc intuentem* (Bunyan, “he looked

⁴ Unless this is an abbreviated way of saying *capta oppida interfecitque sunt omnes*. In 61.3 *pulsi convulneratique* the writer perhaps means that all were wounded as well as routed: this at any rate is what is expressly denoted in 52.3 *eos convulneratos usque in castra regia repellerunt multosque ex iis interfecerunt*. The other instances in B. Afr. are, of the copulative 17.2, 41.1, of the disjunctive 63.5, 85.6, 93.3, 95.2.

⁵ *Atque* 34.32.18; *et* 2.17.2, 35.29.3, 38.49.11, 40.16.8; *que* 2.47.9, 5.26.8, 6.2.12, 23.1.9, 25.41.7, 28.6.5, *ib.* 16.6, 31.41.14, *ib.* 42.6, 48.11, 32.12.3, 35.29.7, *ib.* 30.11, 36.19.6, *ib.* 44.6, 38.17.6, *ib.* 39.2, 42.66.2, 45.1.9; *aut* 10.45.11, 24.16.4, *ib.* 20.6, 40.14, 25.1.4, 26.40.8, 29.33.6, *ib.* 34.16, 30.6.8, 31.21.17, *ib.* 23.8, 36.9.11, 37.24.10, *ib.* 30.8, 58.3, 38.23.3, *ib.* 5, *ib.* 39.3, 47.6, 41.11.6, *ib.* 28.8.

⁶ I do not include Ter. Andr. 266, where the meaning is not, “now this way, now that,” but “in the direction in which you choose to turn it.”

this way and that") with Att. 13.25.3 *Academiam volaticam . . . modo huc modo illuc*. As to Georg. 4.388 (Cir. 395) *qui piscibus aequor et . . . curru metitur equorum*, it may be set beside Ov. Tr. 2.527 *sic madidos digitis siccatur Venus uda capillos et modo maternis tecta videtur aquis*, where the insertion of *modo* makes clearer the fact that the goddess is represented, not as doing two things at once, but in two separate poses. And Stat. Silv. 1.2.135 *huic pennas et cornua sumeret aethrae rector* is also a good parallel to the Virgilian passage, if we remember that the latter might be paraphrased, not only by *modo—modo*, but also by asyndetic repetition of the pronoun. If Statius had written *huic pennas, huic cornua* he would have made somewhat more definite what, even with *et*, we know to be meant, that the two disguises are alternatives. Of course *vel* or *aut* might be used, but *et* is not a substitute for one of these; it expresses a different manner of envisaging the alternatives.

This difference in the point of view from which associated facts may be regarded, and the consequent different expression by one or other of the two particles, is further illustrated by the following examples, in which phrases of a like tenor exhibit varyingly the disjunctive or the copulative: Livy 31.11.17 *si quid ad eas addi, demi mutarive vellet*, Thuc. 5.23.6 ἢν δέ τι δοκῇ προσθεῖναι καὶ ἀφελεῖν; B. G. 5.30.3 *aut ferro aut fame intereant*, B. Alex. 60.1 *ferro flammaque consumerentur*; Tac. Ann. 1.9 *vita eius varie extollebatur arguebaturve*, ib. 25 *diversis animorum motibus pavebant terrebantque*; ib. 28 *prout splendidior obscuriorve laetari aut maerere*, Plin. N. H. 16.19 *pro differentia generum breviora vel longiora*, Ter. Hec. 380 *ut res dant sese, ita magni atque humiles sumus*, Sep. D. 1.1.4 *subeunt ampliores minoresque, prout illas lunare sidus elicit*; Plin. N. H. 14.52 *in Rubrum litus Indicumve merces petitas*, ibid. *digna opera quae in Caecubis Setinisque agris proficeret*, Catull. 45.5 *solus in Libya Indiaque tosta | caesio veniam obvius leoni*, Ulp. Dig. 49.15.24 *ab hostibus autem captus, ut puta a Germanis et Parthis*; Plin. N. H. 2.229 *fons eodem quo Nilus modo ac pariter cum eo decrescit augeturve*, ibid. *pariter cum aestu maris crescunt minuunturque*; Tac. D. 35 *tyrannidarum praemia aut etc.*, ib. 1 *causidici et etc.*; Bacon, Essay XXIX "Princes are like to heavenly bodies, which cause good or evil times," Essay XI "In place there is licence to do good and

evil"; Gardiner, *Hist. of England* I, 48 "Every political movement involved a question of life or death to the nation," *N. Y. Times*, Oct. 27, 1919 "This is a matter of life and death to the women and children of the miners' families"; Moore, *Diary* i 302 "prevent them from plundering and ill-using the inhabitants," Fortescue i 57 "robbery of churches or peasants"; *ibid.* 86 "rejecting all who were physically deficient or imperfectly armed," p. 126 "for the relief of poor, indigent and aged soldiers."

I doubt if "and" in Catull. l. c. and in the common English phrase, "a matter of life and death," can be defended as logical; here the parallelism of the two particles seems to have brought about the same result, trespass by "and" on the field of "or," that we found to occur with numerals and in the corrective phrases. In all the other cases "and" is normal; Ulpian's participle is equivalent to a relative clause, so that a *Germanis et Parthis* (captus) = *qui a Germanis quique a Parthis captus est*; cp. *Æn.* 5.67, 6.612 (but 610 *aut qui*), *Sall. C.* 14.2 (but 3 *aut* with participles).

The fact that distribution may be expressed by contrasted nouns or adverbs, as well as by the particles, leads to a mingling of expressions; the noun or adverb is (1) combined with, (2) set over against, the particle. (1) *Cic. de Or.* 3.198 *terna aut bina aut nonnulli singula verba dicebant*, *Plin. N. H.* 10.112 *percusso semel, aliquae et gemino ictu, aëre feruntur* (the fact that Pliny uses *et* = *etiam*, not *et* = *que*, seems to me to make no difference in the general character of the expression); (2) *Cic. de Div.* 2.121 *Venerium iaciat aliquando, nonnumquam iterum ac tertium*, *Verg. Buc.* 1.65 f., 10.130 f., *Plin. N. H.* 7.38 *alius septimo mense, alius octavo et* (that is *alius alio mense*; we might say "and so on") *usque ad initium undecimi*, 10.113 *sine voce non volant multae aut e contrario semper in volatu silent*,⁷ 14.15 *hic purpureo lucent colore, illic fulgent roseo nitentque viridi*, *Spartian. Hel.* 5.10 *Boream alium, alium*

⁷ "An *aliae* pro *aut*" Mayhoff, an unnecessary conjecture which interprets the sense. Cp. *Serv. Aen.* 2.124 *multi bis intelligendum, id. ib.* 10.131 *subaudiendum alii atque alii*. Noteworthy is the shift in *Liv.* 45.31.1 *in qua cognitione magis utra pars Romanis, utra regi, favisset, quaesitum est quam utri fecissent iniuriam aut acceperant*.

Notum, et item Aquilonem aut Circium ceterisque nominibus appellans.

In both Latin and English the distributive disjunctive is a convenient abbreviation for "the former—the latter" and like phrases: Tac. G. 1 a Sarmatis Dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus separantur, ib. 4 frigora atque inedia caelo solove adsuerunt (tolerare), Ann. 1.55 insigni utrumque perfidia in nos aut fide, Moore, *Diary* i 307 "Some people were observed on foot or on horseback," Grant, *Memoirs* i 314 "Most of the killed and wounded fell outside . . . and were buried or cared for by Buckner," Bacon, Ess. xxix "When the Lacedaemonians and Athenians made war to set up or pull down democracies and oligarchies"—where the monosyllable saves the author from having to write "the former to pull down democracies and set up oligarchies, the latter to pull down oligarchies and set up democracies."

The use of the distributive copulative with numerals is especially to be noted: Michelet "On les pendit par vingt et par trente" (translating the words of a medieval chronicler, illic viginti illic triginta . . . suspendens), Thuc. 4.32.3 διέστησαν κατὰ διακοσίους τε καὶ πλείους, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐλάσσους, Xen. Anab. 4.8.21 τρίτῃ δὲ καὶ τετάρτῃ ἀνίσταντο ("some on the third, some on the fourth day"), Plat. Phaed. 63 Ε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοὺς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας, Moore "It was not until the 11th and 12th that we reached this bay" ("we" being the different ships of the fleet), Dana, *Two Years* "buy shoes at three and four dollars a pair," ibid. "These horses were bought at from two to six and eight dollars apiece," Varr. R. R. 2.8.3 tricenis ac quadragenis milibus admissarii aliquot venierunt, B. G. 3.15.1 singulas binae ac ternae naves circumsteterant (Holmes, *Conquest of Gaul* p. 91 "Two or more galleys rowed up close to one of the enemy's ships"), B. G. 5.14.4, Liv. 28.2.8, Sen. Controv. 1.9 praef. 4, Plin. N. H. 8.35 (dracones) quaternos quinosque inter se cratium modo amplexos, 16.202, Capitol. Gord. 19.3, Vopisc. Aurelian. 26.4. So "and" is used in English with "by" and "in": Shakesp. W. T. 1.2.438 "And will by twos and threes at several posterns Clear them o' the city," *New Statesman* "The police are never allowed to go out in the daytime except in twos and threes." Noteworthy is Bacon's phrase, Ess. xxi "Like Sibulla's

offer, which at first offereth the commodity at full, then consumeth part and part, and still holds up the price."

English does not, I think, exhibit the association of the two particles with each other in the same sentence, which in Latin appears in two ways, (1) different combinations having different particles, (2) the particles varying in the same combination: (1) Sall. C. 14.3 quos manus atque lingua periurio aut sanguine civili alebat, Suet. Jul. 26 nullum largitionis aut officiorum genus publice privatimque omisit, Liv. 21.1.2, Tac. D. 15 *fin.*, H. 1.62, Sil. 1.427; (2) Catull. 25.3 vel pene languido senis situque araneoso, Val. Fl. 8.90 ceu refluens Padus aut septem proiectus in amnes Nilus et Hesperium veniens Alpheus in orbem, Hor. C. 3.27.2 ff., Prop. 2.1.27 ff., Ov. Tr. 1.11.15, Plin. N. H. 14.119, Sen. D. 4.3.2, Luc. 2.199 f.; cp. in Tac. D. 18 quosque, in Sen. D. 2.9.2 quaeque, following on *aut*.

The use of *et* or *que* after a negative was recognized by Bentley on Luc. 2.354; cp. Luc. 1.65, 5.454, Plin. N. H. 8.28 nec amplius quam semel gignere pluresque quam singulos, Mart. 2.11.9 nihil colonus vilicusque decoxit, Tibull. 2.4.17, Ov. Her. 2.90, Sil. 1.427. It is found also in English: Bacon "it seeth not dangers and inconveniences," Clarendon "he was not received and avowed," Stevenson "not pained by personal attention and remark," Dowden "with no private and personal motive." I believe that the disjunctive is more usual in both languages, but have no statistics. In French *ni* is regular, and Littré notes no other usage; but Plattner, *Ausführl. Gram. d. franz. Spr.* (a reference for which I am indebted to my colleague, Professor E. B. Davis) recognizes the employment of *et* and *ou*; add to his examples Voltaire, *Poésies Mêlées* 136 "Jamais dans Athènes et dans Rome On n'eut de plus beaux jours ni de plus dignes prix"; Carlyle, quoting and translating this, turns *et* into "or." In Latin the two particles may alternate with each other and with *non* or *neque*: Georg. 2.495 ff., 4.210 ff., Prop. 2.1.19 ff., Stat. Ach. 1.436 f., Sil. 1.171 ff., Mart. 6.42.3 ff., Tac. D. 40 ne Macedonum quidem ac Persarum aut ullius gentis.

Under the same head belongs the use of the copulative with *sine* and in questions. Of the latter I have only three examples: Mart. 7.95.5, Ov. Tr. 2.344, Cic. Fam. 3.11.2; contrast (though not interrogative) Fam. 15.4.14. The former, as is well known, varies with the use of the disjunctive; Tac. Ann. 1.1 sine ira et

studio, Agr. 1 sine gratia aut ambitione; I have not collected examples. "And" is found in earlier English after *sans*, Oxf. Dict. VIII, pt. 2.98; and I find in Shakespeare, K. J. 3.4.51, "Without eyes, ears, and harmful sound of words." But the other six Shakespearian examples that I have been able to collect from Schmidt's *Lexicon* and Bartlett's *Concordance* have "or"; and contrast the linking of synonyms by the copulative in Sall. Iug. 41.9, Liv. 26.48.11, with English "without stop or stay" (Prior, Scott). German renders French *sans peur et sans reproche*, or *sans peur ni reproche*, by *ohne Furcht und Tadel*; Muret-Sanders, ii, 1523, cite *ohne Hut und Stock*, with which compare Suet. Aug. 10 sine paludamento equoque and contrast Dana's "without shoes or stockings." Goethe's "ohne Spielerei und Anmassung" shows the copulative with words of different signification, Bacon's "without insolency or bravery" and Milton's "without all doubt or controversy" the disjunctive with words of kindred meaning.

Wagner explained *que* in *Æn.* 2.37 as marking a subdivision: "prior quidem sententia in duas solvitur . . . aut abolendam machinam . . . aut terebrandam censent." The following passages might perhaps be cited in confirmation: Vell. 1.12.3 qui nihil in vita nisi laudandum aut fecit aut dixit ac sensit, Sen. D. 2.10.4 dolor corporis et debilitas aut amicorum liberorumque amissio et patriae bello flagrantis calamitas (where, however, Wagner's theory could not apply to the second *et*), Tac. Agr. 22 nullum . . . castellum aut vi hostium expugnatum aut pactione ac fuga desertum,* Dig. 1.12.1.10 contemni se a liberto dixerit vel convicium se ab eo passum liberosque suos vel uxorem, 4.6.1.1 cum is metus aut sine dolo malo rei publicae causa abesset inve vinculis servitute hostiumque potestate esset. But a similar effect may be produced by a disjunctive which varies with a copulative or by a change from one disjunctive to another: (1) Plin. N. H. 11.212 bisulca scissive in digitos pedibus et cornigera, 16.140 venatus classisve et imagines rerum, Capitol. Gord. 21.4 quos servos habuerit . . . et quos amicos et quot paenulas quotve clamydes; (2) Plin. N. H. 1. praef. 12

*Professor Stuart's rendering, in his edition, "*retreat as a result of negotiations; hence, capitulation*," raises the question whether *fuga* can denote a retreat without any pursuit, actual or feared. I do not know if there are examples of such a sense.

excessus aut orationes sermonesve aut casus mirabiles vel eventus varios, 11.13 *aut temporum locorumve mutata ratio est aut erraverunt priores*, 17.166 *iugum fit pertica aut harundine aut crine funiculove*, Sen. D. 4.35.5 *quales sunt hostium vel ferarum caede madentium aut ad caedem euntium adspectus*. The effect thus created of emphasizing the connection in signification or construction between two members of a series might seem thus to be brought about, not especially by the employment of the copulative, but by any variation of the particles, were it not that they vary also in cases where no such effect is produced; it would seem therefore as if the variation were made only for the sake of syllabic harmony or to avoid monotonous repetition.

Divergence of Latin from English usage occurs with the disjunctive as well as with the copulative: Liv. 24.45.3 *ad Faleriorum Pyrrhive proditorem tertium transfugis documentum esset*, Mart. 11.31.5 *has prima feret alterave cena, | has cena tibi tertia reponet*, Liv. 26.8.6 *aut quanto* (commented on by Weissenborn), Tac. D. 33 *didici quid aut illi scirint aut nos nesciamus*, G. 38 *ut ament amenturve*, Agr. 10 *adcrecere aut resorberi*. On Plin. N. H. 10.123 *adeo satis iusta causa populo Romano visa est exsequiarum ingenium avis aut supplicii de cive Romano*, Mayhoff queries "*An potius ac?*" Pliny's *aut* is not odder than Horace's *et* in Sat. 1.6.42, which editors pass by without comment. Whether we render *atque*, *ibid.* 77, by "and" or "or," depends on whether we render *quivis* by "every" or by "any." Where each of the two points of view, that which couples and that which disjoins, is equally correct, the only question that arises is whether in a given language idiomatic usage admits either particle indifferently or excludes the one in favor of the other. The occasional use of either in a context where it is logically indefensible seems to arise from pushing parallelism too far; because the two particles may often be employed at choice, they are sometimes treated as possible alternatives in cases where such treatment is unjustified.

W. H. KIRK.

II.—DIE ENDUNG DES PARTIZIPIUM PRÄTERITI DER GERMANISCHEN STARKEN VERBEN.

Jede bisher vorgebrachte Erklärung dieser Frage geht von dem von Paul¹ aufgestellten Gesichtspunkt aus, dass hier alte (d. h. vorgerm.) Stammabstufung zwischen indogerm. *ē:ō* = germ. *ē(i):ā* vorliege. Für diese Auffassung aber bieten weder die verwandten Sprachen noch das Germanische einen genügenden Anhalt, da ja beim Part. prät. Stammabstufung im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes (d. h. fest geregelter, mit dem indogerm. Akzent zusammenhängender Wechsel des Suffixvokales) nirgends begegnet. Vielmehr spricht das Zeugnis der germanischen Sprachen insofern gegen Pauls Ansicht, als im Part. prät. der starken Verben die Suffixsilbe *-in-* neben *-an-* dem Gotischen² noch fremd ist, und erst in der jüngeren Epoche der germanischen

¹ H. Paul, "Zur Geschichte des germanischen Vocalismus," *Beitr.*, VI, S. 239 ff.

² Zwar begegnet im Gotischen die Suffixsilbe *-in-* beim Adj. (vgl. *fulg-in-s* 'verborgen'), aber niemals beim Part. prät. der starken Verben. Es liegt kein Grund vor, z. B. altn. *folg-inn* Part. prät. zu *fela* Inf. (= got. *filhan*) auf got. *fulgins* (d. h. urgerm. **fulg-in-*) zurückzuführen, wie dies Paul (ibid., S. 240) und Noreen (*I. F.*, XIV, S. 401) wollen, denn dem altn. *folg-inn* stehen die westgerm. Formen dieses Part. prät. mit *a*-Brechung (vgl. ahd.-alts. *-folhan*, angs. *-folen*) zur Seite. Hier geht das Nord- und Westgerm. offenbar nicht auf got. *fulg-in-s* Adj., sondern auf got. *fulh-an-s* (d. h. urgerm. **fulg-an-*) Part. prät. zurück. Wenn es "eine starke Zumutung" ist, altn. *folginn* von got. *fulgins* zu trennen, wie dies Noreen (ibid.) meint, so ist es eine noch stärkere Zumutung, altn. *folginn* z. B. von angs. *-folen* und somit von westgerm. **folg-an* zu trennen. Daraus, dass im Got. das Adj. *fulg-ins* und das Subst. *aig-in* (Neutr. sg. des Adj.) die Suffixsilbe *-in-* aufweisen, folgt nicht, dass sie alte Part. prät. vertreten; sie können doch selbständige Adjektivbildungen sein, die aber zu demselben Stamm (d. h. **fulg-*, **aig-*) gehören wie die Part. prät. Es ist nicht einmal ausgemacht, dass das *-in-* der Adjektiva und das *-an-* der Partizipien im Got. zu einander im Ablautsverhältnisse stehen. Professor Collitz (briefliche Mitteilung) hält es für möglich, dass das *-i-* der Adjektiva auf indogerm. *i* zurückgeht, wie bei den altind. Adjektiven mit "Suffix *-in-*" (z. B. *ārmín*, 'wogend,' neben *ārmí-* (m.), oder *rgmín-*, 'singend,' neben *rgmíya-* 'preiswürdig').

Sprachgeschichte auftritt, der die schriftlichen Denkmäler des Nordischen und der westgermanischen Sprachen angehören.

Es handelt sich im Germanischen offenbar nicht um 'altes' *-in-* neben *-an-* im Part. prät. der starken Verben, sondern nur um altes *-an-*, wie es im Gotischen vorliegt, gegenüber einer Neuerung des Nord- und Westgerm. in jüngerer Zeit. Ich werde also im folgenden zu zeigen versuchen, dass dieses *-in-* (bezw. *-en-*) im Part. prät. des Nord- und Westgerm. nicht auf das vermeintliche 'alte' *-in-* des Urgerm., wie es z. B. im gotischen Adj. *fulgins* vorliegt, zurückzuführen, sondern als jüngere Entwicklung aus ursprünglichem *-an-* zu erklären ist.³ Da die altn. Part. prät. auf *-in-: -en-* sich nicht von den westgerm. Part. prät. auf *-in-: -en-* trennen lassen, so werde ich zunächst die Verhältnisse I) im Nordgerm. und II) im Westgerm. kurz besprechen und dann schliesslich III) diese Verhältnisse mit einander in Zusammenhang setzen.

I. Die Suffizsilbe *-in-: -en-* der Part. prät. der starken Verben im Nordgermanischen.

Kock⁴ stellt die Hypothese auf, dass dieses *-in-: -en-* im altn. Part. prät. auf altes *-an-* zurückgehe, abgesehen vielleicht von denjenigen Fällen, wo die Wurzelsilbe des Part. prät. ein *i* (oder *ai*) enthielt. Hier könnte nach Kock bei freier Wahl zwischen ursprünglichem *-an-* und ursprünglichem *-in-* (auf Grund des Wurzelsvokals, d. h. infolge der Vokalharmonie) dem Suffix *-i(e)n-* 'altes' *-in-* zugrunde liegen; d. h. also nur bei der 1. Ablautsreihe (wie z. B. *bit-i(e)nn* aus **bit-in-r*) und bei gewissen reduplizierenden Verben (wie z. B. *heit-i(e)nn* aus **hait-in-r*).

³Die folgende Erklärung der Entwicklung des jüngeren *-in-: -en-* aus altgerm. *-an-* gründet sich zum Teil auf die mir brieflich mitgeteilten Ansichten des Herrn Professor Collitz, namentlich hinsichtlich der Verhältnisse im Anglo-Friesischen.

⁴A. Kock, "Der A-Umlaut in den altnord. Sprachen," *Beitr.* XXIII, S. 497 ff., und "Zur Frage nach dem Suffix der Participia Passivi altnordischer starker Verba," *I. F.*, XXXIII, S. 337-350. Mit Kock nehmen Walde (*Die germ. Auslautsgesetze*, S. 94), Hultman (*Hälsingelagen och Upplandslagens ärfdabalk* I, Helsingfors, 1908) und Heusler (*Altisl. Elementarbuch*, § 119) an, dass das urgerm. *-an-* des Part. prät. im Altn. zu *-en-* (später *-in-*) geworden sei. Walde ist jedoch der Meinung, dass schon zu urgerm. Zeit *a* in einer Zwischensilbe *lautgesetzlich* in *i* übergegangen sei, eine Auffassung, die mit Kocks Theorie über das Auftreten des Suffixes *-in-* grosse Ähnlichkeit hat.

Die belegte Form *hait-IN-AR* der Runeninschrift von *Tanum* führt er als Beweis für diesen Lautstand zu urnord. Zeit an, der bei freier Wahl zwischen *-in-* und *-an-* dem urgerm. Lautstand entsprechen soll.

Da aber im Ost- und Westgerm. die Suffixsilbe *-an-* bei der 1. Ablautsreihe tatsächlich vorliegt (vgl. got. *bit-ANS*, *hait-ANS*, ahd. *gi-bizz-AN*, *gi-heiz-AN*), ist Kock zu der Annahme gezwungen, dass der Vokal *-a-* hier ursprünglich (d. h. im Urgerm.) nicht bestanden habe, sondern aus den übrigen Ablautsreihen in die 1. Ablautsreihe analogisch übertragen worden sei. Dabei ist er also genötigt, die Verhältnisse im Ost- und Westgerm. für jüngere Entwicklung als diejenigen im Nordgerm. zu halten und infolge dessen die zeitlichen Verhältnisse der einzelnen Sprachen umzustossen.

Kocks Hypothese rührt offenbar aus dem Bestreben her, den Mangel der *a*-Brechung im Part. prät. der 1. Ablautsreihe im Nord- und Westgerm. zu erklären. Dass hier aber der Mangel der *a*-Brechung nicht auf einem ursprünglichen (d. h. urgerm.) Verhältnis zwischen dem Vokal der Suffixsilbe und dem Vokal der Stammsilbe beruht, sondern der Wirkung des erst später entwickelten gemeinsam nord- und westgerm. Gesetzes der *Ablautsharmonie* zuzuschreiben ist, geht aus Professor Collitz' ⁵ Begründung dieses Gesetzes klar hervor. Der Mangel der *a*-Brechung ist hier also nicht aus urgerm. Verhältnissen, sondern aus den jüngeren nord- und westgerm. Verhältnissen zu erklären.

Ferner beweist die Form *hait-IN-AR* der Runeninschrift von *Tanum* nichts für ein ursprüngliches Gesetz der Vokalharmonie (zwischen dem *-i-* der Suffixsilbe und dem *i*-Laut der Wurzelsilbe), weil sich hier das *-in-* als nachträgliche Schwächung aus altem *-an-* in Mittelsilben erklären lässt, gerade wie im Altangs. oder im Ahd. (vgl. II, a, c). Wenn weiter die Form *slag-IN-AR* der *Möjebroer* Inschrift richtig überliefert ist, ⁶

⁵H. Collitz, "Das Analogiegesetz der westgermanischen Ablautsreihen," *M. L. N.*, XX, S. 65-68, March 1905; noch eingehender erläutert in "Segimer oder: Germanische Namen in keltischem Gewande," *J. E. G. Ph.*, VI, S. 297 ff., Jan. 1907.

⁶Vgl. A. Noreen, "Suffixablaut im Altnordischen," *I. F.*, XIV, S. 401. Gegen Noreen liest Kock ("Zur Frage nach dem Suffix der Participia Passivi usw.," *I. F.*, XXXIII, S. 348-350) *slaxinar* statt *slaginar*

spricht sie gegen Kocks Theorie, weil trotz des *a* der Wurzelsilbe die Suffixsilbe ein *-i-* aufweist. Wenn die Form *slag-IN-AR*, woraus später altisl. *slegi(e)nn* entwickelt ist, das Part. prät. von *slá* (Inf.) zu urnord. Zeit darstellt, so erklärt sich das *-in-* in *slag-IN-AR* am einfachsten, ebenso wie in *hait-IN-AR*, als nachträgliche Schwächung aus ursprünglichem *-an-* in Mittelsilben.

Gegen Kocks Auffassung sucht Noreen⁷ zu zeigen, dass altn. *-en-* : *-in-* nicht bei einigen Ablautsreihen aus altem *-in-*, bei anderen Ablautsreihen dagegen aus altem *-an-* entwickelt sei, sondern bei sämtlichen Ablautsreihen auf der Ausgleichung zwischen altem *-in-* und altem *-an-* innerhalb des Paradigmas beruhe, indem "in urnord. Zeit, wenigstens bei sehr vielen Wörtern, die (alten) Suffixformen *-in-* und *-an-* innerhalb eines Paradigmas der Art verteilt waren, dass jene nebentonig und daher später nicht synkopierend, diese unbetont und daher später synkopierend waren" (vgl. seine *Altisl. Grammatik*³, § 167, Anm. 3).

Adjektivische Formen mit altem *ü* (bezw. *y* = *i*-Umlaut des *ü*) der Stammsilbe (wie z. B. altschw. *upin* : *ypin*) lassen sich nach Noreen aus den unsynkopierten Kasus, die Formen mit *a*-Brechung dagegen (wie z. B. altschw. *opin*, altisl. *opinn*) aus den synkopierten Kasus erklären, und ebenso die Part. prät. der starken Verben mit *i*-Umlaut⁸ (z. B. *sleginn*, *tekinn* der VI. Ablautsreihe, vgl. *Altisl. Grammatik*³, § 491, 5) und mit oder ohne *a*-Brechung (z. B. *boðinn*, *flotinn* der II. Ablautsreihe gegen *bitinn*, *snriðinn* der I. Ablautsreihe).

Kock ist weiter der Meinung, dass es strittig sei, was die Inschrift und besonders was die Runenkombination *slaxinaR* bedeute, und dass daher die Form *slaxinaR* (oder *slaginaR*) nichts gegen seine Auffassung über altes *-in-* beweise.

⁷ Vgl. A. Noreen, *Altisl. Grammatik*³, § 167, Anm. 3, "Suffixablaut im Altnordischen," *I. F.*, XIV, S. 399-402, "Geschichte der nordischen Sprachen," im *Grundriss der germ. Phil.*, 1913.

⁸ Da alle Verben mit *g*, *k* die umgelauteten Formen (vgl. *sleginn*, *tekinn*, usw.), dagegen alle Verben ohne *g*, *k* die unumgelauteten Formen (vgl. *alinn*, *galinn*, usw.) gewählt haben, so glaube ich mit Kock (*Beitr.*, XXIII, S. 487 ff.), dass hier der Umlaut erst durch den palatalen Konsonanten hervorgerufen ist. Dialektisch (namentlich im Altschw.) tritt sonst häufig im Part. prät. Umlaut (*o* > *ø*, *d* > *æ*, usw.) ein, aber dieser Umlaut lässt sich als Folge entweder konsonantischen Einflusses oder nachträglicher Analogiewirkung und somit als jung erweisen (vgl. Kock, *ibid.*, S. 494 ff., *I. F.*, XXXIII, S. 339 ff.).

Noreens Erklärung der Adjektivformen (altschw. *ypin*: *ypin* gegen altisl. *opinn*) lässt sich aber angesichts der Verhältnisse im Westgerm. kaum aufrecht erhalten. Im Nordgerm., sowohl wie im Westgerm., weisen die Tatsachen darauf hin, dass alte *-an*-Adj. öfters zu *-in*-Adj. geworden sind. In dieser Beziehung steht das Anglo-Friesische dem Nordgerm. am nächsten, indem im Anglo-Friesischen, ebenso wie im Nordgerm., altes *-an*-⁹ der Adj. in *-e(i)n*- übergegangen und demnach mit altem *-in*- und altem *-in*- lautlich zusammengefallen ist (d. h. *-e(i)n*); so z. B. urnord- urwestgerm. **op-an* = altisl. *op-i(e)nn*, ang. *op-en*; urgerm. **gulf-in* = got. *gulf-eins*, altn. *gull-i(e)nn*, ang. *gyld-en*, altfries. *geld-e(i)n* (mit *i*-Umlaut des *ū* zu *ē*); urgerm. **aig-in* = got. *aig-in* Subst., altn. *eig-i(e)nn*, ang. *æg-en* (neben *āg-en*).

Ebenso wie z. B. altfries. *epen* (das auf **up-in* zurückgehen muss) nach dem Muster z. B. von *gelden*, usw. ein *-in*-Adj. geworden ist, so lässt sich auch altschw. *ypin*: *ypin* nach dem Muster z. B. von *gull-in*, usw. aus nachträglichem Zusammenfall eines ursprünglichen *-an*-Adj. mit den alten *-in*-Adj. erklären, die im Germ. von alter Zeit her zahlreich vertreten waren. Dass die Grundform dieses Adj. im Urnord- und Urwestgerm. **op-an* gewesen ist, lehrt nicht nur das im Altisl.¹⁰ regelmässig vorliegende *op-i(e)nn* (mit *a*-Brechung), sondern auch der dem Altisl. entsprechende Vokalismus der übrigen westgerm. Sprachen (d. h. aller Dialekte ausser dem Altfriesischen), vgl. ahd. *off-an*, alts. *op-an*: *op-en*, ang. *op-en*. Die altschw.-altfries. Form, die jedenfalls auf *-in*- zurückgeht, darf man also als eine jüngere von der urnord-urwestgerm. Grundform abweichende Dialekt-eigenheit betrachten, zumal die altschw. und altfries. Laut- und Analogieneigungen einander sehr nahe lagen (vgl. Kock, "Vocalbalance im Altfriesischen," *Beitr.*, XXIX, S. 175 ff.).

Meiner Meinung nach ist Noreen der Nachweis nicht geglückt,

⁹ Dass im Altn. auslautendes *-an*- lautgesetzlich bleibt, zeigt z. B. die Form *sam-an* = got. *sam-an-a*, ahd. *sam-an-(i)*, *zi-sam-an-e*, alts. *te-samne*. Bei Adj. auf *-an*- dagegen ging das *-a*- zunächst in Mittelsilben in *-e-* (später *-i-*) über und auf diesem Wege ersetzte das *-ē*- / *-i-* das ursprüngliche *-ā*- auch in Endsilben (vgl. III).

¹⁰ Im Altschw. liegt auch die Form *op-in* (mit *a*-Brechung) vor, vgl. Kock, "Zur Frage nach dem Suffix der Participia Passivi usw.," *I. F.*, XXXIII, S. 348.

dass in der adjektivischen Suffixsilbe *-i(e)n-* des Nordgerm. alte vorgermanische Abstufung (zwischen germ. *ǣ(i):ā*) vorliege, denn nachträglicher Zusammenfall der *-an-*Adj. mit den *-in-* und den *-in-*Adj. kann unumgelautete Formen neben umgelauteten Formen der betreffenden Adj. im Nordgerm. genügend erklären.

Hinsichtlich der Part. prät. der starken Verben ist Noreens Auffassung von vornherein bedenklich, indem es dabei noch immer unerklärt bleibt, weshalb die Ausgleichung zwischen altem *-in-* und altem *-an-* bei der I. Ablautsreihe (ohne *a*-Brechung) und bei denjenigen Part. prät. der VI. Ablautsreihe (mit *i*-Umlaut), deren Stammsilbe auf Palatallaut ausging, anders durchgeführt sein soll als bei den übrigen Ablautsreihen, wo die gleichen Verhältnisse (zwischen synkopierenden und nicht synkopierenden Kasus) herrschten, wie bei den oben erwähnten Ablautsreihen.

Da sich der Mangel der *a*-Brechung im Part. prät. der I. Ablautsreihe durch das gemeinnord- und westgerm. Gesetz der Ablautsharmonie erklären lässt, und da der Wandel des *ā* zu *ǣ* in der Stammsilbe des Part. prät. der VI. Ablautsreihe offenbar als jüngerer Palatalumlaut (oder jedenfalls als jüngere Entwicklung) anzusehen ist, so liegt kein Grund vor anzunehmen, dass in diesen Fällen dem *-i(e)n-* des Part. prät. altes *-in-* (neben *-an-*) zugrunde liege, wie dies Noreen tut. Und wenn in diesen Fällen kein *-in-* neben *-an-* vorauszusetzen ist, so ist um so weniger zwingend die Annahme, dass sonstwo im Part. prät. der starken Verben im Altn. altes *-in-* neben *-an-* dem *-i(e)n-* zugrunde liege.

Noreen sucht anscheinend für seine Theorie über die Suffixsilbe der Part. prät. der starken Verben eine Stütze in den Verhältnissen der Adj. auf *-i(e)n-*, aber es lassen sich im Nord- und Westgerm. die umgelauteten Formen der Adj. auf *-i(e)n* neben den unumgelauteten zum Teil ganz anders erklären, als die der Part. prät. der starken Verben (wo z. B. das Gesetz der Ablautsharmonie¹¹ in Betracht kommt). Die Tatsachen weisen darauf hin, dass die Verhältnisse im Adj. den Verhältnissen im Part. prät. nur insofern parallel sind, als altes *-an-* durch Schwächung in Mittelsilben zu *-en-* geworden ist, wobei Mischung mit dem

¹¹ Vgl. oben, Anm. 5.

alten adjektivischen Suffix *-in-* und dem alten subst.-adjektivischen Suffix *-in-* nahe lag. Dies wird aber erst klar, wenn man das nordgerm. *-in-: -en-* mit dem westgerm. *-an-: in-: -en-* im Part. prät. der starken Verben in Zusammenhang setzt.

II. Die Suffixsilbe *-AN-: -IN-: -EN-* im Part. prät. der starken Verben im Westgermanischen.

(a) Althochdeutsch.

Paul¹² führt zahlreiche Beispiele aus dem Ahd. an, wo im Part. prät. *-in-* neben *-an-* vorliegt, z. B. *gi-sceid-IN-êr*, *gi-halt-IN-u*, *gi-bor-IN-u* (Otfrid). Da aber dieses *-in-* niemals in Endsilben begegnet, und da weiter der Wurzelsilbe niemals durch den Vokal *i* der Suffixsilbe angegriffen wird, so handelt es sich hier offenbar nicht um altes *-in-*, sondern um nachträgliche Entwicklung des alten *-an-*, dessen *-a-* sonst häufig in Mittelsilben zu *-ë-* geschwächt ist, wie z. B. *quhoman: quhomenan* (Isidor), *gi-legan: gi-legenan* (Otfrid), usw. Ob nun das *-i-* in Mittelsilben (wie z. B. in *gi-halt-IN-u*) aus älterem *-ë-* (wie z. B. in *gi-leg-EN-an*) weiter geschwächt ist, oder schon auf Mischung mit der alten Adj.-Substantivendung *-in-* (= got. *-in-*, wie z. B. in *fulg-IN-s* Adj., *aig-IN* Subst.) beruht, lässt sich schwer entscheiden. Jedenfalls lag bei der Endung *-en-* Mischung mit altem *-in-* und altem *-in-* (= got. *-ein-*, wie z. B. in *gulf-EIN-s* = ahd. *guld-in*) nahe, ebenso wie bei den Adj. *-e(i)n-* im Altnord. und im Anglo-Fries. (vgl. I).

(b) Altsächsisch.

Im Alts.¹³ begegnet (und zwar auch in Endsilben) neben der Suffixsilbe *-an-* fast ebenso häufig die Suffixsilbe *-en-* und zuweilen auch *-in-*. In einigen Part. prät. (vgl. *ufgeslegenon* Wer. Prud. Gl. 4^a, *forsEkenun* Merseb. Gl. 103^c) scheint sogar *i*-Umlaut des Wurzelsilbens vorzuliegen; jedoch lassen diese Formen auch eine anderweitige Deutung zu (vgl. unt. Fussn. 23).

¹²H. Paul, "Zur Geschichte des germanischen Vocalismus," Beitr., VI, S. 239 f.

¹³Vgl. Holthausen, Alts. Grammatik, § 419, Anm. 1; J. H. Gallée, "Zur alts. Grammatik; alts. Participia auf *-in-*," Zfdph., XXIX, S. 145-149; Alts. Grammatik³, § 47^c, Anm. u. § 52^b, Anm. 2.

Dass dieses *-en-* im Alts. aus altem *-an-* in Mittelsilben geschwächt ist, lehrt das Beispiel der Endung *-an-* der starken Adj. masc. sg., deren *-a-* in der längeren Form *-an-e* häufig zu *-e-* (d. h. *-en-e*) geworden ist, wobei das *-e-* analogisch auch in Endsilben (d. h. *-en-* statt *-an-* im Akk. masc. sg.) eingedrungen ist, z. B. *brêd-ene*, *hard-ene*, *wid-ene* *Heliand* (M), 2120, 2362, 2881, daher *brêd-en*, *hard-en*, *wid-en* neben *brêd-an*, *hard-an*, *wid-an*.

Ebenso lässt sich die unflektierte Form der Adj. und der Subst. auf *-en-* neben *-an-* (vgl. *op-en*: *op-an*, *gam-en*: *gam-an*, *heṽ-en*: *heṽ-an*, *morg-en*: *morg-an*) als Analogiebildung¹⁴ nach den flektierten Formen erklären, wo das ursprüngliche *-an-* in Mittelsilben zu *-en-* geschwächt war, wenn auch letzteres in einigen Fällen wegen der Apokopierung nicht mehr in Mittelsilben erhalten ist.

Bei den Part. prät. der starken Verben aber zeigen nach Schlüters¹⁵ Ermittlung die flektierten Formen eine grössere Vorliebe für *-an-* als für *-en-*. Dieser Umstand lässt sich nur so erklären, dass gerade die flektierten Formen mit innerem *-e-*, von denen das *-en-* ausgegangen war, bis auf wenige Reste wieder beseitigt sind (vgl. Schlüter, *ibid.*, S. 251).

Wenn weiter die äusserst selten begegnenden Part. prät. auf *-in-* (vgl. *kum-in* *Heliand* (C), *githung-in*, *bismit-in*, *gefall-in* der *Genesis*) nicht als altfries., sondern als echt alts. Formen anzusehen sind,¹⁶ so lässt sich das *-i-* im Alts., gerade wie im Ahd., entweder als weitere Schwächung des *-e-* in Mittelsilben oder schon als Mischung mit altem *-in-* und altem *-in-* erklären.

¹⁴ Vgl. O. Behaghel, "Zum Heliand und zur Heliandgrammatik," *Germania*, XXXI, S. 388 ff.

¹⁵ W. Schlüter, "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altsächsischen Sprache," I. Theil, "Die schwache Declination in der Sprache des Heliand und der kleineren as. Denkmäler," Göttingen, 1892, S. 232 f.

¹⁶ Diese Part. prät. hält Gallée ("Alts. Participia auf *-in-*," *Zfdph.*, XXIX, S. 146 f.) gegen Kögel (Ergänzungsheft zu seiner Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur, S. 19) nicht für Frisonismen, sondern für echt alts. Formen, wofür er eine Stütze in den heutigen sächsischen Dialekten findet, die sowohl Formen auf *-in-* wie auf *-an-* aufweisen. Gallée nimmt aber ohne weiteres an, dass dieses *-in-* im Part. prät. auf altgerm. *-in-* zurückgehe, welches nach der von Paul aufgestellten Ansicht (*Beitr.*, VI, 239 ff.) schon in urgerm. Zeit neben *-an-* bestanden habe.

(c) *Anglo-Friesisch.*

Gegenüber dem im Alts. neben *-an-* begegnenden *-en-* herrscht im Angs. nur *-en-*, und im Altfries. entweder *-en-* oder *-in-* vor; also im Anglo-Fries.¹⁷ kein *-an-* neben *-i(e)n-*, ebenso wie im Nordgerm.

In den alten ang. Denkmälern aber, die noch zwischen *a* (= altgerm. *a*) und *i* scheiden, erscheint diese Endung als *-in-* sowohl wie als *-an-*. Es gehören hierher z. B. neben den Formen *gib-ÆN* (= got. *gib-ans*), *âsolc-ÆN*, usw. auch die beiden Formen *binum-IN-i* (= got. *binum-an-*) und *forleg-IN-um* (= got. *-lig-an-*) des alten *Epinaler Glossars*.¹⁸ Diese Verhältnisse im Altangs. stehen mit den Verhältnissen im Ahd. in auffälligem Einklang, indem in beiden Fällen das *-in-* nur in Mittelsilben, das *-an-* (= altangs. *-an-*) dagegen sowohl in Endsilben wie auch in Mittelsilben begegnet. Die Frage liegt also nahe, ob das nur in Mittelsilben vorliegende *-in-* der beiden Sprachen etwa aus älterem *-ē-* weiter geschwächt sei, oder schon auf Mischung mit den alten Adjektivendungen *-in-* und *-in-* beruhe.

Im Altfries., wo *-in-* neben *-en-* begegnet, beruht nach Kocks¹⁹ Nachweis das Verhältnis zwischen dem *-i-* und dem *-e-* der Suffixsilbe in Endsilben auf dem Gesetze der 'Vokalbalance.' Da dieses *-i(e)n-* des Altfries. nicht von dem *-in-* des Altangs. zu trennen ist, so liegt der Schluss nahe, dass die Endung *-i(e)n-* im Altfries., gerade wie das *-in-* im Altangs., aus ursprünglichem *-an-* in Mittelsilben entstanden ist.

Es scheint mir also (nach dem Zeugnis des Altangs. und des Ahd.) die Annahme völlig berechtigt zu sein, dass das *-i(e)n-* der Part. prät. der starken Verben im Westgerm. nicht auf

¹⁷ Im Angs. tritt nur dialektisch bisweilen *-an-* auf (vgl. Sievers, *Angs. Grammatik*³, § 366, 2) und im Altfries. ist das äusserst seltene Part. prät. auf *-an-* wohl nur als eine andere Schreibart für *-en-* anzusehen, da zwischen dem tonlosen *-e-* und dem tonlosen *-a-* kein bedeutender Unterschied gehört wurde (vgl. van Helten, *Altostfries. Grammatik*, § 56, Anm., § 65, Anm., § 284).

¹⁸ Von Sievers, *Angs. Grammatik*³, § 366, Anm. 2, angeführt, und eingehend untersucht in *Beitr.*, VIII, S. 324 ff.

¹⁹ A. Kock, "Vocalbalance im Altfriesischen," *Beitr.*, XXIX, S. 175 ff., auch van Helten, *ibid.*, XXXII, S. 517 ff.

altes *-in-* zurückzuführen, sondern als nachträgliche Schwächung aus ursprünglichem *-an-* in Mittelsilben zu erklären sei.

III. *Das gegenseitige Verhältnis des Nordgermanischen und Westgermanischen bei der Suffixsilbe -I(E)N- im Part. prät. der starken Verben.*

Auf demselben Wege wie im Westgerm. kann auch im Nordgerm. die Suffixsilbe *-i(e)n-* erklärt werden, d. h. aus nachträglicher Schwächung des alten *-a-* (*-an-*) in Mittelsilben zu *-e-* (*-en-*, später *-in-*). Dass sich dagegen im Nord- und Westgerm. ein *-a-* in Endsilben vor einfachem *n* hielt, beweist schon z. B. die Form des Inf. *binda(n)* (vgl. über **op-an-*, Fussn. 9). Demnach ging wohl ursprünglich (d. h. im Urnord-Urwestgerm.) die unflektierte Form des Part. prät. auf *-an* aus, z. B. **bund-an*. In Mittelsilben dagegen wurde das *-a-* stärker angegriffen und ging demnach in dieser Stellung in *-e-* (später *-i-*) über,²⁰ wie z. B. Gen. pl. **bund-AN-ra* > **bund-EN-ra* = altn. *bundenna*, angs. *bundenra*. Die unflektierte Form des Part. prät. (**bund-an-*) ist aber im Altn.-Anglo-Fries. später ganz ausgestorben, d. h. auf dem Wege der Analogie durch den Vokal der Mittelsilben ersetzt, so dass die Endung jetzt überall ein *-e-* oder ein *-i-* aufweist. Vielleicht hat bei dieser Ausgleichung das Bestreben mitgewirkt, den Endungsvokal des Part. prät. deutlich von dem des Inf. zu unterscheiden.

Ferner teilt das Part. prät. bei den Verben der I.-III. Ablautsreihe, und somit bei den meisten ablautenden Verben (denn der IV. und V. Ablautsreihe gehören nur wenige Verben an) den Stammvokal des Prät. plur. und des Opt. prät. Der Optativ zeigt in den Endungen überall ausser im 1. Sg. (= got. *-jau*) den Vokal *i*. Diesen auf die Endung des Part. prät. zu übertragen lag nahe, zumal es im Germ. von alter Zeit her zahlreiche Adj. auf *-in-* gab, mit denen das Part. nach Endung und Flexion identisch ist (vgl. über **op-an*: **up-in*, I). Dass im Altfries.

²⁰ Für das Altn. stellt Kock ("Der A-Umlaut in den altnord. Sprachen," Beitr., XXIII, S. 490 f.) die folgende Regel für den Wandel des *-a-* zu *-e-* auf: "*a* ist in infortissilbe vor *n* + consonant in *e* (später *i*) übergegangen." Diesen Wandel betrachtet Kock also als Palatalisierung des *a* vor *n* + Kons., die aber nur in Infortissilben (d. h. nicht in Fortis- oder Semifortissilben) eingetreten sei. Auch Endsilben, wie z. B. Nom. sg. masc. **bund-an-R* > **bund-ann* > *bund-enn*, glaubt er mit dieser Regel erklären zu können.

der Vokal der Optativendung auf die Endung des Part. prät. übertragen war, ist um so wahrscheinlicher, als die Verben, deren Stammvokal auf Guttural auslautet, vor dem *-e-* meist den zugehörigen Palatal ²¹ zeigen, wie z. B.

- I. Reihe, *strika* Inf., *stri(t)zen* Part. prät.
- II. Reihe, *bi-lûka* Inf., *bi-letsen*, *bi-lezen* (neben *bi-leken*) Part. prät.
- III. Reihe, *breka*, Inf. *bretzen* (neben *breken*) Part. prät.
- IV. Reihe, *spreka*, Inf. *spretzen*, *spreetzen* Part. prät.

Die Palatalisierung bliebe unerklärlich, wenn hier westgerm. *-an-* im Part. prät. zugrunde läge. Der *-i-*Umlaut (vgl. z. B. *bi-letsen* aus älterem **bi-lytsen* < **bi-luts-in*) beweist schon, dass hier dem *-en-* ein früheres **-in-* zugrunde liegen muss. Dass dieses **-in-* aber nicht auf altes *-in-* zurückzuführen ist, sondern aus den Optativformen auf das Part. prät. übertragen war,²² lehren die Formen der Part. prät., welche ihren Wurzelsvokal zu Gunsten des Wurzelsvokals des Opt. prät. aufgegeben haben, wie z. B. die neben *sprecen* belegte Form *spraecen*, deren *ae* nur aus dem Opt. prät. erklärt werden kann (vgl. 3. Pers. sg. westgerm. **sprêki* = as. *sprâki*, ahd. *sprâhi*, nhd. *spräche*). Da die altfries. Formen des Part. prät. augenscheinlich auf nachträglicher Angleichung der Endung des Part. prät. an die Endung des Opt. prät. beruhen, darf man annehmen, dass die Suffixsilbe *-en-* der altfries. Part. prät. noch jüngeren Datums als das gemeinnord- und westgerm. *-en-* ist. Ferner lag bei der Endung *-en-* Mischung mit altem *-în-* und altem *-in-* nahe. Diese Mischung kann dann das Eindringen von umgelauteten Formen aus dem Opt. prät. in das Part. prät. im Angs. und im Altfries. erleichtert

²¹ Vgl. C. Günther, *Die Verba im Altfrisieschen*, Leipzig, 1880, S. 8, 17, 20 f.; van Helten, *Altostfriesische Grammatik*, Leeuwarden, 1890, S. 205 f.; Siebs in Pauls Grundriss² I, 1306 ff.; Heuser, *Altfris. Lesebuch* (Streitbergs Sammlung Germ. Elementarbücher III, 1) S. 31 ff.

²² Ebenso erklärt Gallée ("Alts. Part. auf *-in-*", *Zfdph.*, XXIX, S. 146 f.) den umgelauteten Stammvokal (z. B. *ô*, *ô*, *ôo*) des Part. prät. im heutigen Sächsischen (d. h. in der Sprache der Landschaft *Twenthe* im südöstlichen Teil der holländischen Provinz *Overijssel*) zum Teil als Übertragung aus dem Opt. prät.: "Bei einigen (part. prät.) kann der Umlaut des *praet. indic.*, das den Umlaut aus dem optativ übernommen hat, die Umbildung veranlasst haben, z. B. *helpen* prt. ind. *hölþ*, plur. *hölþen*, partic. *ê-hölþen*" (ibid., S. 147).

haben, z. b. angs.-altfries. *-slege(i)n*²³ (neben *-slagen*), angs. *-cymen* (neben *-cumen*), altfries. *-kemi(e)n* (neben *-komen*) der VI. und IV. Ablautsreihe. Hier beruht der *i*-Umlaut nicht auf altem *-in-*, sondern auf dem jüngeren anglo-fries. *-in-*, das unter Mitwirkung von altem *-in-* und altem *-in-* von denjenigen Ablautsreihen (I.-III.) ausgegangen ist, wo das Part. prät. mit dem Opt. prät. den gleichen Stammvokal teilt.

Der *i*-Umlaut im Part. prät. der starken Verben im Westgerm. beweist also nichts für altes *-in-*, und im Nordgerm. (namentlich im Altschw.) lässt sich der *i*-Umlaut gleichfalls aus nachträglichen Einflüssen erklären (vgl. Fussn. 8).

Die Schwächung des ursprünglichen *-an-* zu *-en-* in Mittelsilben bezeugen für das Westgerm. das Altangs. des *Epinaler Glossars* und das Ahd. Ob nun im Nordgerm. das *-a-* vor *n* + Kons. durch Palatalisierung auch in Endsilben lautgesetzlich zu *-e-* geworden ist (wie z. B. Nom. sg. masc. **bund-an-ε* > **bund-ann* > *bund-enn*), wie dies Kock annimmt (*Beitr.*, XXIII, S. 490 f., vgl. Fussn. 20), lässt sich schwer entscheiden.²⁴ Jedenfalls ist in Mittelsilben ursprüngliches *-an-* im Nordgerm., gerade wie im Anglo-Fries., zu *-en-* geschwächt. Wenn also Kocks Annahme richtig ist, so könnte das *-e-* der Mittelsilben das *-e-* der Endsilben noch weiter begünstigt haben, so dass schliesslich im Nordgerm., ebenso wie im Anglo-Fries., die Suffixform überall ein *-e-* (später *-i-*) erhielt.

²³ Wenn das *uf-ge-sleg-en-on* der *Werd. Prud. Glossen* und das *for-sek-en-un* der *Merseb. Glossen* als echt alts. Formen zu gelten haben, wie Gallée (*Zfdph.*, XXIX, S. 146 f.) meint, ist der *i*-Umlaut sehr auffallend, da das Alts. sonst im Part. prät. keinen *i*-Umlaut aufweist; im *Heliand* liegen immer die unumgelauteten Formen vor (d. h. *ge-slag-a(e)n*, *for-sak-a(e)n*). Demnach wird das *e* der Wurzelsilbe eher als friesisches *e* = asächs. *a* aufzufassen sein, wie z. B. in afries. *seke* = as. *saka* = ahd. *sahha*. Für die Existenz eines altgerm. *-in-* neben *-an-* im Part. prät. der starken Verben bieten diese beiden Partizipien also eine noch schwächere Stütze als die umgelauteten Formen im Anglo-Friesischen.

²⁴ Über den nordgerm.-anglo-fries. Übergang des *-a-* in Endsilben in *-e-* vgl. H. Collitz, "Die Behandlung des ursprünglich auslautenden *ai* im Got., Althochd. und Altsächs.," *B. B.*, XVII, 1 ff. Diesen Übergang hält Professor Collitz nicht für eine eigentliche Palatalisierung, sondern eher für Schwächung, d. h. unvollkommene Bildung mit zurückgezogener Zunge.

Diese Erklärung des nord- und westgerm. *-en-/-in-* aus altem *-an-* steht nicht mit den vorliegenden Tatsachen (namentlich mit den Verhältnissen im got. Part. prät., vgl. über got. *fulgins*, Fussn. 2) in Widerspruch, wie dies bei der herkömmlichen Ansicht über vorgerm. und altgerm. Stammabstufung (zwischen germ. *ē(i)* und *ā*) der Fall ist. Wenn dagegen Pauls Gesichtspunkt (von dem alle Sprachforscher bisher ausgegangen sind) richtig ist, so bleibt noch immer unerklärt, weshalb das *-in-* erst in jüngerer Zeit (d. h. nicht im Got.) als Partizipialsuffix erscheint. Diese Schwierigkeit ist aber überwunden, wenn man annimmt, dass das *-in-* im Part. prät. des Nord- und Westgerm. *nicht auf altes -IN- zurückgeht, sondern erst nachträglich aus altem -AN- entwickelt worden ist.* Diese nachträgliche Entwicklung (d. h. Schwächung des *-a-* zu *-e-* in Mittelsilben) zeigt sich schon im Altangs. und im Ahd., ist aber erst später im Altn.-Angs.-Altfries. durchweg vollzogen worden, so dass hier das ursprüngliche *-a-* überall durch das jüngere *-e-* ersetzt worden ist. Im Alts.-Ahd. dagegen herrschen die beiden Vokale (*a* und *e*) noch immer neben einander und zwar viel häufiger im Alts., das dem Anglo-Fries. näher lag, als im Ahd. Das Nebeneinanderliegen von *-an-* und *-en-* im *M* des *Héliand* geht z. B. dem Gegensatz zwischen unflektiertem *-an-* und flektiertem *-en-* (freilich neben *-an-*) bei Isidor und Otfrid im Ahd. parallel, nur dass im Alts. das ursprünglich flektierte *-en-* auch in Endsilben eingedrungen ist, während im Ahd. die lautgerechte Form des Suffixes sich in Endsilben noch immer unverändert hielt. Letzterer Umstand erklärt sich daraus, dass im Ahd. die Schwächung des ursprünglichen *-an-* zu *-e(i)n* in Mittelsilben (d. h. bei flektierten Formen) noch nicht so weit fortgeschritten war als im Alts.

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III.—PLATO'S HEDONISM.¹

I.

The doctrine of hedonism is in bad odor. It is a little strange, however, that any of that bad odor should attach to Plato, from whom we get our first clear statement of a doctrine to which one might apply that name. Even people who read Plato himself, and not a translation or betrayal of him, have read him carelessly. That is indeed easy to do. Although most of his pages are clear as daylight, and notably so the great and inspiring pages that ring like an anticipation of Christianity—which are at least in harmony with the highest ethics of Christianity—yet sometimes, at critical points, he delights in an unexpected turn which the unwary or the unsympathetic might mistake. And on this one point even good Platonists have gone astray, attributing to him at an early stage of his philosophic life a doctrine which they agree that he soon rose above. But in fact he never held any doctrine that we nowadays call hedonism. Only a superficial reader can find it in the *Protagoras*, where alone any hint of it is found. Whatever later hedonism may be, Plato's brand of it is a fine declaration, in the peculiar manner of the Platonic Sokrates—probably of the historic Sokrates as well—of Plato's faith in the high origin and high destiny of man. It is worth while to make this clear. Those who have really understood Plato have had no doubt about it.

First we have to examine those passages of the *Protagoras* that equate the pleasant with the good. The starting-point is the place (351c) where Sokrates asks, "In so far as things are pleasant (*ἡδύα*), are they not in so far good, unless something else results from them? In like manner, conversely, painful things—are they not bad in so far as they are painful?" To which Protagoras makes the fine reply which shows that Plato was well aware how open to misunderstanding the doctrine is, "I do not know, Sokrates, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is good and the painful

¹Owing to the author's untimely death, this paper did not have the benefit of his final revision.—Ed.

evil. Having regard not only to my present answer but also to my whole life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and some painful things which are not evil, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil." The Platonic Protagoras, no less than the Platonic Sokrates, is the mouthpiece of Plato. He is here warning us to observe accurately his distinctions and qualifications and exact use of terms. This is emphasized in what follows. Pleasure in itself, he explains, is not evil, but good. When pleasant things are evil, they are so because they are found to result in pain of one kind or another, like disease or poverty, or to deprive of pleasure. So also when painful things are good, like military campaigns or the cutting and cautery of the surgeon, they are so because they result in pleasure that surpasses the pain, or because they at least remove or lessen the pain.

If now the analysis went no farther than this it would be superficial enough. But this is only the beginning. And before taking up the farther and more penetrating steps in the analysis we must remind ourselves that the Protagoras is an early composition. Not only the Philebus is many years in the future, and its keen discussion of pleasure undreamt of, but the Republic and the Gorgias are unwritten. We shall have to consider later whether the doctrines there developed invalidate or withdraw positions taken in the Protagoras. But for the present those dialogues are non-existent; we are concerned with the Protagoras alone. And we must farther note in what sense Plato is employing here the terms pleasure and pain, especially the former.

To come at once to the point, the context makes it quite clear that he is using these terms in their widest possible application, expressly including the highest kind of pleasure and purely spiritual pain. This is placed beyond question by the synonyms and the illustrations employed. Prodikos, it is true, is made (in 337c) to insist on distinguishing *ἡδίσθαι* from *εὐφραίνεσθαι*, applying the latter to the mental and moral pleasures, restricting the former to pleasures of the senses. And this falls in with an unmistakable tendency of usage. Only, like other pedants, Prodikos would make a hard and fast rule of what is in fact only a tendency, that never submits to restriction. Sokrates treats Prodikos with great formal respect, here and in allusions to him in other dialogues, in spite of his good-natured irony and

his little traps for the famous teacher's foibles. There was indeed a basis for his repeated claims that he was a grateful pupil of Prodikos, who laid great stress on the accurate distinction of synonyms. That this easily ran into pedantry, as it does nowadays, does not alter the fact that it was right in line with the Sokratic insistence on definition. Discrimination in the use of terms is one phase of the same principle. But it is a superficial phase, touching only words, the conventional signs. Plato and Sokrates went below the outward signs to realities. To emphasize this, to make manifest that what they care for is the thought, Plato is fond of using in close connection many synonyms, all that are available, to put his meaning in all its breadth beyond dispute. Any of these terms will serve, he intimates, and often says: I am not insisting on a word, but on the thing itself which we designate, according to circumstances, by all these terms.

So here. The ordinary word for pleasure in the broadest sense is ἡδονή, for 'pleasant' is ἡδύς; the verb is ἡδεσθαι, 'be pleased.' But χαίρειν 'rejoice' is a synonym in 354d:—"Since even τὸ χαίρειν you call evil when it deprives of greater pleasure than it affords, or causes greater pains than its own pleasures. If you call τὸ χαίρειν itself evil on any other standard and with a view to any other end, you could point out that standard; but that you cannot do." But χαίρειν, like our equivalent 'rejoice,' though very broad in its range, distinctly suggests an emotional or mental state, not one of the body. Again in 358a χαρτόν 'joyful' and τερπνόν 'delightful' are synonyms for ἡδύ: "You agree then that the pleasant is good, the painful (ἀνίαρόν) bad. And I beg our friend Prodikos not to make here his distinctions of words; whether you call it ἡδύ or τερπνόν or χαρτόν, or however you are pleased (χαίρεις) to name such things, most excellent Prodikos, please answer in my sense of the words." Nothing could more clearly indicate refusal to allow any narrowing of that wide range of meaning which the words accept and his doctrine demands. Nor need we go beyond the same composition for uses of the suspected root ἡδ- in the wider sense. When Sokrates and his young friend arrived at the house of Kallias, Sokrates says: "It was delightful to see (ἡσθην ἰδών) this band, how beautifully they took care, like a trained chorus, never to get in front of

Protagoras." In 347b occurs the ordinary polite formula, "I leave to Protagoras whichever is more agreeable to him (*ἡδιον*); and two lines below, "I should like to finish (*ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι*) the investigation along with you." This is of course ordinary Greek usage.

And we may recall here the striking passage in the Nikomachean Ethics (1151 b 18 ff.) where Aristotle also employs *ἡδονή* in its best sense. "Some people," he says, "fail to abide by a resolution for other reasons than lack of moral force (*οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν*), as Neoptolemos in the *Philoktetes* of Sophokles. Yet it was pleasure that led him to change (*δι' ἡδονήν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν*), but a noble pleasure (*ἀλλὰ καλήν*). His sense of honor bade him remain true; he had been persuaded by Odysseus to be false. Not every one who is impelled by pleasure to an action is either wanton or bad or lacking in self-control, but he who is impelled by an unseemly pleasure." The phrasing is of Aristotelian conciseness. Neoptolemos, he means, could not endure the spiritual pain involved in retaining the bow of Herakles, obtained from the trusting *Philoktetes* by lies, and in violating his promise to take the sufferer home. He chose rather to break his previous resolution, restore the bow, keep his promise to take *Philoktetes* home, brave the anger of Odysseus and the whole Greek army, resign all ambition and the hope of rivaling the fame of his father Achilles, and return quietly to an inglorious life in his little island. The pleasure of remaining true, of keeping his honor clean, outweighed all else. That was a kind of pleasure that Plato expressly included under *ἡδονή*. The Aristotelian author of the seventh book of the Ethics even uses *ἡδονή* of God. "Wherefore," he says, "God ever enjoys a *ἡδονή* that is one and simple (*μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν*, VII, 14, 8).

The illustrations of Plato's argument point the same way. Surgical operations, before anesthetics were known, were the readiest examples of pains endured, and chosen as good, because they were expected to restore health, or at least relieve pain and avert suffering. In such cases we have to do primarily with pains and pleasure of a bodily nature. Gymnastic training in general is largely in the same class, but not altogether. It looks also, in Greek practise especially, toward efficient service in war, where the pains and deprivations are bodily and the satisfactions and pleasures mainly of another sort. In the passage where

these are grouped with medical treatment and surgery and hunger-cures (354ab) the compensating pleasures include not only health, but also, from war, the safety of states, rule over others, and wealth. Now, however we may look upon wealth—individual or national—and rule over others as examples of satisfactions resulting from painful military service, the defense of one's country cannot be classed as ignoble. The satisfaction of knowing that one's efforts and deprivations have contributed to its safety is recognized as one of the purest. When Plato includes that as one of the pleasures that make pain a good, no one can fancy that his notion of pleasure is low. When taken with the context, it is clear that—though self-sacrifice became a common term only under Christianity—Plato includes also the high moral pleasure of feeling that life is sacrificed for others, even if life is lost in an attempt that fails. So Demosthenes two generations later carried his Athenian jury with him, when he declared that Athens could not have done otherwise had they all known beforehand that in the struggle for freedom they would be defeated. The satisfaction of having made the struggle outweighed even the pains of defeat.

Finally we reach, near the close of the discussion (in 360a) a broad generalization. It has been agreed that what is honorable or beautiful (*καλόν*) is also good, that *καλαὶ πράξεις* are all good. It is now further agreed that whatever is honorable and good is also pleasant (*ἡδύ*). That is a seemingly easy step in the argument, but one which carries with it an assertion of profound significance. If whatever is morally good is intrinsically pleasant to normal human nature, then that nature is intrinsically good. Plato holds firmly from beginning to end that the human soul is by nature good and greets all good as akin to itself. The immediate application at this point of the dialogue is this: The brave man going into war, when that is an honorable and good action, knows that he is going to what is fairer and better and also pleasanter. The pleasure involved can be only of the highest and finest moral kind, the satisfaction of what we call doing one's duty—enduring hardship, risking and losing life, for one's country. To complete the argument here we must take up another side of the matter. At the present moment this, however, is clear, that whatever Plato's hedonism may be, it does not involve any low conception of *ἡδονή*.

II.

During much of the composition Sokrates is maintaining that the virtues reduce mainly to an intellectual principle, to different applications of knowledge. We are not concerned for the moment to defend that thesis in its full extent, but only to show its relation to Platonic hedonism, that we may better understand the latter. It is a fact of life, Sokrates maintains, that men in general pursue pleasure as good—pleasure undefined and unanalyzed, but taken in the broadest sense—and shun pain, equally undefined and unanalyzed, but taken not less broadly, as evil. Men estimate actions by their results in pleasures and pains of all sorts. According to the preponderance of one or the other, actions are classed as good or bad, that is, treated as normal or unsound. In the Republic also Sokrates argues (357b) that anything is good which we should choose for its own sake and not out of desire for results to flow from it, as τὸ χαίρειν and pleasures that are harmless and give rise to nothing else in the future except χαίρειν. Again (Rep. 505b) Sokrates says, "But surely you know this, that most people regard pleasure, the more pretentious regard intelligence (φρόνησις), as the good." Here we have a plain suggestion of the dispute which is the starting-point of the Philebus, but we have also a reiteration of the statement that pleasure, to the mass of mankind, is the standard of the good. As a practical rule of life, therefore, we may say Sokrates admits, at least does not treat as unreasonable, that popular standard.

One application of it is political utilitarianism, the greatest good of the greatest number as a standard of political action. This is an application, however, which Plato nowhere makes. What we now call egoistic hedonism, enlightened choice of what will in the end be for one's own advantage, is another application, which again Plato does not make, and which involves a subtle distortion of Plato's meaning. For both of these applications, as they have been adopted and advocated, inevitably lay the main stress on material advantages, on the good of the body. The name utilitarianism distinctly implies that. As a principle of political action, if we confine the sphere of the state to this life, as most of us do, utilitarianism may be defended as a good

practical rule. It is only as a standard of morality that the bad repute of hedonism attaches to it. Now when we admit that Sokrates accepts pleasure and pain as the measure of good and evil in morals, we must, if we would avoid gross injustice, attend carefully to the farther development of what Plato means in the Protagoras by pleasure and pain. Nowhere more than in Plato do we need to observe the exact form and setting of words.

What do men mean when they say that one does evil knowingly, because overcome by a desire for pleasure? It is in analyzing this case that Sokrates develops his idea that the virtues are forms of knowledge. Admitting that the preliminaries of his analysis are long and repetitious he says (354e and following): "Pardon me; in the first place, it isn't easy to show just what that is which you call being overcome by pleasure, and, secondly, all my demonstration rests on that. If you accept pleasure and pain as good and evil respectively, then I say it is ridiculous to assert that often, while recognizing evils as evils, one nevertheless does them, when it is in one's power to refrain, because impelled by pleasure; and again, that while recognizing the good the man is unwilling to do it because overcome by the immediate pleasure." To make this plain he substitutes good for pleasure in the one formula and painful for bad in the other. The former then becomes: One does evil, while recognizing the evil, because overcome by good. That can have no meaning but this, that one chooses evil, recognizing the evil, because of good connected with it, quite oblivious of the fact that the good which attracted is less than the evil which was recognized. Similarly the other formula becomes: One does painful things, recognizing that they are painful, because overcome by the pleasant things therewith connected, not recognizing that the pleasures are outweighed by the pains. Parenthetically it should be noted that the word I render "while recognizing" is *γινώσκων*, the present participle, in the place of greatest emphasis. That lays stress on the contemporaneousness of intellectual perception with the act of choice; this has a bearing on the Sokratic doctrine of virtue as a form of knowledge.

Now when the formulas are put in these terms it becomes clear that the wrong choice is made because one misjudges amounts and degrees of pleasures and pains. What one needs therefore is the ability to measure such things rightly. The

metaphor ignores differences of kind; the whole discussion leaves those differences unnamed. This can only be intentional; no one was more conscious of those differences than Plato, and the immeasurable difference in kind between pleasures of the body and the moral and spiritual satisfaction is plainly in his mind all the while, not a whit less than in the *Gorgias*. But for the moment he seems to reduce all sorts of pleasures and pains to a purely quantitative standard. His art of measuring (*μετρητική*), on which depends all our safety and happiness, is the power of recognizing, under all disguises and all illusions of sense, the true and permanent values in the realm of pleasures and pains. To one who has this art in perfection a pleasure near at hand will not, because it is near and therefore looks larger, be taken as larger, a pain or pleasure that is far in the future will not therefore be deemed less.

Why, one asks, did Plato here ignore those differences of kind which were as plain to him as to us? The answer, I think, is twofold, and has been partly suggested. First, the unity of class implied in the common class-names, is a reality of human feeling, in which language is rooted. Beauty offers a parallel case. We speak of a beautiful face or a beautiful landscape, and also of beautiful music and beautiful character. We recognize a fundamental likeness in spite of the differences in kind of beauty, which are in fact as wide as the differences in the kinds of pleasure. Language was made by ordinary people and corresponds to popular psychology. Plato is for the moment accepting the ordinary view as embodied in common speech. The word pleasure designates the feeling with which human nature, body or soul or both combined, welcomes what satisfies a need or desire. The range of the word is wide because body and soul are unlike and each has many needs and desires. Besides, both are liable to aberrations. We may say truly enough that the aberrations are themselves natural, disturbances to which our infinitely complex nature is prone; but we still regard them as aberrations, departures from a condition that we recognize as more fundamentally natural and normal—a condition of health, bodily or spiritual. Pleasures that correspond to conditions of health are alone good, and are by themselves of endless variety.

Von Arnim is of opinion (*Platos Jugenddialoge*, pp. 13 f.)

that the entire hedonistic theory as here set forth is taken from some other philosopher, and the "art of measurement" is Plato's addition, made with a satirical aim, to reveal the hollowness of the theory. But von Arnim cannot name the philosopher, even by conjecture; and he overlooks the passage from the Republic (505b) before cited, which attributes the theory to the general public, "most people," not to a philosopher or a school. Does it not satisfy all the conditions better to suppose that Plato here accepts the popular view for the express purpose of giving it an unexpected turn? A certain irony, of the genuine Sokratic kind, is unmistakable; to speak of it as satirical, aimed at an opposing philosopher, is beyond the mark. Secondly, the unity of class embodied in the class-name, pleasure, corresponds, I venture to believe, to the facts of our ordinary life. We do not, in making the choice we call moral, consciously say to ourselves, "This pleasure is of a higher kind than that, and therefore I choose it." Surely in all but extraordinary cases what one feels is simply, "This pleasure is the one I prefer," or, "This pain is the greater; better the other." To speak even of magnitude or number is figurative; preference is all one thinks of. The art of measurement is a purely figurative expression; it is the art of making the right choice; there is no real weighing or counting or measuring. States of feeling—acts regarded as leading to states of feeling—are the sole objects of moral choice. Whether these be bodily sensations, whatever those are, or psychic states, whatever those are, we cannot literally weigh or measure or count them. I cannot believe that Plato thought we do. But the figure is accurate enough for the purpose, fairly descriptive of what we actually do—choose, with little or no reference to differences of kind.

Similarly Aristotle (Ethics 1105a 3 ff.) says *κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἧττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ*, 'We regulate our actions, some of us more and some less, by pleasure and pain.' This cool and dispassionate observer of life agrees with Plato, the philosophical enthusiast, in representing this as the ordinary practise of humanity. That is why, he says, his whole treatise is concerned with pleasures and pains. People need to be habituated from childhood to make good choices; then gradually they may come to understand why the choices

prescribed are good, and may find their pleasure there. Nor is it in essence untrue to fact to describe making a wrong choice in Plato's terms. At the moment of choosing one estimates wrongly in pleasures and pains the consequences of the act. No one, says Sokrates, while recognizing (*γινώσκων*) the truth, chooses evil—that is, pain—when he may choose pleasure—that is the good. The wrong choice proceeds from a failure to recognize, at the moment of choosing, the facts. That is assuredly a form of ignorance or *ἀμαθία*. At best it is forgetting, under the influence of emotion, what one had previously learned. It is like the schoolboy, who knows it, but has forgotten. And to forget is to lose, for the moment at least, what one previously knew. As Plato puts it in the *Phædo* (75d), "To know is this, to get knowledge of something and then hold it and not have lost it. Isn't what we call forgetting loss of knowledge?" What is needed is the power to hold, without an instant's failure of perception, what one clearly perceived before this present disturbance of mental vision came on.

Now we all recognize that this form of moral ignorance or forgetting has something peculiar about it, something that differentiates it from purely intellectual, unemotional ignorance or forgetting. The Sokratic description of it is paradoxical—contrary to our common feeling and common use of the words. Therein lies the piquancy of it, the Sokratic sting, that stimulates thought. And Plato clearly recognizes that the knowledge needed for right choice, this art of measurement, is a peculiar art and knowledge. "What this art is and this knowledge," he says in 357b, "we will examine another time." He thus admits that farther elucidation is needed; the method of learning and teaching this kind of knowledge is not so simple as for geometry. Later in life, in the discussion of education in the *Laws*, he recognizes, as clearly as Aristotle after him, the importance of *habitation* for this purpose. In the *Timæus* too (86de) he speaks of incontinence in sensual pleasures as a disease of the soul arising from a condition of the body. "No one is willingly wicked, but it is owing to a bad condition of the body and unenlightened nurture that the wicked man becomes wicked, and these are always unwelcome and imposed against his will." After a few words about other ways in which the soul derives

evil from the body, with the farther influence of bad government and bad public example and the lack of curative studies in early life, he adds (87b): "The blame must lie rather with the progenitors than with the progeny, with the educator rather than the educated; however, we must use our utmost zeal by nurture, by pursuits, and by studies, to shun vice and embrace the opposite. This subject belongs, however, to a different branch of inquiry." In the Protagoras itself, however, we find nothing distinct on this point, beyond the admission that farther analysis is needed.

But when he proceeds to describe courage as the knowledge of what is really to be feared and what is not, we see that he fully comprehends the complexity of his "art of measurement." What action in the face of danger really yields the greatest pleasure, the least pain? The coward thinks of death as the worst of evils, depriving one of all the pleasures of life; he fails to estimate at its true value the immeasurably greater happiness that a noble death may yield. The brave man knows that the moral satisfaction of fighting for one's country in a righteous cause is a pleasure that far outweighs the pains of war, including wounds and death, and even defeat of the righteous cause for which he dies. This "art of measurement turns out to be nothing less than acceptance into one's being, complete and unswerving acceptance, of one's place in the kosmos, as Plato conceived that kosmos." Plato's "art of measurement" therefore rests upon the tacit assumption of doctrines that are expressly developed in the Phædo, Republic, Phædrus, and Timæus. For him soul is immortal, the human soul a portion of the world-soul—"of no earthly, but of heavenly growth" (Tim. 90a). All nature is akin; the All is one, the self-evolution of Eternal Mind, who is absolute Good. Being thus divine by nature, the soul welcomes the good, the divine, as its native element, and by nature aspires to the best. "We must needs love the highest when we see it." It is indeed capable, through wrong choices, joined as it is with an earthly body, of falling to a lower scale, of "losing its wings" and ceasing to aspire. But that is unhappiness, is contrary to its nature, is its worst pain. Its greatest pleasure is in choosing the best, in likening itself to God, so far as it can, by becoming *δικαιον καὶ ὁσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως* (Theæt. 176b). That "art of measurement" consists in recognizing constantly, in never forgetting, this fact of the soul's nature, and in living most fully

in accordance therewith. From beginning to end, as I said, this is the basis of Plato's ethical doctrine.

The hedonism of the Protagoras is unintelligible, self-contradictory, unless we assume this underlying belief. Taking a popular principle of action, a principle which may be applied ignobly, and is often so applied, by restricting the range of *ἡδονή* to lower meanings, Plato, by bringing forward that higher meaning and adding his doctrine of measurement, lifts the principle out of itself and transforms it. The Sokratic paradox, easily misunderstood by the careless, becomes to an alert mind a keen moral spur.

III.

What now shall we do with apparent contradictions, in the Gorgias and elsewhere? They are only apparent and vanish when we attend to the meaning of *ἡδονή*, and note for each passage the range to which it is restricted by the context.

The case is clearest in Tim. 69cd; I quote in Archer-Hind's translation substantially. "God wrought this universe, a single living creature containing within itself all living creatures, mortal and immortal, that exist. And of the divine he himself was the creator; but the creation of mortals he delivered over to his own children to work out. And they, in imitation of him, having received from him the immortal principle of soul (*ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον*), fashioned round about her a mortal body and gave her all the body to ride in (*ὄχημα*); and beside her they built in another kind of soul, even that which is mortal, having within itself dread and inevitable passions (*δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα παθήματα*)—first pleasure, the strongest allurements of evil (*μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ*), next pains that scare good things away (*ἀγαθῶν φυγὰς*); confidence moreover and fear, a yoke of thoughtless counselors (*ἄφρονε ξυμβούλω*); wrath hard to assuage (*θυμὸν δυσπαραμύθητον*) and hope that lightly leads astray; and having mingled all these perforce with reasonless sensation and passion that ventures all things (*ἐπιχειρητὴ παντὸς ἔρωτι*), so they fashioned the mortal soul." That is, pleasure which is "the strongest bait of evil" is expressly regarded, along with *θυμός*, *θάρρος*, *φόβος*, *ἐλπίς*, and *ἔρως*, as part of the animal soul, the life of the body, mortal like the body, and distinct from the immortal principle of soul, *ἀρχὴ ψυχῆς ἀθάνατος*; their very dwelling-places

in the body, as he goes on to explain, are distinct. This mortal *ἡδονή* of the body has nothing in common, except that analogy which justifies the common name, with the immortal *ἡδονή* which chooses death of the body rather than alienation from those realities that have charmed the soul in our earlier existence, before incarnation.

In the *Gorgias* one arrives at the same result, only by a longer road—by following our word *ἡδονή* through several pages. And the starting-point is important, as every word gets its atmosphere, its range of meaning, from what has preceded. The dialogue begins with a discussion of the nature and power of rhetoric. This is found to lie in persuasion, wholly apart from instruction—wholly apart, that is, from knowledge, and without reference to right and wrong. Laudation of rhetoric is therefore laudation of power without reference to the moral nature of the means employed in acquiring or exerting power; it is praise of worldly success, though gained by injustice. Polos maintains that successful injustice which escapes punishment is happiness and true success. That leads Sokrates to prove that to commit injustice is worse, for him who does it, than to suffer injustice; that to be punished for injustice committed is better for him who is punished than to escape punishment; that the most wretched of men is he who has gained power wrongfully and escaped all punishment therefor. Being a wrongdoer is the great damage to the soul; taking due punishment for wrongdoing tends to free the soul from this hurt and restore the suffering soul to health. This unexpected conclusion, with its applications, excites the derision of Kallikles. In a long discourse he makes much of the distinction between nature and conventional law. Natural justice, in his view, dictates that the strong should rule; as to the strong man's ruling himself, he who is to live rightly should let his own desires (*ἐπιθυμίας*) be as strong as possible and should be himself competent to satisfy them to the utmost (491e).

Here is the starting-point of a discussion of pleasure. It is because the mass of men are unable to procure satisfaction for their desires—that is, to procure pleasures—that they praise justice and self-control; entire freedom from self-control, if coupled with power, is by nature excellence (*ἀρετή*) and happi-

ness. There can be no doubt about the kind of ἡδοναί Kallikles is praising. These are the pleasures that henceforth are under discussion. When (in 495d) the position of Kallikles is summarized in the principle that pleasant (ἡδύ) and good are the same, while knowledge and bravery are different from the good and from each other, there can be no doubt that under the term pleasant is included precisely that "greatest bait of evil," wholly distinct from the ἡδονή of Plato's hedonism. Nothing has been said to elevate the tone of ἡδύς when a little later (499e, 500a) the principle is accepted that the aim of all action is the good, and that one should do, not the good for the sake of the pleasant, but the pleasant for the sake of the good. The contrast between the good and the pleasant is quite in place and has nothing to do with Plato's hedonism or that pleasure which in the Protagoras is made the measure of the good. And the sentences following fairly suggest the art of measurement. It is agreed that not every man is competent to decide what pleasant things are good and what are bad, but only the τεχνικός, one who has training and skill.

Considering now which arts make pleasure their aim and which make good their aim, Sokrates classes concert music and the art of tragedy with political oratory and fancy cooking as forms of flattery, aiming at pleasure rather than the good of body or soul. Here certainly are included higher kinds of pleasure than those we call sensual, but no suggestion of that highest pleasure of the immortal part of us, the kind of pleasure for which the brave man or the martyr is ready to sacrifice life. That is wholly included under the good. Nowhere in the Gorgias is ἡδονή employed in that inclusive sense, with prominence given ultimately to the noblest phase of it—to the pleasure of the immortal part of soul—which in the Protagoras is the foundation of Plato's hedonism. The myth that ends the Gorgias emphasizes the immortal destiny of man, the happiness of those souls who have kept themselves uncontaminated by the body.

Perhaps we need not follow out in detail the Phaedo, the Philebus, and the discussion of pleasure in the Republic. All lead to the same result. Every kind of pleasure is included under ἡδονή in one place or another, except precisely that which makes Plato's hedonism an elevated doctrine, wholly consistent with

the entire body of his ethical teaching. Demotic or popular virtue is in the *Phaedo* his term for that which rests on a calculation of pleasures and pains of the various lower kinds, philosophic virtue his term for that which chooses above all else the highest happiness of the soul.

Plato seems to have recognized that the paradoxical way of stating his principle of measurement, with the shift in significance of *ἡδονή* and ultimate exclusion of all its lower range, which is precisely its most usual range, led too inevitably to misunderstanding. That was reason enough why he never recurred to that mode of statement.

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IV.—CLITARCHUS.

I.

Clitarchus and Onesicritus are representatives of the same form of rhetorical embellishment in history, and the characterization of the latter by Strabo xv. 1. 28 C 698 might be applied to the former. Their literary relation needs, not demonstration, but merely illustration. Strabo xv. 1. 30 C 699 (from Onesicritus) and Diodorus xvii. 91. 3, with the same Greek words differently arranged, state that in India wives were burned with their dead husbands. Strabo also, in xv. 2. 14 C 726, says there is a gold-bearing river in Carmania. This is, according to Pliny *N. H.* vi. 23 (26). 98, Hyctanis, (flumen) portuosum et auro fertile. Curtius generalizes the statement in viii. 9. 18 aurum flumina vehunt, and the entire description, although derived immediately from Clitarchus, goes back to Onesicritus. So intimately are the two writers associated that it is impossible to determine all the threads woven by each in the later history of Alexander. Still it will be not an altogether fruitless task to consider the actual and also the probable contribution of each to the history of Alexander.

At the outset we are met with uncertainty in all the chronological data in regard to the original writers of the history of Alexander. If we assume that all we have in regard to the seer Aristander is from Callisthenes, the latest date for the close of C.'s work should be 328 B. C., when Aristander is mentioned for the last time. An item in Arrian, *Anabasis* vii. 18. 5, shows that Aristobulus wrote after the battle of Ipsus, 301 B. C. But the original comment by Arrian in *Anabasis* vii. 22. 5 on the greatness of Seleucus, in connection with the other statement, may be taken as an indication that Aristobulus wrote before the defeat of Lysimachus at Corupedion, when Seleucus became master of the larger part of the empire of Alexander. Judging by these passages, the limits would be 301 and 281 B. C. Fränkel (*Die Quellen der Alexanderhistoriker*, p. 123), accepting a misapplication of the words of Arrian *Anabasis* vii. 29, places him after 294 or 287 B. C. This is supported by a calculation

based on Lucian *Macrob.* 22, which says that Aristobulus began his history at the age of 84. If 50 at the death of Alexander, then 323 B. C.—(84-50) = 289 B. C. But absolutely nothing is known about the age of Aristobulus at the death of Alexander, and in spite of Lucian's statement taken from the preface to the work of Aristobulus, he tells us in *The Way to Write History* 12 how Alexander disposed of one chapter of the history, thus giving evidence for an early as well as for a late date of composition. Onesicritus read the story of the Queen of the Amazons, πολλοῖς χρόνοις ὕστερον (Plutarch *Alexander* 46), to Lysimachus who assumed the title of king in 304, and was killed in 281 B. C., and the reading may be placed anywhere between these two dates. The last mention of Nearchus is for the year 312 B. C. The compilation of the work of Ptolemy may belong to the quiet years of his reign before his death in 283 B. C. Arrian, and Curtius in ix. 5. 21, indicate a decided Ptolemaic coloring, and, on the basis of this, we may imagine that near the close of his reign the king received a copy of the work of Aristobulus, and in reply published his history of Alexander. But this hypothesis can be reversed, and in fact all the chronological data are so indefinite that any of them can be shifted to suit any theory of literary relationship.

Very little is known of the personal history of Clitarchus. Pliny *N. H.* x. 49 (70). 136 states that he was the son of Dinon whose history of Persian affairs extended to the invasion of Egypt by Ochus. If the continuation of his work was prevented by death, about 351 B. C. must be the latest assignable date for the birth of Clitarchus. Yet the statement in Pliny: Nec Sirenes impetraverint fidem, adfirmet licet Dinon Clitarchi celebrati auctoris pater in India esse, mulcerique earum cantu quos gravatos somno lacerent, indicates a later date, though Pliny may have confused father and son. Compare *Ælian Hist. Anim.* xvii, 23, where the Sirens are mentioned in a quotation from Clitarchus.

Diodorus ii. 3. 7 does not include Clitarchus among the writers who accompanied Alexander on his Asiatic campaign, and he may not have been an original observer of the facts which he records. On this point also there may be various interpretations. Strabo quotes freely from Aristobulus, Nearchus and Onesicritus, but rejects the statement of Clitarchus in three of the five

passages where he is mentioned, and in another summarily passes him by. Plutarch merely mentions him (*Alexander* 46; and *Themistocles* 27). Still Pliny the Elder and Ælian seem more favorably inclined, the former quoting quite freely from him, and the latter (*Hist. Anim.* xvii. 2; 22-23; and 25), giving, as if they were original, his descriptions of monkeys, birds and snakes. What we get from the Romans seems to favor his originality. The crystallized critical view is given by Quintilian x. 1. 74; probatur ingenium, fides infamatur. Similar to this is Cicero, *Brutus* 11. 42, where, speaking of the description by Clitarchus and Stratocles of the death of Themistocles, there is added: Hanc enim mortem rhetorice et tragice ornare potuerunt. Cicero also says, in *De Legg.* i. 2. 8, that Sisenna had acquired "puerile quiddam," as if he had read none of the Greeks except Clitarchus. However, reliance on him for historical data is attested by Cicero *ad Fam.* ii. 10 (to Caelius), and by Pliny's application to him of the words "celebratus auctor." Curtius in ix. 8. 15 names him as authority for a number which Diodorus xvii. 102. 6 accepts without question, and in ix. 5. 21 belabors him and Timagenes for a mistake about Ptolemy.

The date when Clitarchus wrote can not be determined. Arrian, *Anabasis* vii. 26. 3, states that Aristobulus and Ptolemy have nothing further about the death of Alexander, and then gives, from an unknown source, an account of the poisoning plot. This is set forth in the works derived from Clitarchus—Justinus xii. 14; Curtius x. 10. 14-19; Diodorus xvii. 118. 1-2; and Plutarch *Alexander* 77. The last writer says that no one had any suspicion of the plot until the sixth year after the death of Alexander. If Clitarchus was under the protection of Olympias he may have written at that time. But Diodorus (section 2) declares that most writers did not dare to mention the plot until after the death of Cassander, which was in 297 B. C.

Strabo xvii. 1. 8 C 794 relates that the body of Alexander was buried in Alexandria where it still lay, and Suetonius *Aug.* 18 agrees with the latter part of the statement; cf. *Cal.* 52. See also Curtius x. 10. 19-20: Regnum enim Macedoniae Antipater et Graeciam quoque invasit: suboles deinde excepit interfectis omnibus, quicumque Alexandrum etiam longinqua cognatione contingerant. Ceterum corpus eius a Ptolemæo, cui Ægyptus

cesserat, Memphim et inde paucis post annis Alexandriam translatum est omnisque memoriae ac nomini honos habitus. Diodorus xviii. 28. 2 says that after two years' preparation Arrhidæus started to transfer the body of Alexander from Babylon to Egypt, but Ptolemy advancing as far as Syria decided to place it in Alexandria. Pausanias i. 6. 3 mentions Memphis, as does Curtius, but tells us that the removal from the place was by Ptolemy Philadelphus. This is probably incorrect, yet we may well believe that it was well within the reign of the first Ptolemy before Alexandria attained such prominence as to make it the fittest resting-place for Alexander. If the statement of Curtius was derived from Clitarchus, it merely shows that the latter wrote some time after the removal of the body of Alexander. However, the words "suboles exceptit, interfectis omnibus" refer to some time after 308 B. C., when Cleopatra, the last survivor of the royal house of Macedon, was assassinated by Cassander. From these two indefinite statements we get only the indefinite conclusions, perhaps after 308, perhaps after 297 B. C.

The number of books in the work of Clitarchus is unknown. The scholiast to Aristophanes *Birds* 487 gives an item from the tenth book, and Diogenes Laertius v. 6 Prooem. one from the twelfth, although this assignment may really be to Clearchus who is mentioned in the same passage.

Ancient critics did not fail to notice the rhetorical character of his work. Longinus *De Sublimitate* 3. 2, after mentioning Gorgias of Leontini, continues: "So it is with some of the expressions of Callisthenes which are not sublime but high-flown, and still more with those of Cleitarchus, for the man is frivolous and blows 'On pigmy hautboys, mouthpiece have they none.'" (Translations by Roberts and Way.) Roberts also states, p. 223 s. v. *Cleitarchus*, "It seems hitherto to have escaped notice that the frigidity of Cleitarchus' style is condemned in the *Rhetoric* of Philodemus the Epicurean [ψυχρό]τερον ὁ τι τοῦ Κλειταρχείου, frigidius vel Clitarchico sermone. Herculan. volum. xi. 37." This is in accord with the judgment of Demetrius, *De Elocutione* 304, where he quotes from Clitarchus in regard to the anthredon or tenthredon: "It lays waste the hill-country and dashes into the hollow oaks. This might have served for a description of some wild ox or of the Erymanthian boar, rather than a species of bee. The result is that the passage

is both repellent and frigid" (Translation by Roberts). This is like Goldsmith's criticism: "Dr. Johnson, if you were to make little fishes talk they would talk like big whales." But in fairness to Clitarchus it should be noticed that the wording in Diodorus xvii. 75. 5-6 is very different. After mentioning the vine, the fig-tree and the honey-tree in Hyrcania, he adds: "There is a winged insect in the land, less in size than the bee, but of the greatest usefulness. Flitting over the hill-country it gathers for itself flowers of every kind, and living in the hollow rocks and in the lightning-struck trees, it works in wax, and prepares a liquid excelling in sweetness and not much inferior to honey among us." If Diodorus reproduces Clitarchus, Demetrius gives a parody in which *κατανέμεται* is substituted for *ἐπινεμόμενον*, and *εἰσίσταται* for *ἐνδιατρίβον*. Strabo ii. 1. 14 C 73 gives the first items the same as Diodorus, but is silent in regard to the tenthredon. Pliny *N. H.* xii. 8 (18). 34 (cf. Curt. vi. 4. 22) quotes from Onesicritus in regard to the honey-tree, and in xv. 18(19). 68 in regard to the fig. These assignments mark Onesicritus as the original author of the statements, and, judging by Diodorus, Clitarchus added the description of the tenthredon, and this was parodied by Demetrius in the spirit of Clitarchus himself. That he added items to the account of Onesicritus is also indicated by other statements.

Strabo vii. 2. 1 C 293 criticizes an item from Clitarchus which says that the horsemen of Alexander were almost overtaken by the tide from the Ocean. This is a part—*equites ingenti cursu refugere, et secutus est aestus*—in the long description in Curtius ix. 9. 9 ff. It was a veritable deluge, and may well be considered as an addition to the account, probably from Onesicritus, which is given in Pliny *N. H.* xiii. 25(51). 141. After mentioning the soldiers he adds: *Eodem tractu insularum silvas operit aestus, quamquam altiores platanis populisque altissimis . . . harum minores totas integit mare. maximarum cacumina extant, ad quae naves religantur, et cum recessit aestus, ad radices.* The tides are not mentioned by either Diodorus or Plutarch, and only incidentally by Arrian vi. 18. 4. As Clitarchus seems to have added to the account of Onesicritus, so Curtius added to Clitarchus by giving reminiscences of Sallust and Livy, Vergil and Ovid. On the strength of the statement

in Plutarch *Alexander* 46 it may be held that Onesicritus put into shape the story of the Queen of the Amazons, which had as its real basis Alexander's statement that a Scythian princess had been offered him as a wife. Strabo xi. 5. 4 C 505 quotes from Clitarchus that Thalestria came from the Caspian Gates and the Thermodon, and then adds that these two were 6000 stades apart. Both these items from Clitarchus indicate the way in which he dealt with the work of Onesicritus.

There is another criticism which fits Clitarchus, although it may not have been so intended. Longinus *De Sublimitate* 4. 7 criticises the expression in Herodotus v. 18 to the effect that beautiful women are "eye-smarts," τὰς καλὰς γυναῖκας "ἀλγυδόνες ὀφθαλμῶν," and Plutarch *Alexander* 21 gives, perhaps from Clitarchus, a remark of Alexander in regard to Persian women εἰσὶν ἀλγυδόνες ὀμμάτων αἱ Περσίδες, in which the Greek is slightly different.

II.

In spite of his importance as a writer the material directly assigned to him is provokingly small. More than a dozen of his proverbial passages have been preserved, and if we had only these, he might be ranked as a keen-sighted philosopher, free from the defects of rhetorical exaggeration. *Ab tribus omnia disce.* Stobaeus 53. 13 (Meineke ii. 314): πᾶσα τόλμη καὶ τὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ὑπερβαίνει μέτρα: "Boldness transcends even the limits of power"; Meineke iv. 143, *Addenda* 2: Ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ οὗ ἀδίκως ἔπραξας δις ἀδικήσεις: "Defending what you unjustly did, twice shall you be unjust"; Meineke iv. 239. 2: Ὀφείλομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐθίζειν ἀπ' ὀλίγων ζῆν, ἵνα μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν ἔνεκεν χρημάτων πάθωμεν: "We ought to habituate ourselves to live on slender means, that we may suffer no disgrace in our pursuit of money."

With the exception of the two references in Curtius, and a few others, the fragments give us incidents associated with the career of Alexander, rather than his acts. They fall into four classes: 1. Incidental references used as illustrations; 2. Passages the substance of which is found in other works; 3. Short statements which are found elsewhere in expanded form; and 4. Items which are assigned to other writers also.

1. Strabo v. 2. 6 C 224 refers to the salts of India mentioned by Clitarchus, and in xv. 1. 69 C 718 says that the full

description of the orion and the catreus must be read in Clitarchus, while *Ælian Hist. Anim.* xvii. 22-23 more generously quotes the entire passage. A scholium to Aristophanes *Birds* 487 tells how the Persian kings wore the tiara, and one to Theocritus *Id.* ii. 59 is in regard to the use of the word *θρόνον* among the Ætolians.

2. A few items specifically assigned by one writer, are undesignated in others. Pliny *N. H.* vi. 31(36). 198 describes the richness of the islands of the Indian ocean, and Curtius x. 1. 11 has an adaptation of the same account. Athenaeus iv. 148d, quoted from Clitarchus, shows the source of Diodorus xvii. 14. 4 in regard to the wealth of the Thebans, though the menu given by Athenaeus is omitted.

3. Athenaeus xiii. 576d denies that Thais was with Alexander, but quotes Clitarchus as authority for the report that she was responsible for the burning of Persepolis. Diodorus xvii. 72; Plutarch *Alexander* 38; and Curtius v. 7 associate her with the act of Alexander. Strabo xv. 3. 6 C 729 and Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 18. 11, without mentioning her, say that Alexander wished to avenge injuries done to the Greeks by the Persians. With this story may be placed that about the queen of the Amazons toward which Strabo and Arrian have the same critical attitude; see *Class. Phil.* XIII, 306.

4. The association with Clitarchus of Timagenes by Curtius ix. 5. 21 (the presence of Ptolemy in a battle); of Theopompus by Athenaeus xiii. 586c (Harpalus and Glycera); of Hesiod and later writers by the scholiast (the metamorphosis of Teiresias) are examples of cumulative references, and of the facile acceptance by writers of what they found in the works of their predecessors. One of the best illustrations of this is the scholium to Apollonius Rhodius *Argonautica* ii. 904 in regard to Dionysus. Division of sentiment is shown in Plutarch *Themistocles* 27, where the authority of Charon and Thucydides is opposed to that of Ephorus, Deinon, Clitarchus and Heracleides.

Most of this material is not found in either Diodorus or Curtius, and there is in it nothing marvelous excepting about Teiresias, Thais, Thalestria, the tenthredon and the tides. In favor of the Clitarchan derivation of at least some of the marvelous that is unassigned is the fact that it is not found in

Arrian. However, this is not a sure test for the source of all that is marvelous in Curtius.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus *De Compositione Verborum* 18 tells of the treatment by Alexander of Betis the commander at Gaza. This is not mentioned by Diodorus xvii. 48. 7, nor by Plutarch *Alexander* 25, nor in the brief statement by Josephus *Ant. Iud.* xi. 8. 3, where he is called Bubemesis instead of Betis. Dionysius after giving one account follows with a quotation from Hegesias, some parts of which are parallel to Curtius iv. 6. 7 ff. Strabo quotes from him in viii. 1. 16 C 396, and criticises him in xiv. 1. 41 C 648. Cicero parodies his style *ad Att.* xii. 6, and condemns him (*Orator* 67. 226): *Saltat incidens particulas; as also (Brutus 83. 287): At quid est tam fractum, tam minutum, tam in ipsa . . . concinnitate puerile?* These quotations indicate his rhetorical importance, while Plutarch *Alexander* 3 shows that he drew some of his subjects from the life of Alexander. It is reasonable to suppose that he was known to Curtius, and that from him came the description of the death of Betis. Not only may the story be derived from Hegesias, but there may also be an imitation of his style in section 28: *Videtisne obstinatum ad tacendum? num genu posuit? num vocem supplicem misit?*

There are also some passages which can be traced to other sources than Clitarchus. Strabo xv. 1. 39 C 703—52 C 707, and Arrian *Indica* 11-12 give, from Megasthenes, an account of the classes in India, and practically the same facts are found in Diodorus ii. 40-41, and in the use of Greek he does not differ more widely from the others than they differ from each other. As Megasthenes was at hand for Strabo, there is no need of an assumption that Diodorus did not draw from the same source.

Matthew Arnold in *The Study of Poetry* speaks of "an infallible touchstone for detecting the presence or absence of high poetic quality and also the degree of this quality," but for the facts of Clitarchus there can be nothing more than a theoretical reconstruction based on the similarities and divergences found in later writers. Unity of narrative is given as a criterion, although this may be found in a passage made up from several sources. "Near the Acesines river, which was fifteen stades in width, the Macedonians found great trees, and under the shade of one a myriad of men could rest. Their branches

grew downward, and among them were seen large apes almost human in appearance. On the ground crawled monstrous snakes, one of which seized Pithon the son of Antigenes." This passage does not lack unity, though the items came from Aristobulus, Nearchus, Onesicritus and Ptolemy. At most, unity merely shows that some one has brought into harmonious relations a number of separate elements observed by himself or others. The problem of combining items from several writers giving their original observations is exactly the same as that of one writer making the same observations and combining them into one account.

The dictum *simplex et unum* is merely a suggested line of investigation, and conclusions will differ. At many a turn in the history of Alexander we are met with the query Does a single item that is assigned to some author prove the authorship of the context, or is it extraneous matter introduced for illustration? Diodorus ii. 7 refers to both Ktesias and Clitarchus in his description of Babylon, and some of the same items in Curtius v. 1. 24 ff. might seem to fix Clitarchus as the source for the passage in Diodorus. Yet there is a close resemblance between Curtius and Strabo xvi. 1. 5 C 738, and the reference to the "Wonders" cannot be from Clitarchus, unless he wrote after the erection of the Pharos under Ptolemy Philadelphus. However the question is of most interest in regard to the fifteenth book of Strabo and the *Alexander* of Plutarch.

We find in the first section of the latter the significant remark: "Some little deed, some word or jest has put an emphasis on character more than fights with myriads slain, battle lines the greatest or siege of cities." Plutarch's work is a *vita* not a *historia*, and the quotations are little sidelights showing the wide extent of the field from which he gleaned his material. No one writer could give more than a little to illustrate the many-sidedness of Alexander, and Plutarch has given us a little from many, rather than much from a few. His quotations from Menander (17) and Sophocles (7), from Chares (20) in regard to the wounding of Alexander at Issus, from Sotion (61) about a pet dog, and many other statements, either definitely or indefinitely assigned, are merely to throw light on, rather than to indicate the source of the context.

Let us apply this conclusion to the *Alexander* 31-33 which contains an account of the battle at Arbela. Callisthenes is twice

mentioned, at the beginning, for the prayer of Alexander, and near the end, for an interpretation of the attitude of Parmenio toward Alexander. That the reference to Callisthenes is purely incidental is indicated by another quotation in 31. There was a fight between two sections of the army, so the story runs, and the one called "Alexander" was victor, receiving twelve villages as a reward. "These things says Eratosthenes." Then it is stated that the great battle took place, not at Arbela, but at Gaugamela. Arrian *Anabasis* vi. 11. 5 tells us that both Aristobulus and Ptolemy mention this fact, and it is also found in Strabo xvi. 1. 3. C 737. The last item coming down from the time of Aristobulus was put in to correct what had been recorded by Diodorus, and the narrative was illuminated by two quotations from Callisthenes, one from Eratosthenes, and an item credited to "they say." If Plutarch reproduces the description by Callisthenes, it is passing strange that two items should have been picked out and assigned to him, when all was his. There would be as little need for this as for a writer beginning a long quotation with the words "Four score and seven years ago," to close, "As Lincoln says in his Speech at Gettysburg 'that government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.'"

We may perhaps safely assume that the larger part of Diodorus xvii, as also of Justinus xi-xii, is derived from Clitarchus. Yet the brevity of the work of Justinus limits its use for purposes of comparison, and, in addition, some of his statements have evidently been changed in transmission. The Diodorus-Curtius account gives 10,000 as the number of horsemen among the Malli, and this shows that an l has been added in Justinus xii. 9. 3 lx milia. We find in Curtius viii. 11. 1: Hinc Polypercon ad urbem Noram cum exercitu missus, but in Justinus xii. 10. 1 Polyperconta cum exercitu Babyloniam mittit; it appears the Greek name Ὀρα (Arrian *Anabasis* iv. 28. 4) with some other letters was mistaken for Βαβυλῶνα. There are numerous instances of absolute agreement between Diodorus and Curtius, as also between the latter and Justinus (Pompeius Trogus). In such cases Curtius may have used Clitarchus, or he may have used only the later writers. When the difference is merely in the details, Clitarchus may be the source for all. Justinus xi. 15. 1 gives Thara as the place where Darius was seized by Bessus; Curtius

v. 13. 24 and Plutarch *Alexander* 43 name Polystratus as the Macedonian by whom he was found. All these items may have been given by Clitarchus, and later writers who based their works on his, followed their own stylistic sense in the selection of details. But in Curtius there are also indications that at times he went over to the Aristobulan tradition, as in ix. 5. 9 super latus; Arrian *Anabasis* vi. 10. 1 ὑπὲρ τὸν μαστόν; Diodorus xvii. 99. 3 ὑπὸ τὸν μαστόν; Justinus 12. 9. 12 sub mamma. There are differences more marked in other passages, and we may safely hold that Arrian emphasizes the narrative of Aristobulus to disparage that of Clitarchus. Of the many instances where this is possible we shall mention only the personal combats of Alexander at the Granicus (*Anab.* i. 15. 7: Diod. xvii. 20. 3-7); the wounding of Alexander among the Malli (*Anab.* vi. 9-11: Diod. xvii. 98. 5-99. 4); and the return to the Hydaspes (*Anab.* v. 29. 5: Diod. xvii. 95. 3).

In addition to differences in fact stated, there are also expressional variations in which there are two noticeable features: 1. A change in the order of terms; and 2. Variations in verbal statement.

1. A change in the arrangement of words is generally a sure sign of the use of the same source, and finds its best illustration in the quotations or adaptations of Livy by Curtius, in the abridgement of Pompeius Trogus (Justinus) by Orosius, and, in another field, in the reproduction of parts of Pliny's *Naturalis Historia* by Martianus Capella. There being no originality to be shown in the statement of the same fact, a show of it was gained by changing the arrangement of the terms. As an illustration we may cite Strabo xv. 1. 28 C 698, having the size of the kingdom of Taxiles at the close of the description, while Plutarch *Alexander* 59 has it at the beginning. Some words of Arrian *Anabasis* i. 21. 1-4, and of Diodorus xvii. 25. 5-6 will also be given: sec. 1: Οὐ πολλαῖς δὲ ἡμέραις ὕστερον δύο τῶν Μακεδόνων ὁπλῖται ἐκ τῆς [ὕστερον] Περδικκου τάξεως ξυσκηνοῦντές τε καὶ ἅμα ξυμπίνοντες αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκάτερος ἐπὶ μέγα τῷ λόγῳ ἦγεν; and in 4: καὶ δύο πύργοι καὶ μεσοπύργιον ἐς ἔδαφος καταπεπτωκότα; Diod.: Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δύο μὲν πύργων εἰς ἔδαφος καθηρημένων καὶ δεῦν μεσοπυργίων ἐρριμμένων τῶν μὲν Περδικκου στρατιωτῶν τινες μεθυσθέντες προπετῶς νυκτὸς προσέβαλλον τοῖς τῆς ἀκροπόλεως τειχεσιν. The associated statements are good illustrations of variational

quotations : Arr. : Ἐνθα δὴ φιλοτιμία τε ἐσπιπτεῖ αὐτοῖς, καὶ τι καὶ ὁ οἶνος ὑπεθέρμαινεν, ὥστε ὀπλισάμενοι αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ σφῶν προσβάλλουσι τῷ τείχει κατὰ τὴν ἄκραν . . . καὶ τούτους κατιδόντες τινὲς τῶν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως δύο τε ὄντας καὶ οὐ ξὺν λογισμῷ προσφερομένους τῷ τείχει ἐπεκθίουσιν ; Diod. : οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μέμνονα συννοήσαντες τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν προσβαλλόντων ; Arr. : Καὶ ξυμπίπτει μάχῃ καρτερὰ πρὸς τῷ τείχει καὶ κατακλείονται αὐθις πρὸς τῶν Μακεδόνων εἴσω τῶν πυλῶν οἱ ἐπεκδραμόντες ; Diod. : Καὶ μεγάλης μάχης γενομένης καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιφανέντων οἱ μὲν Πέρσαι βιασθέντες συνεκλείσθησαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν. The passage is about twice as long in Arrian as in Diodorus, and we can not tell whether some original has been contracted by one, or expanded by the other. But, whichever way it was, the setting in Arrian suggests that it was written with an eye to what had already been set forth by Diodorus.

III.

There are no definite indications that Clitarchus made use of the work of Callisthenes, the only historian of Alexander who certainly preceded him. Though little weight can be attached to numbers, it is interesting to compare some of his with those from other sources. The number of men under Alexander when he entered Asia is stated as follows :

	Footmen.	Horsemen.
Callisthenes (Polybius xii. 19. 1)	40000	4500
Aristobulus (Plutarch <i>De Alex. Fort.</i> Or. I 3. 327 D)	30000	4000
Anaximenes (Plutarch <i>De Alex. Fort.</i>)	43000	5500
Ptolemy " " " "	30000	5000
Plutarch <i>Alexander</i> 15 minimum	30000	4000
" " " maximum	43000	5000
Diodorus xvii. 17. 4 ; Justinus xi. 6. 2	32000	4500

Aristobulus gives the minimum number (30000:4000), while the other five sets are different, and it is only in the number of horsemen that Diodorus agrees with Callisthenes. Arrian *Anabasis* i. 11. 3 follows Ptolemy. In the same connection Polybius (from Callisthenes) has 5000:800 as the number of men joining Alexander in Asia before the battle of Issus, while Arrian *Anabasis* i. 29. 4 gives 3000:650 for the same period.

There are however four fragments which give material for a comparison with the narrative of other writers. These are 1. The passage of the Climax; 2. The battle at Issus; 3. The visit to the shrine of Ammon; and 4. The statue of Sardanapalus.

1. Josephus *Ant. Jud.* ii. 16. 5 compares the passage with that of the Israelites through the Red Sea, adding that it was described by all writers of the affairs of Alexander. Strabo xiv. 3. 9 C 666 says that Alexander passed through in the winter season, relying on chance (τῇ τύχῃ). But Eustathius on Homer *Il.* xiii. 29 quotes from Callisthenes in regard to the obeisance of the sea in the presence of the king. Arrian *Anabasis* i. 26. 2 relates that in the eyes of Alexander and his friends the accomplishment was οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θείου. Plutarch *Alexander* 17 quotes from Menander, and also states that many writers mention θεία τιὰ τύχῃ, though Alexander in his epistles denies that there was anything divine about it. Inasmuch as Diodorus who uses τύχῃ freely does not mention this episode, it may be taken as proof that it was not mentioned at all by Clitarchus.

2. Polybius xii. 19 ff. reviews and points out the defects in the description by Callisthenes of the battle at Issus. Arrian *Anabasis* ii. 8 ff. eliminates the difficulties in the narrative of Callisthenes, while Plutarch *Alexander* 20 has little about the battle itself, but quotes from the letters of Alexander, and from Chares in regard to the wounding of Alexander by Darius. Diodorus xvii. 33. 1 puts the horsemen in front, the phalanx in the rear, thus reversing the positions assigned by Arrian ii. 8. 2, and in section 2 characterizes the Thessalians who are barely mentioned by Arrian. His account in general bears no relation to that of Callisthenes, while Curtius closely resembles Arrian.

3. Strabo xvii. 1. 43 C 814 relates that Alexander greatly desired to visit the shrine of Ammon, when he heard that Perseus and Hercules had been there before him. He then mentions the departure from Paraetonium, the wandering, the rains, and the ravens leading the way. Plutarch *Alexander* 27 (from Callisthenes) adds that their cries directed the Macedonians by night. All the other accounts have the story of the ravens, but Ptolemy (Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 3. 5) says that two dragons went before the army uttering cries. Diodorus xii. 51. 3 quotes the declaration of the priest that Alexander would be invincible (ἀνίκητον),

as does Curtius iv. 7. 28 (*invictum*). This may be taken as an addition by Clitarchus, as Plutarch *Alexander* 14 gives it as the declaration of the priestess at Delphi.

4. The statue of Sardanapalus at Anchiale had on it an inscription in Assyrian stating that he had captured Anchiale and Tarsus in one day. "Eat, drink, and be merry, for all else is not worth this"—that is, the snap indicated by the position of the fingers of the right hand. The details of the description vary with different writers who may be classified according to the translation of the last word. Callisthenes (Fr. 32) has *ἔσθιε, πίνε, ὄχευε*. Plutarch *De Alexandri magni Fortuna aut Virtute* Or. ii. 3. 336 C changes the last word to *ἀφροδισιάζε*. Arrian *Anabasis* ii. 5. 4 (without assignment); Athenaeus xii. 530a, and Strabo xiv. 5. 9 C 672 have *παίζε*. Strabo also gives from Choerilus: *ταῦτ' ἔχω, ὅσος' ἔφαγον καὶ ἀφύβρισα, καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος τέρπν' ἔπαθον*. The adaptation by Choerilus is the prevailing form, as in Diodorus ii. 23. 3; Polybius vii. 12. 4; Plutarch *De Alex. Fort.* i. 9. 330 F and *De se . . . laudando* 17; and the scholiast on Aristoph. *Birds* 1022, who states that it was quoted by Apollodorus. The poetical form probably gives the content of the inscription on the tomb of Sardanapalus; the prose form that on the monument, given literally by Callisthenes and softened by Aristobulus. Compare the Septuagint rendition of Ecclesiastes viii. 15 *εἰ μὴ τοῦ φαγεῖν καὶ τοῦ πίνειν καὶ τοῦ εὐφρανθῆναι*, both the original and the translation being produced under Alexandrian influences. Clitarchus (Athenaeus xii. 530a) mentions the death of the king, but nothing is indicated in regard to any inscription.

IV.

Through Arrian we have the facts of Aristobulus, and through Diodorus, Curtius and Pompeius Trogus (Justinus) the facts and fancies of the Clitarchan tradition. There are uncounted differences in numbers, and even the same writer, in the text as we have it, does not always give the same in different connections. According to Curtius vii. 9. 13, Alexander pursued the Scythians 80 stades. Plutarch *Alexander* 45 has 100, and in *De Magni Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute* Or. ii. 9. 341 C, 150. Numbers are a sort of unmental element in the narrative, and differences in statement, where it is a matter of a greater or

lesser number of strokes of the pen, are of little moment, and many differences are merely the result of changes in transmission. Yet there are some which indicate original differences in statement. Arrian *Anabasis* v. 3. 5 says that Taxiles gave to Alexander 200 talents of silver, 3000 sacred cattle, above a myriad of sheep, and 30 elephants. Curtius has in viii. 12. 11: lvi elephantum erant . . . multa pecora eximiae magnitudinis, tauros ad iii milia; and in section 15 signati argenti lxxx talenta. The definite numbers in the first group are separated by the indefinite, *multa* is for myriad, one is not given with the others, and two are different from Arrian's.

Many of the variations in names count for nothing, as they are due to mistakes in copying or to mistaken inferences. When Diodorus has Ballonymus, Bagodaras and Mophis which appear in Curtius as Abdalonymus, Cobares and Omphis, it is clear that there has been merely varying transmission. Noticeable are the different accounts of the combats of Alexander at the battle of the Granicus. Arrian *Anabasis* i. 15. 7 says that he struck Mithridates on the head with a spear, and was struck by Rhoesakes whom he killed. Spithridates raised his ax against Alexander, but Clitus the son of Dropides anticipating the blow cut off his forearm. Diodorus xvii. 20 says that Spithrobatas made the attack and was killed by Alexander. Then came the assault of his brother Rhosakes whose hand was cut off by Clitus the Black. Plutarch *Alexander* 16 relates that Spithridates was slain by Clitus (cf. 50), and Rhoesakes by Alexander, while in *De Alex. Fort.* Or. ii. 2. 326 F Mithridates and Spithridates are mentioned.

Arrian *Anabasis* vi. 11. 1 states that some give Critodemus Cous, and some Perdiccas as the one who extracted the arrow from Alexander when he was wounded among the Malli. The *Indica* 18. 6 (from Nearchus) names Critobulus Cous among the men on the fleet, and we find in Curtius ix. 5. 25 Critobulus, inter medicos artis eximiae, as if he were the one who extracted the arrow from the eye of Philip, citra deformitatem oris (Pliny *N. H.* vii. 37(37). 124). As some of the authors, and all of the scribes were inditing matters which were outside of their own personal experience, it is not strange that confusion should sometimes arise, as in Diodorus xvii. 25. 5, where among the dead Macedonians is mentioned Neoptolemus their leader,

an illustrious man. Arrian *Anabasis* i. 20. 10 names among the slain Persians, Neoptolemus, the son of Arrabaeus, brother of Amyntas, one of those in exile at the court of Darius.

We find in the above, from Arrian, Clitus the son of Dropides, and Neoptolemus the son of Arrabaeus, but, in Diodorus, Clitus the Black and Neoptolemus. There is the same difference in Arrian *Anabasis* i. 7. 6; i. 17. 8; i. 25. 1 Alexander the son of Aeropus; but in Diodorus xvii. 32. 1; Curt. vii. 1. 5 et al. Lyncestes Alexander; Just. xi. 2. 2. et al. Alexander Lyncesta. Notice also *Anabasis* iii. 11. 10 Erigyus the son of Larichus; Diodorus xvii. 57. 3 Erigyus the Mitylenaeus; *Anabasis* iii. 12. 4 Agathon the son of Tyrimma: Diodorus xvii. 64. 5 Agathon the Pydnaean; *Anabasis* ii. 12. 2 Menes the son of Dionysius: Diodorus xvii. 64. 5 Menes the Pellaean. Arrian (Aristobulus) is always very careful in his personal designations, as is shown by the list of ten names in *Anabasis* i. 14, and of fifteen in iii. 11. 8-11. In Diodorus xvii. 57 also, Nicanor and Philotas are designated as the sons of Parmenio, but only one other, Philip the son of Balacrus, as in Curtius iv. 13. 28, for which Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 11. 10 has Philip the son of Menelaus.

We do not have from Aristobulus the names of the men among whom the empire of Alexander was divided, but the short list in Curtius x. 10. 1-4 does not, in any case, indicate the father, nor does Diodorus xviii. 3, except for Ptolemy. Justinus xiii. 4. 10-13 names the father of Antigonus, Cassander and Seleucus, and has Pithon the son of Agenor to distinguish him from Pithon Illyrius. But we find Laomedon Mytilenaeus, Soleus Staganor, Archon Pellaean, and these when mentioned by Arrian are not designated in this way. In only a few instances is there agreement, as in *Anabasis* i. 14. 3 and Diodorus xvii. 17. 4 Calas the son of Harpalus; *Anabasis* i. 8. 2 et al. and Diodorus xvii. 45. 7 Amyntas the son of Andromenes. The *Anabasis* gives us the type of designation for Aristobulus, and the *Indica* that for Nearchus. Diodorus has done the same for Clitarchus, and the two types are entirely distinct.

The names given by Pliny from Onesicritus are different from those in Arrian's *Indica* from Nearchus, as each writer was free to name new places as he pleased. There are also some indications of the same freedom in other connections. Curtius vii. 11 describes the capture of the rock, 30 by 150 stades, of Arimazes

Sogdianus. This is mentioned by Strabo xi. 11. 4 C 517, and by Arrian *Anabasis* iv. 18. 4-7 as the place where the children of Oxyartes were captured. Curtius viii. 2. 19 ff. tells of Sisimithres at Nautaca, and of Alexander using an intermediary—Oxyartes—though later in viii. 4. 21 he recounts the submission of Oxyartes to Alexander. Strabo and Plutarch *Alexander* 58 name Sisimithres and Oxyartes, while Arrian *Anabasis* iv. 21. 1-9 associates the latter with Chorienes. On the Clitarchan side we find Persepolis, which the *Anabasis* has in vii. 1. 1. Here it is associated with Pasargada, which Curtius has in v. 6. 10; and x. 1. 22, as has the *Anabasis* in iii. 18. 10; and vi. 29. 1. Diodorus xvii. 76. 6 states that Bucephalus was a gift from Demaratus the Corinthian, who is mentioned by Plutarch *Alexander* 9, 37 and 56, but it is expressly stated in chapter 6 that the horse was bought from Philonices the Thessalian, and this agrees with Pliny *N. H.* viii. 42(64). 154. There are also other evidences of independent sources. Arrian *Anabasis* i. 11. 1 gives Aegae as the place where the games were held; Diodorus xvii. 16. 3 has Dios. Compare *Anabasis* iii. 18. 2 *ὡς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς πύλας τὰς Περσίδας ἀφίκετο*, and Diodorus xvii. 68. 1 *ἦκεν ἐπὶ τὰς Σουσιᾶδας καλουμένας πέτρας*.

The Agriani, *agema* and ἄγη are the names of the divisions of the Macedonian Army most frequently mentioned. The first two are freely used by Arrian, and occasionally by Curtius. Diodorus has only the last, while it occurs frequently in Arrian, and sometimes where in corresponding passages Curtius has *ala*.

Next to the numbers the names are the most uncertain element in the history of Alexander. And this applies to the important as well as to the unimportant. Diodorus xvii. 15. 1 mentions ten orators, but names only the two most important—Demosthenes and Lycurgus. Arrian *Anabasis* i. 10. 4 associates with these two Hyperides, Polyeuctus, Chares, Charidemus, Ephialtes, Diotimus, and Moericles—nine in all. Plutarch *Demosthenes* 23 states that according to Idomeneus and Duris there were ten, but most writers and the most trustworthy give the following: Demosthenes, Polyeuctus, Ephialtes, Lycurgus, Moericles, Demon, Callisthenes and Charidemus. This list has Demon and Callisthenes who are not mentioned by Arrian, while Hyperides, Chares, and Diotimus are omitted.

A difference at any single point does not always indicate a

difference between authors. Diodorus xvii. 64. 5 says that Alexander put Agathon the Pydnaean in command of the citadel at Babylon, making Apollodorus the Amphipolitan and Menes the Pellaean rulers of Babylon and of the satrapies as far as Cilicia, and giving them 1000 talents of silver. Curtius v. 1. 43 has the last item, but says that Menes and Apollodorus were put over Babylon and Cilicia. Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 16. 4 names only Apollodorus, but in section 9 Menes is given as commander of Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia. In this statement Curtius agrees with Arrian, as also in the position assigned to Mazaeus, though he alone mentions Bagophanes. Similar to this last is Curtius vii. 6. 12 and vii. 1. 7 where Berdes is named as the messenger to the Scythians, although Arrian *Anabasis* iv. 1. 1 and iv. 15. 1 says that some messengers were sent. There is the same definiteness in Curtius ix. 8. 28 where Moeris is named as king of Patalia. Arrian merely mentions the ruler, though in *Anabasis* v. 18. 7 he speaks of Meroes, a friend of Porus.

There is occasionally a misinterpretation of the Greek by Curtius giving a name which might be taken as a part of the Clitarchan tradition. According to Curtius v. 1. 16 Alexander came *quartis castris* to Mennin: *Caverna ibi est, ex qua fons ingentem bituminis vim effundit, adeo ut satis constet Babylonios muros ingentis operis huius fontis bitumine interlitos esse*. The same region and its fountain of naphtha are mentioned by Strabo xvi. 1. 4 C 738, and Plutarch devotes one long chapter (*Alexander* 35) to the subject. No mention, however, is made of any place, so that the Mennin of Curtius is probably the misinterpretation of some Greek word.

The form of personal designation as well as that of sections of the army in the Aristobulan and the Clitarchan tradition are distinctly different. Curtius, who is largely dependent on Diodorus, and who in this way reproduces Clitarchus, occasionally draws from the other branch of the history of Alexander. This is due to Onesicritus and Clitarchus, whose main characteristics are so much alike, that it is impossible to separate the parts due to each in the history as it has come down to us.

R. B. STEELE.

V.—PAUL'S EPISTLES COMPARED WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

This paper makes no attempt to settle the authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Various claims have been set up by Church Fathers, critics, and scholars for Luke, Paul, Barnabas, Apollos, and others. I shall present none of these claims. By some insistent perversity the name of Paul has been attached to the letter until this good hour, altho modern scholarship overwhelmingly believes that Paul was not its author. Many questions are involved in the study of authorship: the date of composition, the place of composition, the people to whom it was written, the object for which it was written, etc. None of these questions will be discussed at the present time. Following up the suggestion that Paul's writings in some instances resemble the letter to the Hebrews as much as they resemble others of his own letters, it is my pleasure to present a few facts observed and collected from various sources. (I include in this study all the letters generally assigned to Paul.)

As I am in no sense trying to establish or disestablish the Pauline authorship, I pass over the external evidence or lack of evidence with this single statement from Westcott's Introduction to his edition of Hebrews, p. LXVI, in which he claims to give the three opinions current at the first appearance of the letter: "At Alexandria the Greek Epistle was held to be not directly but mediately St. Paul's, as either a free translation of his words or a reproduction of his thoughts. In North Africa it was known to some extent as the work of Barnabas and acknowledged as a secondary authority. At Rome and in western Europe it was not included in the collection of the Epistles of St. Paul and had no Apostolic weight." For a long time the Eastern Church was much more favorably disposed toward the Pauline authorship than the Western Church, tho the West was not without advocates of Pauline authorship. As intimated, that advocacy still persists.

Only a few points of internal evidence will be presented in

this paper, and they are not given to establish Paul's authorship, but rather to prove that in regard to many individual elements of style it was just as possible for Paul to have written Hebrews as it was for him to have written some of the letters assigned to him, if some of his other letters are taken as a standard for those particular constructions.

Before presenting these facts, let me say in general that it is a difficult matter to compare Paul's works as a whole with anything, because each letter is a unit, written at a separate time, to a distinct church or person, for a distinct purpose, on a distinct subject, and therefore there need be no uniformity of practice in any single particular. This fact has been too generally overlooked. One object of this paper is to emphasize it.

VOCABULARY.

In speaking of Hebrews, Westcott says on p. XLIV of his Introduction: "The language of the Epistle is both in vocabulary and style purer and more vigorous than that of any other book of the New Testament." "The vocabulary is singularly copious." But he is forced to add: "In the Pastoral Epistles, however, the proportion is still greater." Upon Thayer's list of "words peculiar to individual New Testament writers" I base my figures. Paul uses words peculiar to himself an average of 6.62 to the page. The average number of words to the page peculiar to Hebrews is 8. When we compare Paul with Paul, we find only four to the page in his larger works, while his Pastoral Epistles show an average of 11 to the page. It is quite clear that the difference between 4 and 11, the low and high averages of Paul, is greater than the difference between 8, the average of Hebrews, and either 4 or 11, and much greater than between 8 and 6.62, the average of all Paul's works; and there are probably greater discrepancies in Paul's individual letters. It is not fair, therefore, to deny the Pauline authorship of Hebrews upon the basis of the large use of words not found elsewhere.

This analysis might be carried further and account taken of the distinction between different classes of peculiar words. In general, it is easily evident without a count that the words most commonly peculiar to Hebrews among the New Testament books

are those which are good Greek words found also in the Septuagint.

On p. XLVI of his Introduction Westcott says: "The absence of some words, e. g., πληροῦν, εὐαγγέλιον, οἰκοδομεῖν, μυστήριον, σύν is remarkable." He is referring to Hebrews. Over against this statement I desire to call attention to Paul's use of each word in the list just given. The Pauline πληροῦν is not found in I Cor., I Thess., I Tim. or Philem. among the works of Paul; it occurs only once each in Gal., II Thess., II Tim., twice in II Cor., and from 4 to 6 times in Rom., Col., Phil., Eph. Certainly I Cor. is no less Paul's than Rom., even tho it lacks πληροῦν. εὐαγγέλιον is a common Pauline word, but here too there is great variety. Titus has no example of it; there is one each in Philem. and I Tim.; there are two each in Col. and II Thess. The short Phil. of 6 pp. has as many occurrences as the much longer Rom. of 26 pp. and more than either of the Cor. of 24 pp. and 17 pp. respectively. Phil. of 6 pp. and Gal. of 9 pp. together have as many as the two Cor., and I Thess. of 6 pp. has as many as I Cor. of 24 pp. οἰκοδομεῖν is used 8 times by Paul, 5 of the occurrences being in I Cor., one each in Rom., Gal., I Thess., none in the rest of his letters including II Cor., which is almost as long as Hebrews. μυστήριον is lacking in half of Paul's letters, II Cor., Gal., Phil., I Thess., II Tim., Titus, Philem. σύν will be discussed under prepositions.

Westcott continues: "The writer (of Hebrews) does not use Paul's rhetorical forms τί οὖν, τί γάρ, ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, μὴ γένοιτο, ἄρα οὖν, οὐκ οἶδατε. On the other hand, we notice the peculiar phrases ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, εἰς τὸ διηγεῖσθαι, ἔλαβον ξενίσαντες and the particle ὅθεν."

Here again Paul must be compared with himself. His rhetorical τί οὖν occurs most often in Rom., 9 times, 4 times in I Cor., once in Gal., and nowhere else in his letters. The rhetorical τί γάρ is found in Paul only 5 times, twice in I Cor., once each in Rom., II Cor., Phil. Paul uses his rhetorical expression, ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, just once, I Cor. 15. 35. μὴ γένοιτο occurs 10 times in Rom., once in I Cor., 3 times in Gal., and nowhere else in Paul. ἄρα οὖν is found 8 times in Rom., once each in Gal., Eph., I Thess., II Thess., 12 in all the works of Paul. Paul uses οὐκ οἶδατε only in Rom.,

once, and in I Cor. 10 times. The form *οἶδαμεν* is used by the author of Hebrews just as it is by other writers of the period.

It is readily seen that these rhetorical forms are found in a bare majority of Paul's letters, mostly in Rom., and Gal., and I Cor. Only one of them appears in II Cor., and not one in Col. or the Pastoral Epistles.

Of the expressions mentioned by Westcott as being peculiar to Hebrews, *ὡς ἔπος εἰπῶν* occurs once, Heb. 7. 9, the only occurrence in the New Testament; *εἰς τὸ διηγεῖσθαι* is found only in Hebrews, once in chap. 7 and 3 times in chap. 10, always in connection with sacrifice or purification, an expression needed and expected in connection with the subject of the letter; *ἐλθόντες* occurs just once, neither word being found elsewhere in Hebrews, and not at all in Paul; *δοθέν* appears 6 times in Hebrews, 4 times in Matt., 3 times in Acts, and once each in Luke and I John.

δοθέν 6 times in Hebrews and not at all in Paul's letters sounds plausible to the scholars who claim that Paul could not have written Hebrews. I ask you to recall how freakish Paul can be. As above noted, he uses *οὐκ οἶδατε* 10 times in I Cor. and only once in all his other letters; he uses *μὴ γένοιτο* 10 times in Rom. and 4 times in the rest of his works; he uses *ἄρα οὖν* 8 times in Rom. and 4 times elsewhere, *τί οὖν* 9 times in Rom. and 5 times in other letters. If the author of Hebrews was not Paul, like Paul he occasionally took a fancy to an expression and made free use of it.

PARTICLES.

Many other scholars beside Westcott refer to these expressions in arguing against the Pauline authorship of Hebrews. Dods in his Introduction to the Epistle in the Expositor's Greek Testament quotes from Rendall's Theology of Hebrew Christianity, who makes a "minute comparison of connecting particles, inasmuch as these determine the structure of sentences." He says: "Now in the Epistles of St. Paul *εἰ τις* occurs 50 times, *εἴτε* 63 times, *ποτε* (in affirmative clauses) 19, *εἴτα* (in enumerations) 6, *εἰ δὲ καὶ* 4, *εἵπερ* 5, *ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ* 3, *εἵγε* 4, *μήπως* 12, *μηκέτι* 10, *μεοῦνγε* 3, *ἐάν* 83, while none of these are found in the Epistle of Hebrews except *ἐάν*, and that only once (or twice) except in quotations. On the other hand, *δοθέν* which

occurs 6 times and *ἐάντερ* which occurs 3 times in the Epistle are never used by St. Paul."

An analysis of these facts and figures shows that of the 50 occurrences of *εἰς* in Paul, 18 are found in I Cor. of 24 pp., only 3 in Rom. of 26 pp., and none in Col. of 6 pp., I Thess. of 6 pp., II Tim. of 5 pp.

Likewise most of the 63 or 64 uses of *εἴτε* are found in the two Cor., 41 in all, 27 of them in I Cor. Several of the letters have only one or two and there are none at all in Gal. of 9 pp. or in any of the Pastoral Epistles of 16 pp.

Paul's use of *ποτε* is interesting. He uses it 4 times in Gal. of 9 pp., 6 times in Eph. of 9 pp., and only 3 times in Rom. of 26 pp., once in I Cor. of 24 pp., and not at all in II Cor. of 17 pp. Neither is it found in I Thess. nor in either letter to Timothy. Furthermore, *ποτε* does occur twice in the first chapter of Hebrews, both times, to be sure, in an interrogative sentence, but in neither case as an interrogative particle.

The six occurrences of *εἰτα* in enumerations in Paul are all in I Cor. and I Tim. There is one *εἰτα* in Hebrews, 12. 9, not in an enumeration of figures, but in an enumeration of arguments, with the meaning of 'further,' 'yet again.'

Ten of Paul's letters lack the combination *εἰ δὲ καί*, 9 do not have *εἰπερ*, and 11 are without *ἐκτὸς εἰ μή*. The 4 occurrences of *εἵγε* are limited to 3 of his letters, and the 10 occurrences of *μήπως* are confined to 4 letters, 5 of them being in II Cor. *μηκέτι* is lacking in 8 letters, and *μενούργε* is found only in Rom. and Phil.

The statement of Rendall quoted by Dods shows that Paul is very fond of *ἐάν*: he has used it 83 times, yet 4 of his letters do not use it at all, Phil. 6 pp., II Thess. 3 pp., Titus 3 pp., Philem. 1 p. Of his 83 examples, 40 are in I Cor., 17 in Rom., 7 in II Cor., 6 in Gal., 1 in Eph. Gal. and Eph. have 9 pp. each, and Rom. has 2 pp. more than I Cor.

ὅθεν has already been discussed.

ἐάντερ is used twice in Hebrews and nowhere else in the New Testament, just as *μενούργε* mentioned above is found 3 times in Paul and nowhere else in the N. T.

Continuing the study of particles, Mr. L. W. Harvison of our graduate class has found that of 28 possible words of this class, Paul has used 26, all but *ὅθεν* and *καίτοι*, the author of Hebrews has used 22, omitting *ἄρα οὖν*, *διόπερ*, *μέντοι*, *μενούργε*, *γε*, *ἄρα*. The average number of these particles to the p. is for

Hebrews 10.24, for Paul 12.79. Paul's percentages for his different letters range from 16.71 in I Cor. to 3.33 in Col. The usage of Hebrews is the same as Paul's in Phil., II Tim., and Philem., and practically the same as in I Tim. and I Thess. The average of Hebrews is higher than Paul's in II Thess., Eph., Titus, Col., and lower than the average in Rom., I and II Cor., and Gal., the most Pauline letters. In number of different particles Hebrews leads with 22, Rom. has 20, I Cor. 19, II Cor. 16. Of the particles used by Hebrews and not by Paul, *ὅθεν* has been discussed and *καίτοι* occurs but once, in fact, only twice in all the New Testament. Of the particles used by Paul and not by Hebrews, *ἄρα οὖν* and *μενοῦνγε* have been disposed of; *διόπερ* occurs twice in I Cor. and nowhere else in Paul or the N. T.; *μέντοι* is cited once for all Paul; *γε* including all its combinations is found 14 times in Paul, 5 of them being in Rom., none at all appearing in I and II Thess. or in the Pastoral Epistles; the interrogative *ἄρα* occurs once in Paul.

Now comparing the more common particles, we find in every case that Paul's average practice is nearer the practice of Hebrews than that of some of his own letters. Hebrews leads in the percentage occurrences of *γάρ* 3.40 to 3.09, also in the combination *καὶ γάρ* .24 to .15, and they are exactly parallel in the use of *εἰ γάρ*, .2 each. Of course Paul varies in the use of his combinations: 12 of his 19 *καὶ γάρ*'s occur in I and II Cor., and 11 of his 24 *εἰ γάρ*'s are found in Rom. Several of his letters are without one or the other and 4 are without both.

In the use of *δέ* Paul leads, 4.43 to 1.9. Hebrews, on the other hand, has a larger percentage of *μέν—δέ*, .66 to .33, which might indicate better balance and finish on the part of Hebrews. Upon examination, however, we find that Paul's usage in I Cor., Phil., and II Tim. exactly parallels the usage in Hebrews, tho in 6 of his letters Paul does not use the combination at all.

Paul has a slightly higher average in the use of *οὖν*, .79 to .50. In the combination *μέν οὖν* Heb. leads .14 to .05, but there again the average in Heb. just corresponds to the average of Paul in I Cor. and is below Paul's average in Phil., .14 to .33.

The adversative particle *ἀλλά*, likewise, is found more often in Paul than in Heb., 2.29 to .76, or a difference in favor of Paul of 3 to 1. Yet even here, at least one of Paul's letters, Col., falls below Heb. with a per-

centage of .5. Even in the use of the balancing antithetic group, οὐ μόνον—ἀλλὰ καί, Paul has a higher average than Heb., .23 to .05. However, in at least five of his letters, including I Cor., he does not use the combination at all. His inconsistency is shown from the fact that in Rom. of 26 pp. he uses this combination 11 times and not once in I Cor. of 24 pp. δ.6

shows an average occurrence of .43 in Heb. and .22 in Paul, yet in II Cor., Eph., and Philem. Paul's averages are respectively .51, .55, and 1., greater in each case than that of Heb., while on the other hand, the particle is omitted from 5 of Paul's letters.

τε is found relatively more in Heb. than in Paul, but not a great deal in either. It is used freely in the N. T. only in Acts. The averages for τε solitarius are Paul .04, Heb. .14; for τε—τε Paul .03, Heb. .095; for τε—καί Paul .12, Heb. .62. Eight of Paul's letters do not use τε at all, yet Rom. averages up well with Heb., τε .08 to .14, τε—τε .11 to .095, τε—καί .42 to .62. The author of Rom. is very much more like the author of Heb. than he is like Paul in the other letters ascribed to him as far as τε is concerned.

All N. T. writers make scant use of δὲ. Paul and Hebrews have it once each.

Any claims set up for the artistic superiority of Hebrews as compared with Paul are not well founded as far as particles are concerned, unless one picks out individual letters of Paul for each particle. The artistic skill should appear especially in the combinations of particles, but in every case Paul is equal to Hebrews in one or more of his letters, and in every case more consistent with Hebrews than epistle by epistle with himself.

PREPOSITIONS.

Of the 32 prepositions and prepositional adverbs used in the N. T., Paul has 10 not found in Hebrews and Hebrews has 2 not found in Paul. Most of those not found in both are prepositional adverbs and occur from 1 to 4 times. The one exception is σύν which Paul uses 38 times and Hebrews not at all. σύν is not common in the N. T., only Luke and Paul using it with any frequency. See Blass's Grammar, Thackeray's translation, p. 132, and Clark, Prepositions in N. T. Greek, p. 46. In keeping with the nature of this investigation, where do these 38 σύν's

of Paul appear? They are distributed among 8 letters, not one being found in II Thess. or in the Pastoral Epistles. Gal. of 9 pp. and Phil. of 6 pp. have as many examples each as Rom. of 26 pp., while Col. of 6 pp. has more than Rom. of 26 pp. and as many as I Cor. of 24 pp. and II Cor. of 17 pp.

The other prepositions which have the greatest number of occurrences correspond very well in their averages in Paul and Hebrews, except the preposition *ἐν*. I write the percentage of Paul first each time: *ἀπό* .82: 1.09; *διά* 2.2: 2.7; *εἰς* 3.28: 3.52; *ἐκ(ξ)* 1.61: 1.; *ἐπί* .99: 1.4; *κατά* 1.43: 1.9; *μετά* .515: 1.09; *παρά* .29: .48; *περί* .375: 1.09; *πρός* 1.11: .86; *ὑπέρ* .765: .48; *ὕπό* .58: .43. Not only are these averages close, but the detailed averages for these prepositions with the several cases are equally close: *διά* with gen. 1.39: 1.81, w. acc. .64: .81; *ἐπί* w. gen. .19: .34, w. dat. .38: .48, w. acc. .38: .57; *κατά* w. gen. .11: .10, w. acc. 1.24: 1.62; *μετά* w. gen. .50: .67, w. acc. .03: .43; *παρά* w. gen. .09: 0, w. dat. .11: 0, w. acc. .11: .48; *περί* w. gen. .39: .95, w. acc. .055: 0; *ὑπέρ* w. gen. .65: .43, w. acc. .086: .048; *ὕπό* w. gen. .33: .43, w. acc. .17: 0. It does not seem necessary to analyze these figures for Paul's individual letters as has been done above. Suffice it to say that the same general conditions previously stated exist.

Of course, it is well known, as Moulton has pointed out, Grammar of N. T. Greek, Vol. I³, p. 61, that "Greek is . . . marked . . . by the very free use of prepositions. This characteristic is most obviously intensified in Hellenistic, where we are perpetually finding prepositional phrases used to express relations which in classical Greek would have been adequately given by a case alone." In N. T. Greek we find *εἰς* making wonderful inroads into the territory of *ἐν*, and *ἐν* is making still greater inroads into the territory of *εἰς* and taking up other uses to which it was not the rightful heir. This intermixture is quite marked in narrative writers of the N. T., except Matt. and to some extent in John. "The epistles," says Blass, l. c., p. 123 (39. 3), "show at least in the local signification a correct discrimination between *εἰς* and *ἐν*." Blass does not distinguish here between the epistles of Paul and the Epistle to the Hebrews. The occurrences of *εἰς* in Paul and Hebrews are on an equality as to number, 3.28 to 3.52, giving Hebrews a slight majority relatively. On the other hand, Paul used *ἐν* much more freely,

7.36 to 3.05. Here then, where Paul used more than twice as many *ἐν*'s to the page as Hebrews, how does he compare with himself? His Gal. and Eph. have the same number of chapters and the same number of pp., yet the former has 41 occurrences of *ἐν*, the latter 119; Phil. and Col. likewise correspond as to the quantity of Greek, but the former has 63 *ἐν*'s, the latter 89; both Phil. and Col. are distinctly shorter than Gal., but they have each more occurrences of *ἐν*: Phil. 63, Col. 89, Gal. 41. Every letter of Paul's has a higher percentage of *ἐν*'s than Hebrews, but there is quite a range between Gal. and Titus on the one hand with a percentage of 4.55 and Eph. with 13.22 and Col. with 14.83 on the other hand.

One of Paul's pet phrases, *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, which he uses 48 times, helps to swell the number of *ἐν*'s, and it may be urged that this phrase marks another ground of distinction between Paul and Heb. Passing over the fact of difference in subject-matter, or content, we find that Paul is not consistent with himself. The expression is not found in II Cor. of 17 pp., nor in II Thess., nor in Titus, and there is marked variation in his other letters, some of the shorter ones using the expression more often than the longer ones.

In regard to the uses of the dat. with *ἐν* in other than simple local meanings, Paul has 12 such instances in Rom. of 26 pp., and Heb. of 21 pp. has 11. Thus Paul in Rom. is nearer Heb. in this respect than he is to any of his other letters.

It would seem, then, as far as prepositions are concerned, even including *ὁν* and *ἐν*, that Paul, the writer of some epistles, could have written Hebrews just as well as he could have written other epistles assigned to him. In the use of every preposition Paul differs with himself as much as he differs with Hebrews.

THE ARTICLE WITH PROPER NAMES.

In his Master's thesis on The Article with Proper Names in N. T. Greek, Mr. E. W. McLaurin says: "Paul and the author of Hebrews use the anarthrous construction exclusively with indeclinable place-names." In the same authors "declinable place-names also omit the article more frequently than they have it, except in I. Thess., where the articular construction prevails in the proportion of 5 to 2." For Hebrews "The ratio of the

anarthrous to the articular in declinable place-names is 3 to 2." "Paul uses 10 anarthrous declinable place-names and no declinable place-names with the article in II Tim., whereas the ratio in I Thess. is 2 to 5, with books all the varying distances between. . . . Hebrews would have about the same ratio as II Cor. or Gal.," and that is about Paul's average.

"With indeclinable personal names in Paul's epistles, sometimes the articular and sometimes the anarthrous construction occurs more frequently. Hebrews prefers the anarthrous construction 33 to 4." Hebrews has a greater proportion of anarthrous occurrences than Rom., I Cor., Gal. and Eph., but a smaller proportion than II Cor., Phil., and II Tim. "With declinable personal names, Paul more often uses the anarthrous construction, usually showing a decided preference for that construction. But Eph. is an equally strong exception where the articular construction prevails 22 to 7. Hebrews shows a preference of 22 to 8 for the anarthrous construction."

The results regarding double names are relatively the same.

ARTICULAR INFINITIVE.

I shall let Mr. Sam L. Joekel, *The Articular Infinitive in N. T. Greek* (Un. Tex. Master's Thesis), state his own conclusions on the question of the articular infinitive: "A comparison between the figures of Paul's epistles and those for Hebrews shows some interesting coincidences. The general averages for Paul and Hebrews are two of the highest in the N. T., Hebrews leading with an average of 1.09. Paul's average is .89." "The averages in Phil. and the two Thess. far exceed that of the other epistles of Paul, as they do that of Hebrews. On the other hand, nearly all the rest of Paul's epistles fall far below the average of Hebrews, and the Pastorals and Col. show no examples whatever." "With regard to individual constructions, the nom. and the acc., both with and without the preposition, lead in both Paul and Hebrews."

These conclusions are borne out by the following summary of figures worked out by Mr. Joekel:

	Gen.	Acc. & prep.	Dat. & prep.	Nom. & acc.	Dat.	Average
Rom.	9	16	2	5	0	1.24
I Cor.	2	7	1	5	0	.62
II Cor.	3	4	0	9	1	.94
Gal.	3	1	1	0	0	.62
Eph.	0	3	0	0	0	.33
Phil.	3	2	0	11	0	2.66
I Thess.	0	7	0	4	0	2.10
II Thess.	0	6	0	0	0	2.00
Col. & Pastorals	0	0	0	0	0	
Heb.	5	9	4	3	0	1.09

CONDITIONS.

An examination of conditional sentences as worked out by Mr. John Barrow, of the Seminar in Greek N. T., yields similar results. Paul uses simple conditions more freely than the author of Hebrews, 1.18 to the page as against .38 for Heb., but he is wholly inconsistent in his several letters; 83 of his 151 examples are in Rom. and I Cor., which constitute considerably less than half of his corpus, while Eph. of 9 pp. has no simple condition, and Gal., which is of the same length, uses this form 15 times. *ei* with the pres. ind. is the most generally used form of this condition in both Paul and Heb. Paul, however, uses *ei* with pres. ind. 27 times in I Cor. of 24 pp. and only 12 times in Rom. of 26 pp. Heb. has as much variety in simple conditions as any of Paul's letters except Rom. and has about the same average as all the letters other than Rom., I and II Cor., and Gal.

The general proportion of apodosis for the simple condition is about the same as for the protasis, 1.13 to .38, the distribution and variety being about the same. Likewise the forms of apodosis that prevail in Paul, the pres. ind., fut. ind., and verb omitted, prevail also in Heb. The imperative, which Paul uses fairly frequently, does not occur in Heb. It is also lacking in 5 of Paul's letters, and is used only once in Rom. of 26 pp. and II Cor. of 17 pp., while I Cor. of 24 pp. has it 14 times and I Tim. of 7 pp. has it 5 times.

Paul uses the pres. gen. conditions a little more freely than Heb., .44 to .24, but here again most of the examples, 47 of the 61, are in Rom. and I Cor. II Cor. has one more than Heb.; Gal., I Thess., I Tim. have only one each, while Eph., Phil.,

II Thess., Titus, and Philem. have none. Of the 5 uses by Heb. 4 are not found in Paul, but the 8 different forms used in 1 each of Paul's letters are not found elsewhere in him or in Heb. The same conditions prevail in the apodosis. The situation is reversed in the unreal conditions, Heb. having a larger proportion, .24 to .07. Paul uses this condition in only 3 of his letters. Rom., the longest of his letters, has 1 occurrence; Gal., about one-third as long, has 3; and I Cor. of 24 pp. has just as many as Heb. of 21 pp. The prevailing form in both Paul and Heb. is *ei* with the impf. The apodosis follows the same lines.

In the future more vivid condition Paul again has a larger proportion, .33 to .14. Of his 43 occurrences 29 are in Rom. and I Cor. This condition is entirely lacking in Phil., Titus, and Philem. There is one in Eph., a doubtful one in I Thess., and 2 in II Cor. of 17 pp. as compared with 3 in Heb. of 21 pp. Heb. has one form, *ἐάντε* with pres. sub., which is not used by Paul, and Paul has at least 5 forms in as many letters that are not used elsewhere by him or by Heb. The apodosis needs no additional comment.

In general, it is perfectly fair to say that Paul makes larger use of conditions than the writer of Heb., except in the case of the unreal condition, but it is also fair to remark that his higher average is caused by a few of his letters, whereas the majority of them are nearer the average of Heb., and in every case there are letters of Paul that correspond better with Heb. than with Paul.

HIATUS.

Reference must be made to one of Blass's strongest points. In his grammar, p. 296 of Thackeray's translation, he says: "The Epistle to the Hebrews is the only piece of writing in the N. T., which in structure of sentence and style shows the care and dexterity of an artistic writer, and so it cannot be wondered at, if it is in this work alone that the principle of avoiding hiatus, is, to some extent, taken into account." Among other cases in which Blass claims that hiatus is studiously avoided *μή*, *διό*, and the possible forms of the article and the relative are mentioned.¹

¹ These are sufficient for illustration. I count all Hebrews, including quotations and chapter 13, both of which Blass has omitted.

Paul uses $\mu\eta$ more frequently than Hebrews, 2.19 to the page to 1.33. Paul's use runs as high as 4 to the page in Titus, more than 3 to the p. in II Thess., and nearly 3 to the p. in I Tim. and I Cor. His low average, about one-half that of Hebrews, is .66 in Phil. and .6 in II Tim., and 0 in the one p. of Philem. Now note the relative percentages in Paul and Hebrews between the total number of $\mu\eta$'s and $\mu\eta$ with hiatus. Of Paul's 267 occurrences 113 show hiatus; of Hebrews' 28, 9 show hiatus, a relative percentage of .42 to .32, a difference of .1. Paul's highest percentage of $\mu\eta$'s showing hiatus as compared with the total is .66 found in II Tim. Five of his letters have .5 or .5 plus, four have .4 or .4 plus, while II Cor. has .32—exactly the percentage of Hebrews—and Gal. has only .25, these last two being among the most Pauline of Paul's works. The page proportions also are interesting. Paul's percentage of $\mu\eta$'s showing hiatus is .92 to the p., Hebrews .43. Comparing Paul's works, his highest percentage is 1.66 in II Thess. and Titus. Gal. has practically the same as Hebrews, .44 to .43, II Tim. is just below with .4, and Phil. goes down to .33. From the foregoing it appears that Paul uses $\mu\eta$ more frequently than Hebrews in the proportion of 2.19 per page to 1.33; his percentage of all $\mu\eta$'s to $\mu\eta$ with hiatus is .42 to .32 in Hebrews; his page percentage of hiatus $\mu\eta$ is better than that of Hebrews, .92 to .43: but in every case he is more at variance with himself than he is with Hebrews both in his extremes and in his general averages. Can we, therefore, justly claim more artistic work on the part of the author of Hebrews in the avoidance of hiatus with $\mu\eta$ than for Paul in some of his works, notably Gal., II Tim., and Phil.?

In the case of $\delta\acute{o}$, Paul's numbers are proportionally lower, .14 to .43. In the proportion between the totals of $\delta\acute{o}$ and those showing hiatus, Paul and Heb. are practically parallel, .4 to .33, but Paul's average to the page is less than that of Heb., .09 to .14. In 5 of Paul's letters $\delta\acute{o}$ does not occur. In two it occurs once each and in one twice: in none of these four is there hiatus. In some of the remaining letters the page percentage of hiatus avoidance is below that of Heb.: Gal., .11 to .14, Rom. .077 to .14, I Cor. .04 to .14. The proportion of hiatus occurrences to the total occurrences is slightly higher in Gal. and in I Cor. and II Cor. In Eph. it is .4 to Heb. .33, in Rom. it is just .33.

The forms of the article and of the relative taken into account in hiatus are: *ὁ, ἡ, τό, τοῦ, τῷ, τῇ, οἱ, αἱ, τὰ, ὃ, ἣ, οἷ, αἷ, ᾧ, οῦ, ᾧ, ᾧ*. Blass has found 52 cases of hiatus with these forms in those portions of Heb. which he has counted, just 4 to the page. The average to the page for Paul, exclusive of Rom. and I Cor., which I have not counted, is 5.97. Paul's highest average is in the little one-page Philem., which has 11 cases of hiatus; the next highest is Col., 8.33, then II Thess. 8, and so on down to Titus, 4.33, just above the average of Heb., and finally I Tim. with only 2.59. Here Paul is nearly as far below Heb. as Heb. is below Paul's average, 3 to the page below his own average, and more than 8 to the page below his maximum in Philem. Whatever the cause, Paul has avoided hiatus with forms of the article and relative more than Hebrews in at least one of his letters, I Tim. It is not impossible to believe that he might have been equally successful in Hebrews.²

I cannot contend that either the author of Hebrews or Paul studiously avoided hiatus, tho one gets that feeling for both at times when looking for examples of its occurrence. There are many considerations that enter in as determining factors, *e. g.*, the use or omission of the article, the use of prepositional phrases, such as *ἐν* with the dative, or *εἰς* with the accusative, between the article and the noun, and strikingly the occurrence of certain words beginning with vowels which are demanded by the subject-matter of the letter. One illustration of this point will suffice. Recall from the early part of this paper that *εὐαγγέλιον* does not occur in Hebrews. It occurs as many as 9 times in some of Paul's letters. He does not use it in Titus and only once in I Tim., the two works nearest Hebrews in the use of hiatus.

I have the temerity to present these facts and figures and express these views in the face of Westcott's statement, Introduction, p. LXXVIII, that "the Epistle cannot be the work of St. Paul"; of the statement of Dods in the Expositor's text, Vol. 4, p. 224, "the bare reading of the Epistle suffices to convince us that the Pauline authorship may be set aside as incredible"; of the equally positive statement of Peake in his Introduction, p. 28, "nothing is so certain with respect to the

² Blass has made other counts for hiatus which may be passed over for the present.

authorship as a negative conclusion that it was not written by Paul"; and of many other similar statements by excellent scholars. After Dods has given an excellent résumé of the differences between Paul and Hebrews, he says, in a footnote, quoting from Rendall's *Theology*: "Diversity of style is more easily felt by the reader than expressed by the critic, without at least a tedious analysis of language; one simple and tangible test presents itself, however, in the use of connecting particles, inasmuch as these determine the structure of sentences." He then gives that array of particles which I gave earlier in the paper and which I tried to dispose of by the double comparison of Paul with Hebrews and Paul with Paul.

There are a great many other problems requiring investigation—some of which have been mentioned—before we can claim with positiveness that it was not impossible for Paul to have written Hebrews. When that conclusion has been reached, it will be time to begin a constructive attempt to sift the evidence and establish the fact of the Pauline authorship of Hebrews.

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VI.—THE FIRST ODE OF HORACE.

Some years ago the writer made a somewhat careful analysis of the Odes of Horace, chiefly for use in his own classroom. The purpose of the classification was purely practical, *i. e.*, to arrange the Odes in a limited number of easily recognizable and namable groups, in order to assist the young student in grasping the meaning of the individual Odes, each as a whole. The classification is not precisely logical, and a few more topics might have been admitted (*e. g.*, War, Dramatic Lyrics, Allegorical, Early Roman History, Legend, and Custom). But for the particular purpose in hand brevity was desirable, and the list as constituted seemed to cover, substantially, the contents of all the Odes. It is as follows:

- I. Patriotic and National, including praise of Augustus.
- II. Religious, including hymns and prayers to the gods.
- III. Philosophical and Gnostic, especially Ethical, including "the golden mean" and the doctrine of contentment.
- IV. Wine and Conviviality, including *carpe diem*.
- V. Love Poems, including attacks on women.
- VI. Bucolic or Idyllic (in a broad sense, requiring some special definition).
- VII. Mythological Tales (a very small group, but definite and specific).
- VIII. The Glory and Power of Poetry.
- IX. Personal Addresses; Poems of Friendship (this group also requires some special definition).
- X. Praise of Places (like Group VII, a very small group, but definite and specific).
- XI. Occasional Pieces of the Poet's own Life and Experience, including prologues and epilogues (also requires a little special definition).

This old classification was recalled to the writer's mind by an article by Professor Martin that appeared comparatively recently in *Classical Philology* (April, 1918), entitled *Remarks on the First Ode of Horace*.

The object of the article referred to—to use one of its writer's own phrases in alluding to the interpretations of the First Ode by other scholars—is to get at “the point and purpose of its composition.” This he does by likening the Ode to “a cause of the *genus deliberativum*, perhaps, in which vss. 1, 2 are the *exordium*, vss. 3-34 the *probatio*, and vss. 35, 36 the *peroratio*,” and he analyzes, outlines, and comments upon the poem on this basis. It is not necessary here to go further into the details of the article, but attention is called to another and perhaps simpler way of looking at the poem in the light of the present writer's analysis of the contents of all the Odes, to which reference has just been made.

As an immediate preliminary to this possibly “simpler” way of dealing with Ode i, it may be said that there is no necessary or essential quarrel between Professor Martin and the present writer—at least not throughout. They are simply not working in quite the same way and to the same end. The former is working mainly beneath the surface, to get at the subtle, inner meaning and implication of the words; the latter is seeking first of all to account for and analyze the material that goes into each Ode taken primarily in its surface meaning, though not disregarding inner meanings and implications ultimately. For example, with regard to the First Ode as a whole and its general purpose, Professor Martin says: “the purpose, . . . , of the poem is not to defend the poet's calling, . . . , nor yet to dedicate the first three books of odes, . . . , but simply to express the hope that he may be regarded as the lyric poet of Rome corresponding to Alcaeus among the Greeks and to that end bespeak the sympathy of Maecenas,” which all rests upon detailed special interpretation. The present writer, on the other hand, with no opposition to this except to the statement that the purpose is not “to dedicate the first three books of odes” (which perhaps the writer of it did not mean, as he was writing of the purpose “in the sense of outstanding thought”), starts out simply from the generally obvious facts that the poem is a dedication of and introduction to the following series, and then seeks to analyze the contents, primarily in their plain surface meaning, under several pre-defined heads—to which others would be added, if they anywhere appeared as essential. It is assumed that the alleged facts are “obvious” from (1) the address to Maecenas

at the beginning and again, without the latter here being named, at the end, (2) from the position of the Ode at the beginning of the collection—alongside of the similar addressing of Maecenas at the beginning of the Epodes, the Satires, and the Epistles—, and (3) from the general character of the surface contents of the piece.

To repeat in part, it should be noted in what follows that the detailed facts brought out came out quite naturally and inevitably, without being sought for to support any particular interpretation of the Ode as a whole, in the course of an analysis made primarily simply to see what material—material taken as it comes and primarily in its plain surface meaning, with no search for subtleties—the Ode contained. This fact adds to the interest, if not to the convincingness, of the results.

That Horace is a careful and painstaking writer is known to all. He tells us so himself, and it is obvious on every page of every department of his writings. Each word is chosen with care; the writer's *curiosa felicitas* (which means careful choosing and the ability to choose the one apt and right word) was noticed from the first; his connections, except where they are deliberately abrupt, as they sometimes are (perhaps especially in the Satires), are carefully and nicely made. Each Ode is a polished gem. Now the First Ode, as remarked just above, was evidently written as an introduction to the collection, and its material (the opening and closing addresses to Maecenas, intended to serve as a dedication, quite possibly added after the rest of the Ode was completed, as was long since pointed out; and the theme of the wide variety of the tastes and ambitions of men, intended to serve the purpose of emphasizing the distinction of Horace's ambition from those of other men) was admirably chosen to serve this purpose.

But is this quite all? The allusion to wars and camps (23-25) at least suggests the theme of patriotism. There are slight touches of religion in allusions to the gods (6 and 30). The general theme of the variety of tastes (3-34) may be regarded as gnomic or philosophical. There is a touch of wine and conviviality (the man who does not disdain to take a part from the solid day with cups of old Massic; 19-22). There are also touches of love and the country (the tender wife, 26; the green arbutus tree and the springs of holy water, 21 f.; the cool groves

and the dancing of the nymphs and the satyrs, 30 f.; etc.). The last few lines touch on the glory of poetry. By reason of its address to Maecenas the piece goes into group 9 as defined above. And the poem is an "occasional" one, as that term has been defined.

Now can this be accidental? These several topics or characteristics make up nine of the eleven that constitute the complete list given above for the contents of the Odes; the only ones that are not represented are those of the two very small and special groups, 7 (mythological tales) and 10 (praise of places); there are no other plain surface topics introduced in the piece except as or in mere illustrations; and no other single Ode contains quite so wide a range of material according to the specified style and standard of analysis. Does it not look, then, very much as if Horace, having finished the collection of three books of Odes, sat down to compose, with care and pains, combined—perhaps as an afterthought—with a dedication to Maecenas, an introduction that should really introduce the collection by indicating to the careful reader not merely the poet's general aim and purpose in writing, but in considerable detail the precise field covered? One cannot be certain, of course, but it is either design or a curious and remarkable chance.

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VII.—SOPHOCLES PHILOCTETES 1360-61.

The context shows that Philoctetes is thinking of the probability, if not certainty, that Odysseus and the Atreidae will continue to be *κακοί* in Troy as they were *κακοί* in Lemnos when they abandoned him on the desert island (1356). Any attempt to restore the text without keeping this fact constantly in view must result in failure. At the end of his entreaty (1369 f.) the sufferer repeats the thought: *ἔα κακῶς αὐτοὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι κακούς . . . καὶ κακούς ἐπωφελῶν δόξεις ὁμοίους τοῖς κακοῖς πεφυκέναι*.

The passage has been variously *mis*-understood. Hermann's interpretation of the text is impossible. The other three explanations (1. Brunck and Buttmann, 2. Musgrave, 3. Schneidewin) are, to say the least, extremely improbable. Of the numerous emendations, Wakefield's is the only one that alters *παιδεύει*. Jebb, Reiske, Seyffert, Meineke, Dobree, Erfurdt, and others, change some other word, or words.

My conviction is that the seat of the corruption is in *παιδεύει*. The patent meaning of the verse is: *ἐὰν γνώμη κακῶν μήτηρ γένηται, τᾶλλα γ' ἃ τίκτει κακὰ (ἔσται)*. The context alone proves this. Consequently, what we want is some verb like *τίκτει*, *φιτύνει*, *φέρει*, to replace *παιδεύει*. But, since Sophocles does not always continue the metaphor to the very end of the thought (and here *μήτηρ γένηται* is merely a poetical expression for *ἀπαξ φρονῆ*), the lost verb is probably one that corresponds to our 'meditate,' 'cogitate.' I suggest *εἰλύει* (uoluit). The scribe that unwittingly wrought the change misread *ΓΕΙΑΥΕΙ* as *ΠΑΙΑΔΕΥΕΙ* (Π for Γ and Δ for Α, as often). In fact, this very word was converted into *εἰδύει* by some copyist: "eodemque modo ab eod. vitiose scriptum *εἰδύει*" (Thesaurus, s. v.).

The Homeric verb *εἰλύειν* is not used by any other tragic poet, and by Sophocles only in the *Philoctetes*, where it occurs three times. This rare word would naturally cause some mistake in copying; and the not dissimilar *παιδεύει* seemed to be a fitting word after *μήτηρ γένηται*. In early times there were doubtless other manuscripts which preserved the true reading. A comparison of these MSS would tend to show that the general sense

of the passage was 'when one's mind brings forth bad children, they are generally brought up bad.' Hence one meaning given to εἰλύειν would be ἐκτρέφειν. Curiously enough, this is just what has happened, for one signification assigned to εἰλύω by the lexicographers is ἐκτρέφω, on which the writer in the Thesaurus remarks: "sed habet praeterea . . . et κτυπεῖ, item ἐκτρέφει. At quid de his expp. tam diversis a praecedente sentiendum est? . . . Praesertim tamen de duabus expp. id a me dictum intelligi volo, sc. κτυπεῖ et ἐκτρέφει."

The metaphor in εἰλύει is common to all languages, and even if no exact parallel could be found in Greek, we would be justified in substituting this verb for παιδεύει in the passage under discussion, for φιεύω is uoluo, and εἰλύει means 'revolves,' 'turns over,' 'invents,' 'meditates,' 'cogitates,' 'conceives.' Indeed, Cicero's characterization of Catiline might be applied to Odysseus by Philoctetes: "quid enim mali aut sceleris fingi aut excogitari potest, quod non ille conceperit?" (*Cat.* 2. 4. 2). Examples of uoluerē (or uolutare) in this sense are numerous (Sallust, Tacitus). So in Italian *volgere* means 'aggirarsi in mente' or 'nell' animo' (= *meditare*). So in French 'rouler en la tête' (Molière, *L'Étourdi* 3. 1), or 'dans l'esprit.' The Spanish *volver* is used in the same way. But we do not have to go to other languages for parallels: the ordinary Greek word στρέφειν has a similar metaphorical use. Cp. Eur. *Hec.* 750 τί στρέφω τάδε; Plato, *Phaedr.* 278 D ἄνω κάτω στρέφων (the Chaucerian 'rollid up and down'), Dion. Hal. 6. 867. 10, Arrian, *Epict.* 4. 6. 15 ἄνω κάτω στρέφω τοὺς προτεινομένους λόγους, 3. 21 καθήμενος αὐτὰ στρέφε αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαντοῦ, Luc. *Alex.* 8, *De Merc. Cond.* 17, *Dial. Mer.* 10. 2. Consequently, I am inclined to think that Sophocles wrote οἷς γὰρ ἡ γνώμη κακῶν | μήτηρ γένηται, τᾶλλα γ' εἰλύει κακά, and that the thought is the same (though the metaphor is slightly different) as in Aesch. *Prom.* 888 ἐν γνώμῃ ἐβάστασε. Cp. Ar. *Thesm.* 438 πάσας δ' ἰδέας ἐξήτασεν, | πάντα δ' ἐβάστασεν φρενί.

A word remains to be said on the connotation of εἰλύειν in the other two passages of the play in which the verb occurs. Jebb translates εἰλνύμενην (291) 'crawl' and compares Plato, *Tim.* 92 ἰλυστώμενα ἐπὶ γῆς (the participle here has nothing to do with εἰλύειν) and adds: "Thus the notion is different from that of εἰλίποδες (βοῦς), where a 'rolling' gait is meant." In my opin-

ion, it is just this rolling, 'wibbly-wabbly,' tottering gait that the poet has in mind: the limping Philoctetes goes *clopin-clopant*, but he goes also *à cloche-pied* (which in popular etymology at least would be associated with *cloche*, 'a bell'). The sufferer toddles along with uncertain steps like a child ἀτερ φίλας τιθήνας (703). If εἰλνόμενος means 'creeping' in 702, then εἶρπε in 701 is otiose. Moreover, both παίων and τό τοι σύνηθες ὀρθώσει μ' ἔθος in 894 indicate that the lame man is making full use of his sound leg (as he naturally would), not placing the knee of this leg against the ground. A man with two sound legs sways slightly from side to side as he moves forward; but in the case of a *boiteux* this swaying motion is much more marked: one who walks *à cloche-pied* describes small circles (*uoluitur*, εἰλύεται); the forward movement is spiral, since both feet are not planted equally firmly on the ground. Cp. Molière, *Scap.* 2. 1 "ce vers cloche," that is, "n'est pas sur ses pieds." Even as I write these words I observe from my window a French ex-soldier whose left leg is so maimed that it can almost be said to dangle from the trunk: the nutations of his torso and the oscillations of his legs are just such as I imagine Philoctetes to have made as he εἰλύετο dragging after him his δύστηνον πόδα. The stick on which he leans is but a poor substitute for a sound leg.

Even in the passages in which εἰλύω means *occulto*, the primary meaning of the word appears, for the idea is generally 'envelop' (*inuoluo*, *obuoluo*).

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REPORTS.

GLOTTA. Volume 10. 1919.

Pp. 1-22. A. Maidhof, Rückwanderer aus den islamitischen Sprachen im Neugriechischen (Smyrna und Umgebung). Words which were originally borrowed from Greek into oriental languages (mostly Arabic and Persian) and thence, mostly thru Turkish, borrowed back into the Greek dialect of Smyrna. Out of 1500 Osmanic loanwords noted by the author in this dialect, about 50 are found to be such 'return-wanderers.'

Pp. 22-23. J. Wackernagel, Zur Etymologie von *βραχύς* und *brevis*. Sogdian *murzak* 'short,' removes all doubt that these words go back to IE. *mr̥ghú-*.

Pp. 23-29. H. Sjögren, Zur Wortstellung *tua Bromia ancilla* und Verw. This word order is not so regular as has been often assumed. It is found in Plautus, Terence and Cicero's Letters principally when the appellative denotes a socially inferior person (*servus, filius*, etc.).

Pp. 30-38. H. Blass, Zum Konjunktiv im Lateinischen. 1. Der Jussivus des Plusquamperfekts. Maintains that the Latin plup. subj. is used in jussive sense, against Methner, *Lat. Synt. d. Verb.* 154.

Pp. 38-62. P. Kretschmer, Mythische Namen. (Continued from Glotta 8. 121.) 6. Tritogeneia und die Tritopatoren. *Τριτοπάτωρ*, *-πατρεύς* = 'Urahn,' originally greatgrandfather, 'third father'; then more vaguely 'Stammvater,' 'founder of the family.' *Τριτογενής*, *-γένεια* is a contrasting formation to the above, as it were 'Stammsohn, -tochter,' that is 'echter Nachkomme'; cf. *pronepos* to *proavus*, grandson to grandfather (contrast the more logical *petit-fils*, Dutch *kleinzoon*). Latin *tritavus* is a conscious and artificial imitation of *τριτοπάτωρ*; *trinepos* for **tritonepos* a contrasting formation to *tritavus*. *Τριτογένεια* is then the 'genuine, true-born child (of Zeus).' 7. 'Αργεῖφόντης. Meaning 'Argos-slayer' is the etymologically correct one. *ἀργεῖ-* for *ἀργο-* *metri gratia*; it is formed from stem of τὸ ἸΑργος, homonym to ὁ ἸΑργος. Cf. ἀνδρεῖφόντης for the (in dact. hex.) metrically impossible ἀνδροφόντης. 8. Deiphobos. Inscriptional variations thereof: Δαίφονος, Δηίθυνος(?). 9. Die Kentauren. Κένταυρος (orig. sing.) from κεντεῖν and αὔρα 'water' (probably not identical with αὔρα 'wind'), 'Was-serpeitscher,' applied to the genius of a mountain torrent in winter time; masculine equivalent of nymph's name Πληξάνθη.

(An addendum to this below, pp. 211 f.) 10. Cheiron. Both *Χείρων* and *Χίρων* are genuine old forms; etacism is not concerned. Parallels to such vowel variation. Derivation from *χείρ* defended.

Pp. 62-93. G. Wolterstorff, *Entwicklung von ille zum bestimmten Artikel*. Study of uses of *ille* in Latin which led to its evolution into the Romance article. Gradual loss of original meaning; development of meanings (such as use in substantivizing non-substantives, and use before indeclinable words and expressions used for the nonce as quasi-substantives) which belong to the article in other languages; use in translating the article of other languages, esp. Greek. The paper contains little that is new in principle, but many of its numerous text-quotations are interesting.

Pp. 93-108. W. Kroll, *Syntaktische Nachlese*. 1. Konjunktiv und Futurum. Emphasizes their close similarity of function in many cases, which 'zwar allmählich verdunkelt, aber nie ganz vergessen worden ist.' 2. Satzverschränkung. Departures from 'normal' word order, esp. the insertion of the main (governing) verb in a dependent clause (type *haec res metuo ne fiat*).

Pp. 108-112. P. Kretschmer, *Die Thargelien*. *Θαργήλια* (-λος, -λιος, etc.) appears in Ionic inscriptions as *ταργ-*. This suggests a case of psilosis. The word may then be a crasis of *τὰ ἀργήλια*, *ἀργη-*. *ἀργήλια* to *ἀργματα*, 'Erstlingsspenden' (from *ἀρχω*, with *γ* as in perfect middle, Osthoff Perf. 317; *ἀργήλια* formed by analogy of *γαμήλια* to *γάμος*). The rough breathing in (*τὰ*) **ἀργήλια* would be vulgar Attic, as in *ἱππος*, *ἰχθύς*, *ἀριθμός* etc.

Pp. 112-122. P. Kretschmer, *Der griechische Imperativus Aoristi Activi auf -σον*. Explains the hitherto problematic form as an old neuter gerundive (-σον for -*τιον*: -*τερον*, cf. Skt. *kar-tva-m*); the origin of its use as an imperative is seen in the colloquial *οἶσθ' ὃ δρᾶσον*; of Attic drama, where the construction clearly required is that of a gerundive, 'scisne quid faciendum (sit).' Afterwards it was felt as 'scisne quid fac,' and the *σ* led to popular association with the sigmatic aorist. Hence prohibitions with *μή* do not use this form, since *μή* would be inappropriate to a verbal adjective. Hence also the strong tendency to prefer this form in prayers to the gods; it is an impersonal and indirect injunction, hence more polite than the brusque present, which is a true imperative.

Pp. 122-127. H. Bauer, *Das Geschlecht von finis*. *Finis* as fem. develop in sporadic cases from a misunderstanding of *ea fine, qua fine (fini)*, in which *fine (fini)* was in truth a preposition and the other element a pronominal adverb.

P. 128. P. Kretschmer, Dromedarius. The *e* of the second syllable analogically from *essedarius* or *verēdarius*?

Pp. 129-136. E. Hermann, Zur Aktionsart im negierten Satz bei Homer. Draws close parallel between Greek (esp. Homeric) and Slavonic languages in use of perfective (aorist) and imperfective (imperfect) verb forms, particularly with negatives, with which the imperfective is in the nature of things preferred, but the perfective (aorist) may be found when the action is felt as a unit, in a point of time as it were.

Pp. 136-143. F. Harder, Zu den Misch-Konstruktionen. Expressions which sacrifice strict logic or grammatical rules, thereby gaining in psychological simplicity.

Pp. 143-146. P. Von der Mühl, Στίχος μείουπος (Hesiod, Erga 263). For *ἰθύετε ἄκας* read *ἰθύε* [-τε; sentence haplogy] *θέμοντας*.

Pp. 147-157. P. Kretschmer, Lat. *quirites* und *quiritare*. New evidence for *quirites* = **co-virites*, synonym of *cives*; and for *quiritare* (French *crier* etc.) as denominative verb from it, 'cry *Quirites!*,' 'cry' in general.

Pp. 157-173. P. Kretschmer, Zur italischen Wortgeschichte. 1. Bedeutungslehnwörter im Oskischen. Osc. *egmo* 'res' from **egere* = *egēre*, direct imitation of *χρῆμα* from *χρή*. German *Sache*, originally 'contest, lawsuit,' then 'thing' under the influence of *causa*, 'lawsuit,' and in vulgar and late Latin 'thing' (Fr. *chose*). Other similar cases. 2. Die Bedeutungsentwicklung von Lat. *putare*. Separates *putare* 'cleanse' from *putare* 'cut,' and develops from the latter *putare* 'reckon,' originally 'cut notches in a tally-stick for record,' and so 'count, figure, reckon, think,' etc. 3. Neugriechisch *τσέτουλα* und Lat. *scheda*. *τσέτουλα* 'Holzstab, Kerbholz' from Ital. *cedola* (Fr. *cédule*, Ger. *Zettel*), from *schedula*, from *sc(h)eda*, *sc(h)edium* = *σχίδα*, *σχέδιον*. Lt. *scheda* and descendants must have meant 'Holzstab' as well as, and before, 'Zettel.' 4. Zu den unlogischen Konträrbildungen. *Süßwasser*, developpt as illogical contrasting form to *Salzwasser*, is probably a 'semantic loanword' from Lat. *aqua dulcis* (: *a. salsa*), and this in turn from *γλυκὸ ὕδωρ*.

Pp. 173-193. U. Leo, Ueber Bedeutungsentwicklung einiger Simplicia und Composita im plautinischen Latein. 1. *cludere* und *Composita*. *Claudere* 'close, lock' secondary to *occludere* 'close, lock,' originally 'put the peg or bolt (*clavis*) across (*ob*),' sc. the door, *portam*. 2. *cedere*—*concedere*. The meaning 'yield, give way' developpt first and quite naturally in *concedere*, and past from it to *cedere*. 3. *evenire*, *portendere*, *promittere*. Survivals of etymologically original meanings in

Plautine Latin. 4. *ob* und *sub*. Finds evidence of their original meanings in Plautus. Pott was right in connecting the two etymologically.

Pp. 193-198. J. Brück, Sabinisches *alpus*. *Alpum* 'white' for *album* by popular confusion with *al(i)pem* 'fat' (: Lat. *adipem*).

Pp. 198-9. J. Brück, Lat. *ballaena*. Loanword borrowed early from Greek into Illyrian and thence into Latin.

Pp. 200-209. E. Kieckers, Zum 'pleonastischen' *inquit*. Repetition of *inquit* within or at the end of a direct quotation, which has been introduced by a verb of saying, is not due to any weakening of *inquit*, still less to its reduction to a mere mark of quotation like Sanskrit *iti*. It is a syntactic contamination, due to the frequent interpolation of such a verb in quotations when no verb of saying has preceded. Many examples from Latin and other languages.

Pp. 210-211. E. Kieckers, Zur direkten Rede bei Plautus und Terenz. Additional material to IF. 35. 1 ff. and 36. 1 ff.

Pp. 211-212. P. Kretschmer, Zur Bedeutung von *Κέρταυρος*. Addendum to pp. 50 ff. above.

P. 212. P. Kretschmer, Pontifex. Addendum to Glotta 9. 230 f. Other cases in which officials have come to have duties wholly different from those suggested by their titles (*ταχιστοί*, quaestores, aediles).

Pp. 213-282. Literaturbericht für das Jahr 1916. Greek by Kretschmer; Italic by Hartmann and Kroll.

Pp. 283-292. Indices, by A. Nehring.

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REVUE DE PHILOGIE, vol. XLIII, pts. 3, 4 (1919).

Pp. 241-275. Paul Lejay. La durée et le moment exprimés par le verbe latin. This article is based mainly upon a study of a Paris thesis of 1913, by D. Barbelenet, 'De l'aspect verbal en latin ancien et particulièrement dans Térence.' The chief novelty of it consists in claiming for the Latin verb—or for some Latin verbs—something analogous to the 'aspects' of the Russian verb. That is, as a simple Russian verb, 'imperfective,' may be turned into a 'perfective' by prefixing to it a preposition (which loses its original meaning), so in Latin a compound verb may indicate the beginning, the end, or the result, of the action expressed by the simple verb.

Pp. 275-276. Paul Lejay. La mort de Livius Andronicus. Cicero's 'usque ad adulescentiam meam,' De Sen. 50, is really confirmed by Livy, 31, 12, 8.

P. 276. L. Bayard. Vita Cypriani. In 2, read 'famem sustentandam' and 'praedii pretia'; in 3, 'perfecerunt,' in 9, 'aemulatione bonitatis.'

Pp. 277-282. Bulletin bibliographique.

Revue des revues et publications d'Académies relatives à l'antiquité classique. Fascicules publiés en 1915. Pp. 33-180.

W. P. MUSTARD.

REVIEWS.

Ergebnisse und Aussichten der Homeranalyse von HANS FISCHL.
Wien und Leipzig 1918. Buchdruckerei und Verlagsbuch-
handlung Carl Fromme. 8°, 84 pp.

The book is remarkable for its sensible ideas, clearly conceived and excellently expressed. It begins with a criticism of the search for objective criteria—linguistic, mythologic, historic or archeologic; but the author, concluding from past experiences that the prospect of finding such criteria is pretty slim, soon turns to the *Kompositionskritik*. It is (according to Cauer) the sovereign of this domain—holding however a limited monarchy and needing the support of the objective criteria. To test its value Fischl contrasts the two most recent analyses of the Iliad—those of Bethe (1914) and Wilamowitz (1916). This constitutes (pp. 16-75) the bulk of the book, and is very well done.¹ His conclusion (p. 73) that it is impossible in this way to rise above subjective probability to objective truth seems fully warranted. Only the emphasis is to be put on "in this way," which means the making of the *Kompositionskritik* an absolute monarch. At this point there opens a pitfall into which Unitarians regularly tumble. Fischl avoids it and draws (p. 76) the correct conclusion so neatly that his words deserve to be quoted in full:

"Wir teilen daher auch keineswegs die Ansicht der Unitarier, dass, insolange nicht eine vollkommen befriedigende Theorie über die Entstehung durchgeführt sei, die Interpretation von der absoluten Einheit von Verfasser und Werk ausgehen müsse. Das Versagen der Analyse bedeutet noch lange nicht eine vollständige *restitutio in integrum* für die 'homerische Frage.' Die Lösungen sind zwar missglückt, aber die Probleme dennoch vorhanden. Die zweifellos nachgewiesene Mannigfaltigkeit und das Durcheinander aus verschiedensten Zeiten stammender sprachlicher, stofflicher und kultureller Bestandteile gestattet nicht, an eine völlig freie Schöpfung im Sinne einer modernen Dichtung zu denken. . . ."

Fischl's own position (p. 80) is that the Iliad is the product of a freely creative imagination working largely in dependence on traditional forms, and with a large use of material already cast into shape. The problem is to understand the peculiar attitude of the poet to his material. The hope of a complete analysis is a will-o'-the-wisp, but one that has led scholars along paths on which they have obtained a deep insight into the historical development of the epic material and of the epic language.

The basic difference between Fischl and myself is that I am

¹ The elaborate attempt (pp. 56 ff.) to establish the indivisibility of A is, however, not convincing.

not convinced by his arguments intended to show that our knowledge of the development of the epic language cannot lead to a distinction between older and younger portions of the Iliad. At the most, they show the need of extreme care in the selection and application of such criteria. That is to be gladly conceded, altho the "warnendes Beispiel" (p. 6) is far from terrifying. It is that curious concatenation of blunders around the question of the distribution of the abstract nouns in Homer, of which I have treated in *Class. Phil.* 14 (1919) 328-337 and *Class. Journ.* 15 (1920) 368-369. The gravest blunders are those of Scott and Rothe, who practically reduce the difference between the Iliad and Odyssey to zero. Croiset's statement, taken literally, is open to criticism; but on the main issue, the increase of these words in the Odyssey, he is correct. The increase is no less than 32 per cent. when compared with the whole Iliad, and no less than 42 per cent. when $\Theta\text{IK}\Psi\Omega$ are excluded from the comparison.²

The issue in the 'Homeric Question' it must be remembered, is simply whether it is possible to frame a hypothesis which can do what the Unitarian hypothesis most obviously cannot do—provide a reasonably satisfactory explanation for the existence of the Iliad. The first demand to be made of such a hypothesis is that it shall bring the linguistic peculiarities of the Iliad into line with our knowledge of the historical development of the epic language. The work, chiefly of Bechtel, has already shown in my opinion that this can be done only by assuming that roughly speaking one-fifth of the Iliad is older than the remainder.³ Only at this point can the *Kompositionskritik* intervene. It must determine in the first place the interrelation of the various materials comprised in the older stratum. Here one fact is evident: this stratum can be followed consecutively for long stretches in AAHP but shortly after the beginning of Σ it disappears, in these portions we must recognize fragments of an Iliad. The rest of the stratum probably includes fragments of this and fragments of other poems. To sort these out and to reconstruct the poem or poems involved is the first task of the *Kompositionskritik*. Obviously there can be no hope of a "complete solution," but on the larger issues a high degree of probability may be attained.⁴

²Croiset's statistics agree so closely in detail with the usage of the remaining nineteen books that only *Judaicus Apella* could believe the coincidence accidental.

³The assumption is confirmed by the observation that only "Mycean" armor is found in this fraction of the poem.

⁴Such study may lead to rectifications of the boundaries of the older stratum. Fischl, p. 6, objects to such a procedure, but without sufficient reason. If the hypothesis can be framed to fit the facts of both sorts, so much the better; only, when the two clash, the linguistic criteria as the more objective must be given the right of way.

The remaining four-fifths of the poem is a second field for the *Kompositionskritik*, and fortunately it is one in which the problems lie nearest to the surface. Consequently the analysts here show at least an approximation of views on certain fundamental questions—for instance their general attitude towards ΘΙΚΨ²Ω. At times the agreement goes much further, as might be shown by the treatment of Y 353—X 394 in Robert and in Wilamowitz. Nor does every divergence of the critics bring us to a dead centre—that is a thought of the Unitarians fathered by their wishes. Often it is possible and then a duty to decide between them—even when our decision must be based solely on stylistic impressions and our analysis of the composition. Further progress must depend upon the discovery of archaeologic or linguistic criteria which may limit in this field too the possibilities of the analysis. It would be rash either to predict or to deny that such discoveries will be made—but I may confess that I am personally optimistic.

Still more confidently may progress be looked for from another quarter. Fischl (pp. 76 f.) lays his finger on the fatal flaw in Drerup's work: 'it ends in the belief that E as we have it has not changed a hair's breadth from the form in which it issued from Homer's hand. He might have applied a somewhat similar criticism to Bethe, who in practise handles Wolf's edition as identical with that of Aristarchus, and 'in general' identifies the latter with the Peisistratean *attisches Urexemplar*. The latter is the real object of our study (cf. Bethe, p. 53) and what is needed is a more systematic effort at its restoration. Otherwise we shall be like archaeologists discussing the authorship of a vase before its cleansing. The material has often been discussed,⁶ but the discussion has been piecemeal, has been entangled with hypotheses about the analysis of the poem, and has generally misunderstood the problem and consequently dated the interpolations much too early. A separate approach, made methodically step by step, should prove fruitful; external evidence alone can carry us far,⁷ and can show us how to proceed still farther. We should be able to reach a rather definite agreement about the *attisches Urexemplar*, which will be a new and sounder basis for the discussion of the genesis of the poems.

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⁶ With his criticism, compare my remarks AJP 35 (1914) 129-132, and more generally Prentice's brilliant review AJP 34 (1913) 332 ff.

⁷ Wilamowitz' consideration of it is one of the best features of his book.

⁸ Cf. my articles: The Archetype of Our Iliad and the Papyri AJP 35 (1914) 125-148, The Latest Expansions of the Iliad AJP 37 (1916) 1-30, The Latest Expansions of the Odyssey *ibid.* 452-458.

Accidence of Hebrew Grammar, with Exercises. By HENRY A. COFFEY, S. J., Professor of Hebrew in Woodstock College, Maryland. B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis and London, 1918. vi + 113 pp. \$1.25 net.

In view of the favorable mention which this book received last year at the hands of no less a person than Rev. Samuel B. Mercer, Ph. D., D. D., Professor in the Western Theological Seminary, Chicago, Rector of the Society of Oriental Research, and the author of various books and articles on Oriental subjects, it is necessary to call attention to its true character. In the review referred to, which covers about half a page in the *Journal of the Society of Oriental Research* (Vol. III, No. 1, Mar. 1919, p. 49), the reviewer, before pointing out two mistakes, one omission, one misprint, and making two suggestions for improving the book in minor points, pronounces the following eulogy on the work: "Professor Coffey has compiled a very attractive and most useful little book on Hebrew Grammar, with exercises. The type, both Hebrew and English, is clear and sharp, and the soft white paper is a pleasure to the eye. In his attempt to simplify, and make attractive, the study of Hebrew, the author has rightly omitted all complicated and uncertain matters, and has emphasized the verb, which is the backbone of the language. After every section of grammatical explanation comes an excellently chosen exercise which serves to consolidate and test the student's knowledge step by step. There are very few points to criticize in this excellent little book." It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reviewer is writing his review without reading the book, for even a cursory examination would have made such statements impossible.

The Grammar proper consists of 61 pp., of which about 25 are devoted to paradigms and exercises, leaving about 35 or 36 for grammatical statements or rules, which it is needless to say are very meager and incomplete. The Grammar is followed by 24 pp. of additional paradigms, 5 pp. of selections for reading, 10 pp. of glossaries, 3 pp. of index.

Note the following typical misprints: p. 7, l. 3 of Ex. שְׁרִיּוֹ for שְׁרִיּוֹן; p. 23, l. 5 הַקְטִיל for הַקְטִיל; p. 30, l. 2 of Ex. מִצָּח for מִצָּח; p. 32, l. 4 of Ex. הַנִּסָּה for הַנִּסָּה; p. 44, l. 1 of Ex. שְׁרִיּוֹן for שְׁרִיּוֹן; p. 58, § 85 עָלֶיךָ for עָלֶיךָ; p. 59, l. 1 הַחֲרִיב for הַחֲרִיב; p. 61, l. 6 רְבוּחִים for רְבוּחִים; p. 93, l. 1 הָדָר for הָדָר. Others occur on p. 15, l. 1 of Ex.; p. 29, l. 3; p. 36, l. 2 of Ex. *bis*; p. 37, l. 2 of Ex.; p. 57, ll. 2, 3 of Ex. (5 mistakes); p. 58, § 86 *ter*; p. 61, l. 2; p. 66, last l.; p. 76, l. 9; p. 91, ll. 1, 2

(first selection), ll. 1, 2, 4, 8 (second); p. 92, l. 1; p. 93, ll. 1, 15; p. 94, l. 14; p. 95, ll. 4 *bis*, 6, 7 (last selection); p. 101, No. 63; p. 103, No. 153. Some of these, as for example those on pp. 15, 30, 32, and 58, § 86 may be mistakes and not misprints.

The following are examples of incorrect or inaccurate statement: \aleph (as a vowel letter) = a, e, i, o (p. 2); The sign ֿ is placed under a letter that has no vowel (p. 5); Daghesh lene removes the aspiration from (the) begadkepheth (*ibid.*); If it (a syllable) begins with two consonants, the first has vocal shewa (p. 6); It (the construct infinitive) is so called because it is construed with other parts of speech (p. 11); The term of motion (= place whither) (p. 18); Daghesh forte is usually omitted in ׳ (p. 39); The first radical נ (of verbs נ׳פ) is dropped or assimilated as the case may require except in 2 pl. pf. *kal* (p. 39).

There is much that is comparatively innocuous in the grammatical statements, the paradigms, the selections from the Old Testament, the glossaries, etc., but the exercises put the final seal of condemnation on the book. No Hebraist could write such Hebrew, many of the sentences being like those found in the uncorrected exercises of beginners. Here אל 'to,' which never occurs in the Bible, is used thruout for אל־ (cf. above); the sign of the accusative is in most cases similarly אֵל instead of the more common אֶל . The article is frequently omitted where it should stand, e. g., p. 19, $\text{אֵת ראש פִּלְשֶׁתִּי}$ (for הַפִּלְשֶׁתִּי) 'the head of the Philistine (*acc.*)'; *ibid.*, אֵל מִדְבָּר (for הַמִּדְבָּר) 'to the desert'; *ibid.*, אֵל בָּאֵשׁ (for בָּאֵשׁ) 'was consumed by fire.' This omission is especially frequent after the accusative sign אֵת . On the other hand אֵת is frequently omitted before the article. So it would seem almost as if the author considered the two interchangeable. He uses the imperfect several times in a past sense as the equivalent of the perfect or imperfect with *waw* conversive, e. g., p. 30, $\text{וַהֲטַבַּע הָאֶבֶן וַהֲאֶבֶן הִטְבַּע}$ 'and the stone sank' (cf. p. 37, l. 1 of Ex.; p. 38, l. 3 of Ex.). He sometimes uses the wrong form of common verbs, e. g., פָּהַר for מָהַר 'hasten,' p. 32, l. 4 of Ex. (cf. צִוָּה for צִוָּה 'order' p. 42, last l.). Sometimes an unusual word which occurs in the Old Testament a few times with a certain meaning in a certain connection, is used freely in that meaning in any connection. For example, סִנִּי (only סִנִּי occurs in O. T.) which with a single exception

occurs always with *בִּיד* 'to deliver into the hand of,' is used four times in various forms on p. 18 apparently in the sense of 'deliver over' (?) to judge from such sentences in the accompanying English exercise as "David delivered over a man of battle" (cf. also the meaning "deliver" given for the Piel of *סגר* in the vocabulary, p. 103). Moreover the Qal *סגר* which means 'to close' and not to 'deliver into the hand of,' is used in this latter sense on p. 26, viz., *לֹא יִסְגֵּר בִּיד*. Similarly *נִסָּה* which regularly means 'to try, prove,' and rarely if ever 'to try, attempt,' is used in this latter sense on p. 44, viz., *נִסָּה לָרֶדֶח* 'try to go down,' and the meaning "try, attempt" is given as the only rendering in the glossary, p. 103.

The peculiar quality of some of the exercises can best be appreciated from the following complete sentences with their conjectural meaning added in parentheses, e. g., *נָתַן שָׂאוֹל אֶת קִיבֵּעַ* (p. 19) (Saul put the helmet on the boy's head); *נִבְחָרָה לְדָוִד אֶבֶן מִן הַנָּחַל לְקִלְעַ אֲשֶׁר לוֹ בַּצָּאן* (p. 32) (a stone was chosen by David from the brook for the sling which he had with the flock); *לֹא נָתַן לֶאֱכֹל* (p. 36) (don't give anything to eat); *קָלַע הַנַּעַר אֶת אֶבֶן יָדוֹ אֶת־הַפִּלִּשְׁתִּי אֶל מִצְחָה* (p. 40) (the boy threw the stone and smote the Philistine in the forehead); *נִסָּה לָרֶדֶח וְהוֹצֵא* (p. 44) (try to go down and bring us out of this place).

The above statement of deficiencies and errors is by no means complete, but it is sufficient to show that the book is worse than useless. It is true that some of the forms, some of the rules, and some of the examples given are not incorrect, but that such a work, bristling as it does with misprints, mistakes, and misstatements, should ever form the basis for a real knowledge of the Hebrew of the Bible, is unthinkable.

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Dramatic Compositions Copyrighted in the United States, 1870 to 1916. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918. 2 vols. 4to. Pp. v, 1662; 1663-3547, in double and triple columns.

While the chief purpose of this publication may well be considered to be one of administrative efficiency, yet there are many aspects of this huge compilation which may prove to be of interest to the scholarly world as well. By way of orientation it may be stated that there are notable collections of dramas in many of the world's greatest and most famous libraries, among which the following may be mentioned:

a. 80,000 dramas in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal at Paris. "La plus belle collection du monde." E. Morel, *Bibliothèques*, Paris, 1909. Vol. 1, p. 60.

b. 70,000 dramas in the Palli collection of the Biblioteca Nazionale at Naples. Karl J. Trübner, *Minerva*, passim.

c. 50,000 dramas in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. E. Morel, *Bibliothèques*, Paris, 1908. Vol. 2, p. 143.

Thus it will be seen at a glance that the 60,000 dramas and drama titles included in the catalogue just published by the Library of Congress in themselves form a collection worthy to take rank with other notable collections known to the scholarly world.

An important provision of the Copyright Law for many years was that dramas might be deposited in typewritten form, and as a result thousands of such dramas in duplicate are still preserved in the Library of Congress with which the public is unacquainted. Scholars interested in original research in this field would do well to bear this point in mind.

In regard to the languages represented the following general statements may be made. The vast bulk of the catalogue is made up necessarily of English dramas which have appeared either in America or in England. Among the foreign languages Spanish stands out preëminent owing to the very large number of dramatic compositions published in Spain that have been sent in for registration in recent years. Many other languages of Western Europe are also represented; and in this connection attention should also be called to the fact that the enormous emigration of recent years has resulted in the publication in America of a certain number of dramas in a variety of foreign languages. Then, too, translations and adaptations in English of foreign dramas are extremely numerous, and these are all still foreign in spirit to a greater or less extent. The dramas of a famous author are apt to be found represented in many and varied forms. Dialect plays are likewise quite a noticeable feature of the catalogue.

In conclusion it may be well to add a few general statements concerning the various copyright laws as they have affected the registration of dramas from time to time. In the Colonial period there were separate copyright provisions for each colony, but the use made of these laws was very limited in extent. After the formation of the United States of America a uniform copyright law was enacted for the whole country, which was divided for administrative purposes into various districts administered in the matter of copyright by the respective district courts. Many of these latter copyright records are still preserved in the Copyright Office at the present time, so that it is possible in numerous instances to obtain such information concerning them as may be desired by the public. In later years the law provided for the annual deposit of the copyright records and copies in the Department of State, and later still in the Patent Office in Washington, whence by an act of Congress approved July 8, 1870, they were transferred to the Library of Congress. Broadly speaking it is, therefore, possible to determine the copyright status for any drama registered for protection in the United States since the Revolutionary War.

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Fasti Triumphales Populi Romani, by ETTORE PAIS, in two parts, 546 pp., 21 plates and several illustrations. Published in Rome, 1920, by A. Nardecchia, Via dell'Università 11. Price 100 lire.

This publication of the *Fasti* is by no means a reproduction of the German and Austrian volumes on the subject, but offers the student much that is new and valuable. Instead of the faulty drawings or inadequate reproductions of casts, Professor PAIS presents excellent photographs of the entire series of blocks, and has been able to establish with much accuracy a set of formulae for determining the number of missing lines.

The comprehensive character of the present volume can be seen by a glance at the Table of Contents. In the first part is an historical introduction of 118 pages, followed by a transcription of the text and 300 pages of comment. The second part contains a series of chapters on various problems suggested by the *Fasti*, such as that of the filling in of the lacunae. More careful measurements than those hitherto made have led to the correction of several errors in the *Corpus*.

Other chapters in the second part deal with such questions as Triumphs, booty and military gifts (App. VII); Roman triumphs and river and maritime divinities (App. VIII); Con-

cerning the temple of Felicitas (App. IX); Triumphal Arches (App. X); List of temples erected during the Republic (App. XI).

The volume is beautifully printed with clear type and on excellent paper. To have produced such a work in spite of the many uncertainties due to the war may almost be said to add another triumph to the long list given by Professor PAIS.

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Orazio lirico: Studi di GIORGIO PASQUALI. Firenze: Felice Le Monnier, 1920. viii + 792 pp. 25 lire.

This ample volume is written in Italian, but it is thoroughly German in its horizon, method, and tone. It is divided into four chapters: (1) Horace and Alcaeus; (2) Horace and Hellenistic poetry; (3) The Roman elements of the Odes; (4) Poems of Horace's youth and of his maturer years. The first chapter shows how Horace, so far from being a slavish imitator of Alcaeus, often adopts a mere text or motto from the Greek poet, and develops it in a quite independent fashion. The second chapter is concerned largely with 'source-inquiry.' It contains a vast amount of speculation as to Horace's models in particular odes, often, of necessity, inconclusive. It is 500 pages long—"libro eccessivo, ma dotto e non inutile," as Professor PASQUALI says of a somewhat similar study, p. 177. On p. 127, Martial's 'motto,' *hominem pagina nostra sapit*, is misquoted. On p. 578, the Song of Silenus is referred to the Tenth Eclogue, instead of the Sixth.

W. P. MUSTARD.

Lucrèce, De la Nature. Texte établi et traduit par ALFRED ERNOUT. Paris: Société d'édition "*Les Belles Lettres*," 1920. 2 vols. xxvii + 580 pp. 20 frs.

This is one of the early numbers of an important new series of classical texts, "Collection des Universités de France." The Latin text is well edited, and the translation ("en regard") is uniformly good. The editor is duly conservative; he allows all possible weight to the two important Leyden MSS, and he is not given to unnecessary transposition of lines. In one or two passages he has introduced conjectures of his own: 3, 84, 'suasu,' for 'suadet'; 5, 836, 'quod quiti ut nequeat,' for 'quod potuit nequeat.' At 6, 461, it is hardly necessary to admit Bentley's 'furvae' for 'fulvae.' The most novel rendering of any passage seems to be, 'laissée vierge criminellement,' for 'casta inceste,'

1, 98. The *format* is attractive, and the type and paper are good. There are too many misprints: 2, 388, 'trasnit,' for 'transit'; 4, 413, 'auriae,' for 'uariae'; 5, 675, 'nimbres,' for 'imbres'; 6, 40, 'tea' for 'tela'; 6, 961, 'eadem,' for 'eodem.' 'Tanto,' 5, 140, and 'propterea,' 6, 462, have each lost a letter; and the words 'genus humanum' are confused, 2, 975. At 3, 857, the word 'sunt' is omitted, and at 5, 198, the word 'nobis' has been transferred to the following line.

W. P. MUSTARD.

Lovers of the classics everywhere will welcome the news of the successful inauguration of a project that will place within easy reach the fruits of French scholarship. During the war there was formed at Paris, under the presidency of M. MAURICE CROISSET, with headquarters at 157 Boulevard Saint-Germain, an organization of the leading classicists of France. This organization, named the *Association Guillaume Budé*, has for its object the maintenance and the diffusion of classical culture. In pursuance of this object it has projected several series of works in the field of classical antiquity, and has engaged the *Société "Les Belles-Lettres"* to publish these works as rapidly as they may be produced. The first series is the *Collection des Universités de France*, which will comprise the texts and the translations in French of the most important works (about 300) of the Greek and the Roman authors. The texts and the translations will be published both separately and conjointly—in the latter case facing each other on opposite pages. Eight numbers of this series have thus far appeared: Vol. I of Plato's Works, by MAURICE CROISSET, and Vol. II, by ALFRED CROISSET; Theophrastus' Characters, by M. NAVARRE; Vol. I of Aeschylus, by PAUL MAZON; Lucretius, by ALFRED ERNOUT (reviewed above); Persius, by M. CARTAULT; and Vol. I of Cicero's Works, by M. DE LA VILLE DE MIRMONT. Of a second series, entitled *Collection d'Etudes Anciennes*, two numbers have appeared; namely, *Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne*, by PIERRE DE LABRIOLLE; and *Règles pour éditions critiques*, by LOUIS HAVET. American scholars may aid and encourage their French confrères in the promotion of this important enterprise by joining the *Association Guillaume Budé* as annual members, or as founders, or as benefactors. Annual members pay 10 francs per annum; founders make a single payment of at least 200 francs; and benefactors, a single payment of at least 500 francs. It may be observed that membership in the Association does not entail the practice of a great amount of altruism, for members receive the equivalent of their fees in publications of the Association, and they are entitled to a discount of 25% on all books published under the auspices of the Association.

C. W. E. MILLER.

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